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This dissertation comprises of three essays on mutual funds. In the first essay,
I test whether fund investors rationally incorporate portfolio manager ownership
disclosure in their portfolio allocation decisions. Using a natural experiment, reg-
ulations that mandate portfolio manager ownership disclosure, I find that investor
flows respond to higher percentage ownership. The relationship between investor
flows and percentage ownership is persistent well after the regulatory change in 2005,
suggesting that the investor responses are permanent rather than transient and are
robust to several controls as well as unobserved heterogeneity reflected in fund fam-
ily and manager fixed-effects. The investor responses to ownership are rational, as
investors investing in higher percentage ownership funds are rewarded back in terms
of higher risk-adjusted performance. Finally, I shed light on the channels through
which higher ownership translates into better investor rewards. I show that agency
alleviation is one of the channels through which ownership translates into better in-
vestor rewards. These findings are consistent with a “rational investor” viewpoint in
which, at least, some investors incorporate managerial ownership in their portfolio
allocation decisions.
In the second essay, I analyze the “herding” (trading together) behavior of
managers, conditional on their ownership stakes in the funds they manage. I find
that the funds with low and high managerial ownership have economically distinct
patterns in their herding behavior. Each herd has its own distinct trading style and
different qualitative and quantitative effect on stock prices. Low ownership funds
herd more and engage in positive-feedback trading that is followed by stock price
reversals. High ownership fund herding is followed by more stable price adjustments.
Low ownership herding effects appear to dominate in the full sample where herding
causes price reversal. These findings suggest that there is heterogeneity in the
herding behavior of mutual funds, which appears to be related with ownership. It
is costly for the high ownership managers to ignore their substantive information
due to reputational concerns, or to engage in uninformed trading, and thus herding
by such managers results in more informative prices. On the other hand, lower
ownership fund herding appears to be driven by agency that generates temporary
price movements that are reversed.
In the third essay, I and my co-authors, Gerard Hoberg and N. R. Prab-
hala, propose new techniques for identifying benchmark peers for mutual funds. We
identify the location of funds in the space of stock style characteristics. All funds
within a pre-specified normed distance are a fund’s peers. Our benchmark peers
are customized to each fund, intransitive, and employ techniques that are readily
scalable across dimensions and loss functions. We show that peers derived in this
fashion are significantly different cross-sectionally from conventional peers and ex-
hibit considerable dynamic churn. The customized peers we construct outperform
traditional peers in out of sample prediction tests, have lower tracking error, and
our peer-excess alphas predict the future Characteristic-Selectivity and Carhart al-
phas of funds. We find that measures of competition derived from our peers predict
performance persistency of funds for up to four quarters.
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Chapter 1: Are Fund Investors Rational? Evidence from Port-
folio Manager Ownership, Fund Flows, and Per-
formance
1.1 Introduction
Following the late trading and market timing scandals, to increase transparency,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated mutual funds to disclose
dollar ownership levels of portfolio managers in the funds they oversee. This disclo-
sure is required of all funds filing their disclosures after February 2005. According to
the SEC, managerial ownership is a direct indication of incentive alignment between
a manager and fund investors.1 Not just the SEC, industry participants too have
long been concerned about ownership of fund managers. In his testimony before
the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, Managing Director of the fund rating agency,
Morningstar Inc., stated:
“.....Every week, we speak with mutual fund portfolio managers who
tell us that before they buy stock in a company, they look to see how
management is compensated. They want managers who eat their own
cooking and whose interests are aligned with theirs.......Why, then, are
fund shareholders not given the same insights into their investments?”2
1See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 Code of Federal Regulation Parts 239,
249, 270 and 274, File No. S7-12-04, Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered
Management Investment Companies.
2The full testimony can be found at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Home. Review of current in-
1
Managerial ownership is disclosed in the Statement of Additional Information (SAI).
Specifically, funds are required to disclose the dollar ownership in ranges of $0, $1-
$10,000, $10,001-$50,000, $50,001-$100,000, $100,001-$500,000, $500,001-$1,000,000
and greater than $1,000,000. I create a new dataset on portfolio manager ownership
of diversified, open-ended, actively managed U.S. equity funds covering the period
from 2006 to 2009 using multiple sources. Using this dataset, I analyze whether
investors value managerial ownership disclosure in directing their investments, and
whether their response to ownership is rational. The basic idea is very simple. If
investors react positively to managerial ownership, and if ownership also predicts
superior risk-adjusted performance, then investors acted rationally. If this is the
case, I then try to understand the channel through higher ownership translates into
better fund performance.
There are two important reasons for studying investor behavior towards own-
ership disclosure. First, many studies in the past examined the rationality of fund
investors in various contexts. But the evidence on investor rationality is mixed. For
instance, Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004) analyze the investor behavior in S&P
500 index funds. They show that although difference in future returns of S&P 500
index funds are predictable, yet a large amount of new cash flow goes to the poorest
performing funds. The authors suggest that the relationship between cash flows and
performance is weaker than would be expected by a rational investor view point.
Another kind of investor irrationality is related with performance persistency and
flow-performance relationship. According to Carhart (1997), after accounting for
momentum, there is no significant evidence for performance persistency except for
the worst performing funds, yet investors reward past winners with more flows and
do not punish past losers (Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Another example is related
with the “smart money” effect. According to the smart money effect, investors
vestigations and regulatory actions regarding the mutual fund industry: understanding the fund
industry from the investor’s perspective (February 25th, 2004).
2
have fund selection ability and money flows to the funds that will outperform in
the future. Gruber (1996) first analyzed this effect and found supportive evidence.
He concludes that investors in actively managed funds may have been more rational
that previously assumed. Zheng (1999), Wermers (2004), Keswani and Stolin (2008)
also find evidence to support the smart money hypothesis. But the “smart money”
view is challenged by “dumb money” view by Frazzini and Lamont (2008). They
find that the smart money effect is confined to the short horizons of one quarter and
that by reallocating flows across different funds, retail investors reduce their wealth
in the long run.3 Thus, there appears to be no consensus on investor behavior.
Second, the question of whether investors rationally respond to managerial
ownership disclosure is also important from the regulator’s perspective. The call
for more information disclosure is based on the premise that the new information
will help investors (principal) in monitoring their portfolio managers (agents). The
idea is that investors, armed with the new information, will direct their investments
towards their preferred portfolio managers. This disciplining mechanism will in-
duce managers to avoid taking actions that can harm investors’ interests. Such
actions can include risk-shifting associated with style changes, or convexity in flow-
performance relationship (Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996a), Chevalier and Ellison
(1999a)), forgoing profitable investments and going-with-the-herd (Scharfstein and
Stein (1990)), engaging in uninformed trading when no profitable trades are identi-
fied (Dow and Gorton (1997)), window dressing etc. Note that there are, at least,
two types of costs associated with more disclosures as well. Fund companies have
to dedicate more staff and resources towards preparing such disclosures. The in-
creased costs will indirectly be borne by investors in the form of expenses, and thus
lowering their return. Also, there are social costs associated with more disclosures.
3Other studies on investor behavior include Ippolito (1992), Barber and Odean (2001),
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005), Del Guercio and Tkac (2008),
and Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011).
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The regulatory authorities too have to dedicate resources and staff to discuss, de-
bate with the interested parties that will be affected by the proposed disclosures.
Unless a reasonable mass of investors value the previously undisclosed information,
so that the benefits outweighs the costs, investor might be worse-off, if they do not
value the new disclosures. Thus, whether investors rationally incorporate owner-
ship disclosure in their portfolio allocations is an issue of interest for the regulatory
authorities as well.4 Note that for investors, it does not matter what the actual
reason is for managers to have investment in their funds (I discuss this issue later
in Section 1.2.3). Investors can interpret higher ownership as a desirable incentive
alignment attribute of a fund.
I start with a natural experiment, regulations that mandate managerial own-
ership disclosure in 2005, to test investor responses to ownership disclosure. I find
that investors respond to higher percentage ownership but not to higher dollar but
low percentage stakes in larger funds, suggesting that investors possibly judge the
latter type of stakes to create insufficient incentives. The investor response is eco-
nomically significant. Using a cross-sectional regression of first-difference in average
monthly flows between 2006 and 2004 on lagged managerial ownership and controls
for fund, fund family and manager characteristics, I find that a 1% increase in per-
centage ownership is associated with 1.038% increase in first-difference in average
monthly flows. I also measure difference in average monthly flows between 2007
and 2004 because some investors might learn about ownership disclosure with a lag.
I now find that a 1% increase in percentage ownership is associated with 1.412%
increase in first-difference in average monthly flows, or a one standard deviation in-
crease in percentage ownership is associated with 0.105 standard deviation increase
in difference in average monthly flows.
4For a more detailed and an excellent discussion, see Tkac (2004).
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Thus, investors reallocated their investments taking into account the new dis-
closures on managerial ownership. The sharp investor reaction to percentage own-
ership, but not to dollar ownership is a little surprising. It suggests that (at least
some) investors believe that a higher dollar ownership in the funds does not al-
ways translate into higher managerial incentives. From the investors’ perspective,
managers of larger funds should have larger stakes to create sufficient incentives.
This is possibly based on the premise that managers of larger funds earn more and
thus should have greater investment. I further examine investor reaction during
the post-regulatory change period from 2007 to 2010 using a panel regression of
fund flows on lagged percentage ownership and several controls as well as unob-
served heterogeneity reflected in fund family fixed-effects. I continue to find robust
flow-ownership relationship. To control for unobserved heterogeneities across fund
managers, such as latent managerial skill, risk-preferences, etc., I consider a sub-
sample of single manager funds in which some managers have more ownership in
some funds than others and use manager fixed-effects. I find that the coefficients on
percentage ownership and past return are statistically and economically significant.
A one standard deviation increase in percentage ownership is associated with 0.339
standard deviation increase in subsequent average monthly flows, while a one stan-
dard deviation increase in past return is associated with 0.247 standard deviation
increase in subsequent average monthly flows. Thus, both managerial ownership
and past performance influence investor behavior during the post-regulatory change
period.
In summary, persistency in flow-ownership relationship well after the regula-
tory change suggests that the investor responses are permanent rather than tran-
sient. This is also an important finding for the mutual fund industry in general, and
fund management companies and managers in particular. Because management
companies maximize profits by assets under management, they have an implicit
5
incentive in voluntarily making ownership information available to investors. This
can decrease search costs for investors who prefer managers who “eat their own
cooking”.5
Given that investors react positively to ownership, and if ownership also pre-
dicts fund performance, then investors’ reaction to ownership can be termed as
rational. I find that there is an increasing relationship between ownership and
subsequent performance. A 1% increase in ownership is associated with 2.66% im-
provement in subsequent annual 4-factor adjusted performance after several controls
as well as family fixed-effects. I also control for the time-invariant unobserved man-
ager characteristics that could be correlated with managerial ownership through a
sub-sample of single manager funds in which some managers have more ownership in
some funds than others and use manager fixed-effects. I now find that a 1% increase
in ownership is associated with 5.36% increase in subsequent 4-factor adjusted an-
nual return, or a one standard deviation increase in ownership is associated with
0.177 standard deviation increase in subsequent 4-factor adjusted monthly perfor-
mance. Interestingly, the coefficient on average past return is always negative and
statistically significant in all regressions. In the same single manager regression as
above, a one standard deviation increase in past year average monthly return is
associated with 1.425 standard deviation decrease in future 4-factor monthly per-
formance. There is also some weak evidence of concavity in ownership-performance
relationship, suggesting managerial entrenchment at relatively higher values of per-
centage ownership. These are typically very small but high dollar ownership funds,
and consist of just one-tenth of the sample. Overall, the ownership-performance
relationship is increasing for the vast majority and more representative sample of
the fund industry, and robust to unobserved heterogeneity reflected in family and
5Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) find that, in the case of S&P 500 index funds, which are charac-




The above findings show that investors react rationally to ownership disclosure
but the same cannot be said about investor response to past performance. This is
consistent with the findings of Carhart (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998). Further,
it suggests that the investor community is heterogenous. There are possibly naive
investors who just irrationally chase past performance, but at the same time there
are sophisticated investors who incorporate predictors of fund performance, such as
managerial ownership, in their portfolio allocation decisions. These findings are also
consistent with Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011). They find that behaviorally biased
investors are more likely to chase fund performance, while sophisticated investors
experience relatively good fund performance.
Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) also find positive ownership-performance
relation. But this study is different in several ways. Apart from examining investor
flows using a natural experiment, and flows during the post-regulatory change pe-
riod, and also examining agency alleviation through decreased risk-taking, I add
to their main finding of positive ownership-performance relationship in three ways.
First, I use a relatively bigger sample of four years. Second, I also control for the
unobserved cross-family heterogeneities that can influence managerial ownership6
via family fixed-effects. Third, I check for non-linearities in ownership-performance
relationship.
6For instance, in its disclosure, American Century mentions the following:
AMERICAN CENTURY HAS ADOPTED A POLICY THAT, WITH LIMITED
EXCEPTIONS, REQUIRES ITS PORTFOLIO MANAGERS TO MAINTAIN IN-
VESTMENTS IN THE POLICY PORTFOLIOS THEY OVERSEE. HOWEVER,
BECAUSE THIS PORTFOLIO MANAGER SERVES ON A TEAM THAT OVER-
SEES A NUMBER OF FUNDS IN THE SAME BROAD INVESTMENT STRAT-
EGY, THE PORTFOLIO MANAGER IS NOT REQUIRED TO INVEST IN EACH
SUCH FUND.
The complete disclosure can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100334/000010033406000048/pea118-2006.htm.
Also see, “Which Fund Families Top the Manager Ownership Charts?” at
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=251746
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If ownership is influenced by the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities
across families (such as, the firm culture or policies) and managers (such as, the
risk-preferences), then incentive alignment is the channel through which ownership
translates into better performance. But if managers invest because they have supe-
rior information about the expected performance of their portfolio, then information
is the channel through which ownership translates into better performance. It is dif-
ficult to differentiate between the incentive and information channels. However, in a
sub-sample of hand-collected ownership data, I find that the dollar ownership levels
of managers do not vary significantly across years. It casts a little doubt over the
information channel, but it cannot be rejected, because if managers already have
high investment beyond $1 million, then increase in ownership will not be reflected
in the data. Thus, my limited and cautious conclusion is that to the extent that
managerial ownership is driven by time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities, “own-
ership matters” for fund performance. My findings are more in line with some of
the past studies in the corporate finance area which find that managerial ownership
matters for firm value (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes
(1990), McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2008)).
While it is hard to pin down the information channel, it is possible to verify if
ownership aligns managers’ incentives with that of fund investors. Once a manager
has ownership in the fund, for whatever reason, it imposes costs on the manager
for her agency influenced actions. One particular kind of agency is associated with
the increased risk-taking in the later half of a year. Since the compensation of
the manager depends on the assets under management, the manager takes decisions
which increase inflows to the fund, even though this may not deliver an optimal risk-
adjusted performance to the investors. Thus, due to the “compensation incentives”
of the manager, a fund lagging behind its peers tries to catch up by “gambling” in
the later half of the year (Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996a) and Chevalier and
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Ellison (1997) and thus engages in excessive risk-taking. I examine whether higher
ownership modulates the tendency to take excessive risk-taking in the later half
of the year. I find that ownership indeed moderates the risk-taking behavior of
managers. However, the effect is symmetric for both losers and winners. That is,
there is no interaction between ownership and mid-year performance. There is also
some evidence of convexity in risk-taking with respect to ownership, for very high
ownership stakes. These are typically very small funds with high dollar ownership
stakes.
My findings make several contributions to the literature. First, my primary
contribution is to use a new economic metric, managerial ownership, to test investor
rationality. I show that there exist, at least, some investors who rationally incor-
porate managerial ownership in their portfolio allocation decisions, but the same
cannot be said about their responses to the past performance. This suggests that
the investor community is heterogenous in the sense that there are there sophisti-
cated investors who pay attention to ownership incentives. At the same time, there
are naive trend chasers. These results relate to the findings in Gruber (1996), Zheng
(1999), Wermers (2004), Keswani and Stolin (2008), Frazzini and Lamont (2008),
Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011), and also provide an input to the regulators that
some investors value previously undisclosed information about portfolio managers.
Second, I add to the debate in corporate finance literature on the relationship
between ownership and performance. On the one hand, studies such as Demsetz
and Kenneth (1985), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Claudio and Martin (1997),
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), among
others, suggest that ownership has little effect, perhaps because it is optimally set
based on each firm’s own circumstances. On the other hand, the evidence in Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991), McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2008) suggests that ownership alters the
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value of a firm. I add to this literature by providing evidence from the mutual
fund industry. I find some support in favor of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988),
McConnell and Servaes (1990), and McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2008). A more
definite conclusion can only be reached once the drivers of managerial ownership are
clearly identified. The increasing ownership-performance finding is also consistent
with Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007), Evans (2008), and Cremers, Driessen,
Maenhout, and Weinbaum (2009). Third, I find that ownership is a significant
driver of risk-taking. I show that ownership moderates excessive risk-taking that
managers undertake (Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996a), Chevalier and Ellison
(1997), Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) etc.) in the second half of the year to
improve year end performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data
and portfolio manager ownership in detail. Section 1.3 presents main results, and
also discusses the seemingly puzzling co-existence of funds with varying ownership
levels in the market. Section 1.4 concludes the paper.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Sample Selection
I obtain data on diversified open-ended actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds
from CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database. CRSP funds are matched
with the Thomson funds by MFLINKS dataset. My sample selection procedure is
similar to Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008). I first select funds whose Lipper
Classification code is one of the following: LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MCCE, MCGE,
MCVE, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE, EIEI, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE. If a fund’s Lipper
Classification code is missing, then it is selected if its Strategic Insights Objective
Code (SI code) is one of the following: AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, SCG. If
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the fund’s SI code is missing, then it is selected if its Wiesenberger code is one
of the following: G, G-I, AGG, GCI, GRI, GRO, LTG, MCG, SCG. If the fund’s
Wiesenberger code is missing, then it is selected if its policy code is CS. If the fund’s
policy code is missing, then it is selected if it has an average of at least 80% but not
greater than 105% of its amount invested in common stocks over its lifetime. From
the above selected funds, I exclude all funds whose CRSP policy code is one of the
following: C & I, Bal, Bonds, Pfd, B & P, GS, MM, TFM, or if Thomson Reuters
investment code is one of the following: 1,5,6,7,8. I also exclude index funds which
are identified by words such as index in their names. Finally, to focus on equity
mutual funds for the sample duration, I require that fund should have at least 50%
of its amount invested in common stocks at the end of the calendar year. Note that
this is different requirement than the earlier requirement of an average of at least
80% investment in common stocks over its lifetime. But I do not exclude funds with
missing values of percentage investment in common equity, because many times such
funds are valid equity funds with missing values.
I also exclude all funds that can’t be linked by MFLINKS dataset. I further
require that the total net assets of a fund should be at least $5 million at the start of
a calendar quarter. I then categorize funds into five investment objective categories
- Aggressive Growth, Growth, Growth and Income, Equity Income, and Capital
Gains7.
Portfolio manager ownership data is obtained from Morningstar and the SAI
disclosure filed by funds with the SEC. The SAIs are obtained from the SEC
7The fund objective categorization is done on the basis of a fund’s Lipper Objective Code
(Lipper Code), Strategic Insights Objective Code (SI code), Thomson Investment Objective Code
(IOC) and Wiesenberger Objective Code (Wiesenberger code). I follow the following rule in in-
vestment objective categorization of a fund. If SI code is AG or IOC is 2, then objective is set
to “Aggressive Growth”. Otherwise if Lipper Code is GI or SI code is GRI or Wiesenberger code
is GCI or IOC is 4 then objective is set to “Growth & Income”. Otherwise if Lipper Code is G
or SI code is GRO or SI code is SCG or Wiesenberger code is G or Wiesenberger code is SCG
or IOC is 3 then objective is set to “Growth”. Otherwise if Lipper Code is EI or SI code is ING
then objective is set to “Equity Income”. Otherwise if Lipper Code is CA or Wiesenberger code
is MCG then objective is set to “Capital Gains”.
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Edgar. The CRSP-Thomson matched dataset is then combined with the Morn-
ingstar dataset. Thus, I create a dataset having information on fund returns, various
fund, fund family and manager characteristics, such as expense ratio, turnover ratio,
fund age, family size, manager tenure, and managerial ownership. The ownership
data used in this study covers the period from 2006 to 2009.
1.2.2 Recorded Ownership Over Time
The data on portfolio managerial ownership was obtained from Morningstar in Jan-
uary 2009. Since ownership data is declared annually and most funds file this infor-
mation in the later half of a year, the ownership data obtained corresponds to the
year 2008. Unfortunately, Morningstar does not achieve historical data on owner-
ship. This creates a big data challenge because the ownership disclosure is not made
in any standard format in the SEC filings, and thus can’t be extracted through a
script.
To overcome the data challenge, I use Morningstar data for 2008, hand-
collected data and ownership estimates to build a dataset consisting of managerial
ownership from 2006 to 2009. I hand-collect ownership data for a sample of funds
for 2006, 2007, and 2009 and compare it with the ownership of the same manager for
2008. In unreported results, I confirm that the sample selected from 2008 is unbiased
as far as the ownership is concerned. I compare difference-in-mean in percentage
ownership of selected sample and the remaining sample from 2008 and found it not
to be statistically significant even at 10% level. In the hand-collected sample, there
are 449 unique managers of 166 funds, who managed the same fund in both 2007
and 2008 (see Table 1.1). I find no change in managerial ownership for 92% of the
managers. 97% of the managers show no change in ownership level or change of just
one level in ownership. Thus, there is strong consistency in managerial ownership
across consecutive 2007 and 2008.
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When I compare ownership of same managers for 2006 and 2008, I find no
change, or change of just one level in dollar ownership for 88.4% of the managers,
which is still almost 9/10th of the hand-collected sample. For 2008 and 2009, the
corresponding percentage is 90.2%. So, even across 2006/2008, and 2008/2009, I find
strong consistency in managerial ownership. This finding is also consistent with the
slow changes in top executive ownership of corporations over the years as reported by
Zhou (2001). Thus, for 2006, 2007, and 2009, where the same manager manages the
fund in 2008 as well, I estimate ownership from 2008. Sometimes the ownership data
is not available, just because of the timing of disclosure. For instance, if a manager
left the fund on July 31, 2007 and the fund filed its disclosure on October 31, 2007,
then the ownership data for that particular manager is not available for 2007. In
such cases, where possible, I bring forward their ownership from the previous year.
This is reasonable given that ownership doesn’t change much across years. Thus, I
am able to build a dataset consisting of managerial ownership from 2006 to 2009.
1.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
My final sample consists of 1463 distinct funds and 4673 fund-years. The total dollar
managerial ownership is calculated using mid-points of the reported ranges, except
for the last range, greater than $1 million, where I take $1 million as ownership,
and then summing ownership of all managers in case of multi-manager funds. I
follow Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) and measure ownership as percentage
of shares outstanding. Also, to have a precise measure of managerial ownership, I
first calculate quarterly managerial ownership and then take average over the four
quarters to arrive at yearly ownership. The reason is that in some funds there might
be managerial turnover in the middle of the year, and when that fund discloses
ownership in the last quarter, one may not have a precise measure of ownership for
that fund during the first quarter. It is thus important to know which managers
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oversee the fund during any particular quarter. There are 44,010 fund-quarter-
managers in the sample, out of which I am able to obtain ownership data on 41,203
fund-quarter-managers, which is almost 94%. Thus, for the sample considered, I
have comprehensive data on managerial ownership.
Table 1.2 shows descriptive statistics on ownership. Panel A shows that, on
an average, around 27% of the funds have zero ownership. Khorana, Servaes, and
Wedge (2007) report a figure of 57%, but they include bond funds as well. They also
find that ownership is higher in equity funds than in bond funds Thus, ownership
numbers seem consistent with that of Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007). The
mean and median ownership in my sample is around $500,000 and $250,000, respec-
tively, which translates into roughly 0.420% and 0.030% of total net assets, after
taking average over the four years. Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007)’s sample
has 606 fund-years for domestic equity funds (their total sample consists of 1406
fund-years including bond, international, sector and balanced funds) and report a
mean of $226,000 which is half of what I find. This could be because of the differ-
ences in the sample. Given consistency in individual managerial ownership across
years, I find almost no variation in mean and median total ownership (that is, total
ownership of all managers overseeing a fund) across years either if it is measured in
dollar terms or in percentage terms.
Panel B shows ownership by fund segment. Both mean and median dollar
ownership is highest among the Capital Gains fund segment. While in percentage
terms, mean and median ownership is highest for the Equity Income funds and Ag-
gressive Growth funds, respectively. There is considerable variation in percentage
ownership across fund segments. For instance, the mean percentage ownership in
the Aggressive Growth segment is only 0.11%, while in the Equity Income segment
it is 0.538%. Panel C shows the correlation of ownership with fund, family, and
manager characteristics. To avoid multiple counting of fund-classes, expense ratio
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and turnover ratio are weighted by fund class total net assets. Fund total net assets
is the sum of total net assets of all fund classes, and fund age is the age of the
oldest class. Note that generally, percentage ownership has low correlation with
other characteristics than dollar ownership. For instance, dollar ownership has high
correlation of 0.464 and 0.314 with fund size and manager tenure (average tenure
in case of multi-manager funds). While the corresponding correlations in the case
percentage ownership are -0.070 and 0.054 only. Thus, in multivariate regressions,
multi-collinearity concerns are alleviated when one works with the percentage own-
ership rather than with the dollar ownership.
Panel D shows variation of dollar and percentage managerial ownership within
and across families. The variation is the overall variation and variation by fund
segments for the year 2008. Results for other years are qualitatively similar. Overall
within family variation is calculated by first taking standard deviation of ownership
within each family and then taking mean of standard deviation across families.
Across variation is calculated by first calculating mean ownership for each family
and then taking standard deviation of means across families. Similarly, within and
across family variation is also calculated for each segment. It can be seen that there
is less variation within families and more variation across families. For instance,
the overall average standard deviation of percentage ownership across families is
2.067, which is more than three times the standard deviation within families, 0.623.
Similarly, there is more variation in ownership across families than within families
for all fund segments. For the growth oriented funds, that form a major part of the
sample, the ratio of across family to within family percentage ownership variation is
4.24. One arrives at a similar conclusion if dollar ownership variation is examined.
It thus appears that there are significant cross-family heterogeneities that influence
managerial ownership, such as the corporate culture. It is also consistent with the
findings of Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2008). They report from an Investment
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Company Institute document that 14% of fund complexes require fund directors
to own shares in the funds they oversee, and 37% encourage it. I control for these
(time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneities across families using family fixed-effects.
There could be other reasons as well for manager to own stakes in the funds
they oversee. For instance, managers may invest in funds that are more aligned with
their risk-preferences. I control for such (time-invariant) unobserved characteristics
through manager fixed-effects. Managers may also voluntarily invest because they
may have superior information about the expected performance of their portfolios.
But in the hand-collected ownership data, I find that the dollar ownership levels
of managers do not vary significantly across years. It casts a little doubt over the
information channel, but it cannot be rejected, because if managers already have
investment beyond $1 million, then increase in ownership will not be reflected in the
data. Or if the managerial ownership is, say $125,000, then she will have to invest
a lot to cross $500,000 for the change to be reflected in the data, assuming no big
change in fund size to due to returns. So, although managers have same ownership
levels across years, they may increase or decrease ownership within their current
levels according to the fund’s expected performance. Finally, managers may invest
if they are overconfident of their abilities. But this is inconsistent with the positive
ownership-performance result that I find in Section 1.3.3.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Do Investors React to Ownership Disclosure?
I start with a natural experiment to examine whether investors channeled their flows
towards higher ownership managers. I use two measures of managerial ownership,
dollar ownership in millions and percentage ownership. Dollar ownership, Own($), is
calculated at the start of every calendar quarter, then average of quarterly ownership
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is taken for each fund, so that for each fund and for each year, there is one observation
for managerial ownership. Similarly, percentage ownership, Own(%), is calculated
at the start of every calendar quarter by dividing the dollar ownership with total
net assets of the fund, then average of quarterly percentage ownership is taken for
each fund. The flow for a fund i, during the period t to t+1, is measured by
Flowi,t+1 =
TNAi,t+1 − TNAi,t(1 +Ri,t+1)
TNAi,t
(1.1)
where TNAi,t represents the total net assets of fund i at the end of period t and
Ri,t+1 is the return of the fund i during the period t to t+1. To neutralize the affect
of outliers and obtain robust results, I winsorize dollar and percentage ownership
at the 90th percentile for each segment and for each year. Also, because of the
high volatility of fund flow, it is winsorized at corner 5 percentile for each month.
The empirical strategy to examine the investor reaction to ownership disclosure is
to employ a cross-sectional regression of first-difference in fund flows on managerial
ownership and first-difference in control variables.
In Panel A of Table 1.3, the dependent variable is the difference in average
monthly flows between 2006 and 2004. Own($) and Own(%) represent dollar and
percentage ownership at the end of 2005.8 In Panel B, the dependent variable is the
difference in average monthly flows between 2007 and 2004. I use flow difference
between 2007 and 2004, because some investors may learn about ownership disclo-
sure with a lag. In this case, Own($) and Own(%) represent dollar and percentage
ownership at the end of 2006. The first-differences in controls in Panels A and B
are obtained by subtracting the control value at the end of 2003 from the control
value at the end of 2005 and 2006, respectively. The control variables are aver-
age monthly fund return over the past year (Fundret), turnover ratio (Turnratio),
8Actually, since the ownership data begins from the start of the first quarter of 2006, it represents
ownership data at the start of 2006, which is same as ownership data at the end of 2005.
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expense ratio (Expratio), natural logarithm of fund size (Log(Fundsize)), fund age
(Log(Fundage)), family assets (Log(Famassets)), and average manager tenure of all
managers overseeing the fund (Log(Mgrten)). P -values are reported in parentheses.
All regressions in Table 1.3 are performed without intercept.
Panel A, in which the dependent variable is the first-difference in flows between
2006 and 2004, shows that investors do not react to dollar ownership. The coefficient
on Own($) in Model 1 is -0.063 (P -value 0.76). Similarly, with all controls in Model
2, the coefficient on Own($) is 0.145 with a P -value of 0.48. The coefficient on
∆Fundret is 0.660 with a P -value of 0.00. Thus, fund investors do not seem to
react to dollar ownership disclosure, while they give more importance to increase
in average past performance. But investors’ reaction is very different to percentage
ownership. Model 3 shows that the coefficient on Own(%) is 1.297 (P -value 0.00)
and the coefficient on ∆Fundret is 0.661 (P -value 0.00). That is, a 1% increase
in percentage ownership is associated with 1.297% increase in difference in average
monthly flows, and a 1% increase in difference in average past returns is associated
with 0.661% increase in difference in average monthly flows. Similarly, with all
controls in Model 4, the coefficient on Own(%) is 1.038 (P -value 0.01) and the
coefficient on ∆Fundret is 0.683 (P -value 0.00).
Panel B, in which the dependent variable is the first-difference in flows between
2007 and 2004, shows similar results. In Model 6, with all controls, the coefficient on
Own($) is -0.184 (P -value 0.38) and the coefficient on ∆Fundret is 0.400 (P -value
0.00). In Model 8, with all controls, the coefficient on Own(%) is 1.412 (P -value
0.00) and the coefficient on ∆Fundret is 0.492 (P -value 0.00). That is, a 1% increase
in percentage ownership is associated with 1.412% increase in difference in average
monthly flows, and a 1% increase in difference in average past returns is associated
with 0.492% increase in difference average monthly flows. In terms of comparable
economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in Own(%) is associated
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with 0.105 standard deviation increase in difference in average monthly flows. And
a one standard deviation increase in ∆Fundret is associated with 0.103 standard
deviation increase in difference in average monthly flows. In other words, in their
portfolio allocations, investors not just paid attention to increase in past returns,
but also to percentage managerial ownership disclosure.
In summary, investors did not react to dollar ownership disclosure. Instead
they reacted sharply to percentage ownership. This is a little surprising and suggests
that, at least some, investors believe that a higher dollar ownership in funds does
not automatically translates into higher managerial incentives. From the investors’
perspective, fund managers of larger funds should have larger stakes to create suffi-
cient incentives. This is possibly based on the premise that managers of larger funds
earn more and thus should have greater investment. For the rest of the paper, I use
percentage ownership as a measure of managerial stake in the fund.
1.3.2 Fund Flows Post-Regulatory Change
I next test whether funds with higher managerial ownership continue to attract
greater flows during the post-regulatory change in 2005 or whether it was just a
transient phenomenon. Table 1.4 reports coefficients from panel regression of subse-
quent flows (during 2007 to 2010) on lagged managerial ownership, fund, fund family
and manager characteristics, with cluster-robust standard errors, where clustering
is by fund. The control variables are average monthly fund return over the past year
(Fundret), turnover ratio (Turnratio), expense ratio (Expratio), natural logarithm of
fund size (Log(Fundsize)), fund age (Log(Fundage)), family assets (Log(Famassets)),
and average manager tenure of all managers overseeing the fund (Log(Mgrten)). All
regressions include time and investment objective fixed-effects.
In Panel A, I include all funds and use family fixed-effects to control for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneities across fund families. In Model 1, the coefficient
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on Own(%) is statistically and economically significant with a magnitude of 1.215
and P -value of 0.00. The coefficient on Fundret is 0.408 (P -value 0.00). This is
consistent with earlier studies which find that investors are return chasers. In Model
2, with all controls, I find that the coefficient on Own(%) slightly reduces to 0.828
with a P -value of 0.00, while the coefficient on Fundret is 0.438 with a P -value of
0.00. That is, a one standard deviation increase in Own(%) is associated with 0.118
standard deviation increase in average monthly flows. And a one standard deviation
increase in Fundret is associated with 0.509 standard deviation increase in average
monthly flows in the next year. Thus, past return seems to have a greater effect on
investor flows than Own(%), but investors do give importance to ownership as well
in deciding their capital allocations. In Model 3, I restrict the sample to the funds
for which the manager tenure is greater than 1 year because investors may avoid
funds with recent manager turnover. In Model 4, I restrict the sample to the funds
with turnover greater than 20% to remove closet index funds. In both Models 3 and
4, I find similar results as in Model 2.
In Panel B, I consider a sub-sample of single manager funds in which some
managers have more ownership in some funds than others and use manager fixed-
effects to control for time-invariant unobserved manager characteristics that happen
to be correlated with managerial ownership. The variation in ownership comes only
from the managers who manage multiple funds. Model 5 shows that the coefficient
on Own(%) is 2.915 with a P -value of 0.00, while the coefficient on Fundret is 0.175
with a P -value of 0.11. When all controls are included in Model 6, the coefficient
on Own(%) is 2.689 with a P -value of 0.00, while the coefficient on Fundret is 0.209
with a P -value of 0.07. In terms of comparative economic magnitude, a one standard
deviation increase in Own(%) is associated with 0.339 standard deviation increase
in average monthly flows, while a one standard deviation increase in Fundret is
associated with 0.247 standard deviation increase in average monthly flows in the
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next year. Models 7 and 8 yield similar results.9
Thus, the relation between ownership and subsequent flows appears to be very
strong and is robust to the inclusion of several controls as well as unobserved hetero-
geneity observed in family and manager fixed-effects. It suggests that the investor
reaction to initial ownership disclosure was not transient, rather they continue to
channel more flows into higher ownership funds well the regulatory change. This is
also an important finding for the mutual fund industry in general, and fund man-
agement companies and managers in particular. Because management companies
maximize profits by assets under management, they have an implicit incentive in
voluntarily making ownership information available to investors. This can decrease
search costs for investors who prefer managers who “eat their own cooking”.
1.3.3 Are Investors Rewarded by Higher Ownership Managers?
If ownership predicts superior risk-adjusted performance, it would imply that in-
vestors rationally incorporated ownership in their portfolio allocation decisions. I
use managerial ownership for the year t to predict average monthly risk-adjusted
performance for the year t+1. As before, managerial ownership for the year t is
calculated as the average of quarterly percentage ownership for each fund. The
future monthly risk-adjusted one-factor alpha (Jensen (1968)), three-factor alpha
(Fama and French (1993)), and four-factor alpha (Carhart (1997)) are obtained by
subtracting the estimated fund return from the fund’s return. The estimated return
is obtained by multiplying estimated factor loadings (obtained from past 36 month
regression, with a minimum of 30 observations) with factor returns. Finally, aver-
age monthly future risk-adjusted return is obtained over the next year, which is the
dependent variable in all linear regressions in Table 1.5.
Motivated by the finding in the corporate finance literature that there is a
9I also perform regressions of flows on lagged dollar ownership and controls. I find relatively
weaker results.
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non-linear relationship between executive ownership and firm performance (Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), McConnell, Servaes,
and Lins (2008)), I also employ two piecewise linear specifications. For the first
piecewise linear specification, I define Own1 and Own2 as,
Own1 = managerial ownership if managerial ownership < 0.5
= 0.5 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.5
Own2 = 0 if managerial ownership < 0.5
= managerial ownership - 0.5 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.5
For the second piecewise linear specification, I define Own1 and Own2 as,
Own1 = managerial ownership if managerial ownership < 0.6
= 0.6 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.6
Own2 = 0 if managerial ownership < 0.6
= managerial ownership - 0.6 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.6
There is no strong theoretical justification for the above break points. I per-
form non-parametric tests to check where possible infection points could be and use
them as guidance for breakpoints in piecewise linear regressions. Around 86% of
the sample has ownership below 0.5%. Thus, only a relatively small sample of funds
has ownership greater than 0.5%. The control variables are turnover ratio (Turnra-
tio), expense ratio (Expratio), natural logarithm of fund size (Log(Fundsize)), fund
age (Log(Fundage)), family assets (Log(Famassets)), average manager tenure of all
managers overseeing the fund (Log(Mgrten)), and average monthly fund return over
the past year (Fundret). All regressions include time and investment objective fixed-
effects. Standard errors are clustered by fund.
In Panel A, I consider full sample and use family fixed-effects to control for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities across fund families. In Model 1, the coef-
ficient on Own(%) is 0.139 with a P -value of 0.00. This suggests that a 1% increase
in managerial ownership is associated with 1.668% (0.139 multiplied by 12) CAPM-
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adjusted annual return in the next year. Interestingly, the coefficient on Fundret is
negative and statistically significant. Its magnitude is -0.132 (P -value 0.00). Model
2, in which the dependent variable is the 3-factor risk-adjusted performance, shows
that the coefficient on Own(%) is 0.066 (P -value 0.17), however when the 4-factor
model is used to calculate the risk-adjusted return in the next year, the coefficient on
Own(%) is 0.115 (P -value 0.01). This suggests that the lower ownership funds may
be betting significantly on high past return stocks. Indeed, Kumar (2012) shows
that the low ownership funds employ momentum trading strategies, while it is not
the case with the high ownership funds.
In Models 4-6, I employ the piecewise linear specification with percentage own-
ership breakpoint at 0.50%. I now find that the coefficients on Own1(%) are higher
than the corresponding coefficients in Models 1-3. For instance, in Model 5 with
3-factor adjusted average future return as the dependent variable, the coefficient
Own1(%) is 0.174 (P -value 0.08), while in Model 2 with the linear specification
it is only 0.066. Similarly, in Models 4 and 6, with CAPM and 4-factor adjusted
average future return as the dependent variables, respectively, the coefficient on
Own1(%) is double the earlier coefficient in the linear specifications in Models 1
and 3. The coefficient on Own2(%) is statistically insignificant, and the Wald test
fails to reject the equality of coefficients on Own1(%) and Own2(%). I find similar
coefficients on Own1(%) in Models 7-9 that employ the piecewise linear specifica-
tion with ownership breakpoint at 0.60%. In Models 8 and 9, the coefficient on
Own2(%) is slightly negative, and the coefficients on Own1(%) and Own2(%) are
marginally different from each other in Model 9. Thus, there appears to be some
weak evidence of concavity in ownership-performance relationship. Beyond, 0.60%
managerial stake, ownership-performance relationship is flat. The mean and me-
dian fund size of the sample above 0.60% ownership are $72M and $42M, and below
0.60% are $2189M and $492M. It suggests some managerial entrenchment in small
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funds with high managerial ownership. These funds could be started by wealthy
managers who break away from their earlier fund companies.
In Panel B, I include only single manager funds in which some managers have
more ownership in some funds than others and use manager fixed-effects to control
for time-invariant unobserved manager characteristics that happen to be correlated
with managerial ownership, such as latent managerial ability, risk-preference etc.
The variation in ownership comes only from managers who manage multiple funds.
With CAPM-adjusted future return as the dependent variable, I find that the co-
efficient on Own(%) is 0.380 (P -value 0.05). I find similar result with 3-factor and
4-factor adjusted dependent variable. In Model 3, with 4-factor adjusted future per-
formance, the coefficient on Own(%) is 0.447 with a P -value of 0.04. In economic
terms, it means that a 1% increase in managerial ownership is associated with 5.36%
increase in subsequent Carhart-adjusted annual return, or a one standard deviation
increase in Own(%) is associated with 0.177 standard deviation increase in future
Carhart-adjusted monthly performance. Also, the coefficient on average past return,
Fundret, is always negative and statistically significant in all regressions. In Model
3, a one standard deviation increase in Fundret is associated with 1.425 standard de-
viation decrease in future Carhart-adjusted monthly performance. As earlier, I also
employ piecewise linear specifications. But Wald test does not reject the equality
of coefficients on Own1(%) and Own2(%). Thus, when the same manager manages
multiple funds with variable ownership stakes, ownership-performance relation is
linearly increasing in ownership.
The above findings show that investors rationally incorporate ownership in
their portfolio allocation decisions, because the same metric, managerial ownership,
also predicts future fund performance after several controls as well as family and
manager fixed-effects. However, trend chasers do not realize superior future risk-
adjusted performance. It suggests that the investor community is heterogeneous in
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the sense that there are naive investors who just irrationally chase past performance,
whose money is possibly “dumb”, but at the same time there are sophisticated
investors who incorporate predictors of fund performance in their portfolio allocation
decisions, whose money is “smart”. These findings are consistent with the findings
of Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011). They find that behaviorally biased investors
are more likely to chase fund performance, while sophisticated investors experience
relatively good fund performance.
These findings also contribute to the debate in corporate finance literature
on the relationship between ownership and performance. On the one hand, studies
such as Demsetz and Kenneth (1985), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Claudio and
Martin (1997), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga
(2001), among others, suggest that ownership has little effect, perhaps because it
is optimally set based on each firm’s own circumstances. On the other hand, the
evidence in Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990),
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2008) suggests that
ownership alters the value of a firm. Based on the findings, one can only make a
limited and cautious conclusion, because ownership may also be driven by manager’s
information, that to the extent that managerial ownership is driven by time-invariant
heterogeneities across fund families and managers, “ownership matters” for fund
performance.
Before I move onto the next section, I want to mention one limitation of the
above findings. It is possible that governance also plays a role in affecting fund
performance. I do not have explicit data on board of directors of mutual funds. The
interesting work in this area is done by Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) and
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2008). In their sample of one year, Khorana, Servaes,
and Wedge (2007) control for governance measures and find that ownership still
strongly predicts fund performance, and that there is no relation between governance
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and performance. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2008) find weak relationship between
the director ownership and future fund performance.
1.3.4 Does Ownership Moderate Risk-Taking?
I now explore the channel through which higher ownership translates into better
performance. One reason for such a finding could be that higher ownership allevi-
ates managerial agency by aligning the incentives of mangers and fund investors.
The other reason could be that managers with high ownership have superior infor-
mation about the expected performance of their funds, and this is reflected in better
performance. While it is hard to pin down the information story fully, it is possible
to verify if ownership alleviates agency problem. Past literature has examined many
manger-investor conflicts. These include excessive risk-taking in the later half of the
year due to convexity in flow-performance relationship, (Brown, Harlow, and Starks
(1996a), Chevalier and Ellison (1999a)), forgoing profitable investments and going-
with-the-herd (Scharfstein and Stein (1990)), engaging in uninformed trading when
no profitable trades are identified (Dow and Gorton (1997)), window dressing, risk
associated with style changes etc. A comprehensive analysis of whether ownership
moderates all agencies is beyond the scope of this study. I focus only on the first
agency.
Since the compensation of the manager depends on the assets under man-
agement, the manager takes the decisions which increase inflows to the fund, even
though this may not deliver an optimal risk-adjusted performance to the fund in-
vestors. Thus, due to the “compensation incentives” of the manager, a fund lagging
behind its peers tries to catch up by “gambling” in the later half of the year (Brown,
Harlow, and Starks (1996a) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997).10 This causes fund
managers to shift risk onto investors. Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011a) show that
10Also see Busse (2001), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), Chen and
Pennacchi (2009), Massa and Patgiri (2009), Hu, Kale, Pagani, and Subramanian (2011).
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risk-shifting adversely effects the performance of a fund. To the extent that risk-
shifting is harmful for the investors, higher managerial ownership in the fund could
alleviate risk-shifting. Once a manager has ownership in the fund, for whatever
reason, it influences her risk-taking behavior (at least to some extent). Thus, she
is less likely to engage in risk-shifting after she has stakes in the fund. That is, the
“ownership incentives” may balance the “compensation incentives”.
1.3.4.1 Risk-Taking Measure
Risk-taking associated with the convexity in flow-performance relation in mutual
funds is usually measured by the increase in volatility of fund returns in the sec-
ond half of a year. I follow Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) and Huang, Sialm,
and Zhang (2011a), and calculate intended risk change by the fund, instead of re-
alized risk change. Intended risk change is a better metric to measure risk-shifting
than realized risk change because the latter could be affected by the market volatil-
ity. The original formulation of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996a) is (σ2L/σ1L) >
(σ2W/σ1W ), where the subscripts L and W refer to the mid-year losers and winners,
and 2 and 1 refer to the second and first half of a year (see p.89 of Brown, Harlow,
and Starks (1996a)). By subtracting 1 from both sides, it translates into risk in-
crease in the second half of a year as a fraction of risk experienced in the first half
of the year. I thus calculate intended risk increase as a fraction of risk experienced
in the first half of a year.
To calculate the intended risk increase, I first calculate the realized risk, σ1t ,
in the first half of the year as the standard deviation of realized daily portfolio
returns. Next, I construct hypothetical returns using portfolio weights from the
current quarter and stock returns from the prior quarter. Thus, for a stock held in
the third quarter, I use returns from the second quarter. And for a stock held in the
fourth quarter, I use returns from the third quarter. I thus construct a hypothetical
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daily return series of a fund for the second half of the year. The standard deviation
of this hypothetical daily return series is the “intended” risk, σ2,intt , in the second
half of a year. I finally define intended risk increase, IntdRiskInc, as:
Intended Risk Increaset = (σ
2,int
t − σ1t /σ1t ) ∗ 100 (1.2)
1.3.4.2 Multivariate Regression
I now test in a multivariate regression setting, whether the high ownership funds
increase less risk than the risk increased by the low ownership funds controlling
for mid-year performance and other controls. Table 1.6 reports coefficients from
panel regression of intended risk increase (IntdRiskInc) on linear, and piece-wise
linear functions of managerial ownership, mid-year objective-adjusted rank of a fund
(Rank), interaction of ownership and rank, for the period 2006 to 2009, with cluster-
robust standard errors, where clustering is by fund. The piecewise linear regressions
are performed to capture any non-linearities in risk-taking with respect to ownership.
As before, managerial ownership (Own) is calculated at the start of every calendar
quarter by dividing the dollar ownership with total net assets of the fund, then
average of quarterly percentage ownership is taken for each fund. Piecewise linear
regressions specifications are defined as earlier in Section 1.3.3. For each year and
for each fund, Rank is obtained by ranking funds in the same investment objective
category based on cumulative raw returns in the first half of the year. To capture
any asymmetry in risk-taking with respect to ownership, that is, whether higher
ownership makes mid-year losers more risk-averse than mid-year winners, I interact
ownership and mid-year rank. I first demean Own and Rank and then calculate
Own*Rank. Similarly, other interaction terms of ownership and mid-year rank are
obtained by first demeaning the variables. Turnratio and Expratio are expense ra-
tio and turnover ratio, respectively. Log(Fundsize), Log(Fundage), Log(Famassets),
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Log(Mgrten) are natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund, fund age, fund
family assets, and average manager tenure of all managers overseeing the fund, re-
spectively. All explanatory variables are measured at the end of the calendar year
of year. In Panel A, I include all funds and control for time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneities across fund families using family fixed-effects. In Panel B, I include
only single manager funds and control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities
across managers using manager fixed-effects.
In Panel A, Model 1, I find that the coefficient on managerial ownership, Own,
is -2.36 (P -value 0.03), which is statistically and economically significant, while the
coefficient on Rank is -3.75% (P -value 0.00). The coefficient on Rank suggests in
moving from the highest to the lowest rank, a fund increases risk by 3.75%. But
at the same time, a 1% increase in ownership is associated with 2.36% decrease in
risk-taking. Thus, higher ownership mitigates tendency to take excessive risk in
the later half of the year. In Model 2, I also test if ownership and rank interact
ownership with each other. I do not find that to be the case. It thus appears that
for both losers and winners, higher ownership is associated with lower risk-taking.
In Models 3-4, I perform piecewise linear regressions with 0.50% ownership
as the break point. In Model 3, the coefficients on Own1 and Own2 are -5.87
(P -value 0.01) and 0.72 (P -value 0.72) and they are different from each other at
10% level. This suggests that there is some convexity in risk-taking with respect to
ownership at high values of ownership. For the vast majority of the sample (86%),
for which ownership is less than 0.5%, ownership mitigates managerial tendency to
take excessive risk in the later half of the year, but in very small funds with high
managerial stake there appears to be no relationship between ownership and risk-
taking. As in Model 2, in Model 4 too, I find no interaction between ownership and
Rank. I find similar results in Models 5-6, where the breakpoint in ownership is set
at 0.60%.
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In Panel B, I test the relationship between ownership and risk-taking, control-
ling for unobserved manager characteristics that could be correlated with managerial
ownership. To control for such characteristics, I consider a sub-sample of single man-
ager funds in which some managers have more ownership in some funds than others
and use manager fixed-effects. None of the variables, including main variables of
interest such as Own, Own1, Own2, Rank or the interaction variables, is statisti-
cally significant. The most likely explanation seems to be that the sample size is
too small and hence the power is less to detect the ownership and risk-taking rela-
tion. Perhaps a larger sample is required to say anything about the within-manager
ownership-risk-taking relation or even about the performance and risk-taking re-
lation. In summary, from the regression on the full sample, I find that ownership
moderates excessive risk-taking in the second half of a year that managers undertake
to improve end-of-year reported performance, and there is weak evidence to suggest
that the relationship between ownership and risk-taking is convex in nature.11
1.3.5 What Explains the Coexistence of the Low and High Ownership
Funds?
One of the puzzling question that arises from the above results is that if the high
ownership managers to better than the low ownership managers, then what ex-
plains their coexistence? Several explanations are possible based on the past litera-
ture. There may exist different clienteles (Gruber (1996)). There are sophisticated
well-informed investors who gather all possible information about fund managers
and then direct their investments based on their perception of manager’s ability
to outperform. The second category of investors are disadvantaged investors who
direct their investments based on advertising (Jain and Wu (2000)) and advice from
11In unreported robustness results, I get qualitatively similar results if I work with the absolute
intended risk change, σ2,intt - σ
1
t , instead of the percentage intended risk change.
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brokers, or tax benefits may make it inefficient to move money across funds. In
the similar spirit, Tkac (2004) mentions that there are considerable heterogeneities
across fund investors. She cites evidence from an Investment Company Institute
report that while some investors hold funds on their own, others hold through their
retirement plans. Some investors buy funds through broker dealers while others buy
though fund companies. Some investors use sophisticated analysis and are more
educated than others in finance and economics. The broader point is that investor
heterogeneities may result in channeling of their investment into funds with varying
ownership levels. Finally, search costs can also rationalize the coexistence of funds
with varying managerial ownership. For instance, in the case of S&P 500 index
funds, which are characterized by a very high degree of portfolio homogeneity, Hor-
tacsu and Syverson (2004) find that small search costs can rationalize the fact that
the index fund offering the highest utility doesn’t capture the whole market.
The other related concern in the above analysis is that the greater flows into
higher ownership funds may dilute managerial ownership. While this is a valid
concern, I find that the relative percentage ownership ranking of funds persist.
I calculate the transition probabilities of percentage managerial ownership across
consecutive years. Results are reported in Table 1.7. I find about 90% of the funds
in the top quartile remain in the same ownership quartile in the next year as well. I
find similar results for other quartiles. Thus, while it is true that higher ownership
funds attract more flows, the relative ownership ranking persists. This is consistent
with the investor heterogeneity argument. If investors are homogenous in the sense
that they all value managerial ownership highly, then low ownership managers will
die out in the sample very soon. The eventual death of these funds is an interesting
question for the future.
31
1.4 Conclusion
I analyze whether investors value managerial ownership disclosure in directing their
investments, and whether their response to ownership is rational. There are two
reasons for studying investor behavior towards ownership disclosure. First, many
studies in the past examined the rationality of fund investors in various contexts.
The evidence on investor rationality from these studies is mixed (Elton, Gruber,
and Busse (2004), Carhart (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Gruber (1996), Zheng
(1999), Frazzini and Lamont (2008)). Second, the question of whether investors
rationally respond to managerial ownership disclosure is also important from the
regulator’s perspective. The is based on the premise that investors, armed with the
new information, will allocate their investments towards their preferred portfolio
managers. This disciplining mechanism will induce managers to avoid taking actions
that harm investors’ interests.
Using a natural experiment, regulations that mandate portfolio manager own-
ership disclosure, I find that investor flows respond to higher percentage ownership
but not to, higher dollar but low percentage stakes in larger funds, suggesting that
investors possibly judge the latter type of stakes to create insufficient incentives.
The relationship between investor flows and percentage ownership is persistent well
after the regulatory change in 2005, which indicates that the investor responses are
permanent rather than transient and are robust to several controls as well as un-
observed heterogeneity reflected in fund family and manager fixed-effects. Second,
the investor responses to ownership are rational, as investors investing in higher
percentage ownership funds are rewarded back in terms of higher risk-adjusted per-
formance. Finally, I shed light on the channels through which higher ownership
translates into better investor rewards. I show that ownership moderates agency
problems from excessive risk-taking in the second half of a year that managers un-
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dertake to improve end-of-year reported performance. These findings are consistent
with a “rational investor” viewpoint in which, at least, some investors incorporate
managerial ownership in their portfolio allocation decisions.
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Table 1.1: Recorded Managerial Ownership Over Time
This table reports statistics from comparison of managerial ownership for the same manager for
different years for the hand-collected sample. Nfunds is the number of funds compared across two
years, such as for 2007 and 2008 this number is 166. NMgrs is the number of managers compared
across two years, and Diff(Own Range) is the difference in managerial ownership range reported
by the fund for two years. For instance, if a fund manager has disclosed dollar range of $1-$10,000
in 2006 and $50,001-$100,000 in 2007, then Diff(Own Range) for that fund manager is 2.
2008-2007 2008-2006 2008-2009
Nfunds 166 153 170
Diff(Own Range) NMgrs Percent NMgrs Percent NMgrs Percent
-6 0 0.00 0 0 2 0.38
-5 0 0.00 1 0.28 2 0.38
-4 4 0.89 4 1.13 5 0.96
-3 0 0.00 0 0.00 5 0.96
-2 5 1.11 8 2.26 22 4.23
-1 10 2.23 12 3.39 32 6.15
0 415 92.43 268 75.71 397 76.35
1 10 2.23 33 9.32 40 7.69
2 1 0.22 15 4.24 8 1.54
3 3 0.67 5 1.41 1 0.19
4 1 0.22 6 1.69 5 0.96
5 0 0.00 1 0.28 1 0.19
6 0 0.00 1 0.28 0 0.00
Total 449 100.00 354 100.00 520 100.00
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics on managerial ownership in Panel A, descriptive statistics on managerial
ownership by fund segment in Panel B, correlation of ownership with fund, family, and manager characteristics in
Panel C, and average standard deviation ownership within and across families for the year 2008 in Panel D. In Panel
A, N and Zero represents the number of funds and number of funds with zero managerial ownership, respectively.
In Panel B, N and Zero represents the number of fund-years, and number of fund-years with zero managerial
ownership, respectively. Mean and median of dollar ownership, and dollar ownership as percentage of total net
assets is also reported. Dollar ownership is calculated by first taking the midpoint of range of managerial ownership
reported by the fund in the SEC filings and then summed across all managers in case of multi-manager funds. For
the last range, greater than $1 million, $1 million is taken as ownership. Percentage ownership is calculated at
the start of every calendar quarter by dividing the dollar ownership by total net assets of the fund, then average
of quarterly percentage ownership is taken for each fund, so that for each fund and for each year, there is one
observation for percentage ownership. Panel C reports contemporaneous correlation of managerial ownership with
average monthly fund return measured over the current year (Fundret), end-year fund age (Fundage), total net
assets (Fundsize), turnover ratio (Turnratio), expense ratio (Expratio), total family assets (Familyassets), average
manager tenure of all managers overseeing the fund (Mgrten). In Panel D, within family ownership variation is
obtained by first calculating standard deviation of ownership for each family and then average of the resulting series
is calculated. Across family variation is obtained by first calculating average ownership for each family and then
standard deviation of the resulting percentage ownership series is calculated. Similarly, within and between family
variation for each fund segment is also calculated.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by year
Mgr Own($) Mgr Own(% of TNA)
Year N Zero Mean Median Mean Median
2006 1139 306 536351 250000 0.422 0.031
2007 1144 311 505013 250000 0.390 0.025
2008 1244 352 503525 250000 0.421 0.026
2009 1146 303 504921 250000 0.437 0.038
Total fund-years 4673
Total funds 1463
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Fund Segment
Mgr Own($) Mgr Own(% of TNA)
Fund Segment N Zero Mean Median Mean Median
Equity Inc (EI) 237 46 431461 250000 0.538 0.025
Growth (G) 2964 822 514101 250000 0.451 0.033
Growth & Inc (GI) 1020 293 523511 250000 0.386 0.021
Capital Gains (CG) 269 71 559261 280000 0.273 0.032
Agg Growth (AG) 183 40 454590 250000 0.111 0.034
Panel C: Correlation of managerial ownership with fund, fund family, and manager characteristics
Fundret Fundage Fundsize Turnratio Expratio Familyassets Mgrten
Own($) 0.014 0.131 0.464 -0.185 -0.092 0.129 0.314
(0.356) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Own(%) 0.012 -0.131 -0.070 -0.028 0.135 -0.110 0.054
(0.444) (0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel D: Managerial ownership variation within and across fund families for the year 2008
Std Dev Overall AG G GI CG EI
Own($) Within 341698 459627 355919 351506 483518 210512
Across 765128 501544 723245 889486 516683 523742
Own(%) Within 0.623 0.019 0.480 0.436 0.291 0.015
Across 2.067 0.179 1.870 1.760 2.095 2.052
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Table 1.3: The Effect of Ownership Disclosure on Fund Flows
This table reports coefficients from a cross-sectional regression of first-difference in fund flows on
dollar or percentage ownership and first-difference in fund, family, and manager characteristics.
First-difference in flows is obtained by subtracting the average monthly flows over 2004 from
average monthly flows over 2006 and 2007 in Panels A and B, respectively. Own($) and Own(%)
represent dollar and percentage ownership at the end of 2006. Dollar ownership, (Own($)), is
calculated at the start of every calendar quarter, then average of quarterly ownership is taken
for each fund, so that for each fund, there is one observation for managerial ownership. Similarly,
percentage ownership (Own(%)) is calculated at the start of every calendar quarter by dividing the
dollar ownership with total net assets of the fund, then average of quarterly percentage ownership
is taken for each fund, so that for each fund, there is one observation for managerial ownership.
The first-differences in controls are obtained by subtracting the control value at the end of 2003
from the control value at the end of 2005 and 2006 in Panels A and B, respectively. The control
variables are average monthly fund return over the past year (Fundret), turnover ratio (Turnratio),
expense ratio (Expratio), natural logarithm of fund size (Log(Fundsize)), fund age (Log(Fundage)),
family assets (Log(Famassets)), and average manager tenure of all managers overseeing the fund
(Log(Mgrten)), respectively. P -values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: 2006-2004 Panel B: 2007-2004
∆Flow (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Own($) -0.063 0.145 -0.645 -0.184
(0.769) (0.489) (0.005) (0.388)
Own(%) 1.297 1.038 0.926 1.412
(0.001) (0.012) (0.034) (0.002)
∆Fundret 0.540 0.660 0.661 0.683 0.668 0.400 0.907 0.492
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Turnratio -0.137 -0.126 -0.140 -0.141
(0.370) (0.381) (0.300) (0.262)
∆Expratio -1.637 -1.880 -0.313 -0.413
(0.105) (0.066) (0.639) (0.546)
∆Log(Fundsize) -2.147 -2.087 -1.650 -1.623
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆Log(Fundage) 2.573 2.198 -0.262 -0.702
(0.003) (0.015) (0.632) (0.231)
∆Log(Famassets) 0.459 0.429 0.239 0.193
(0.214) (0.238) (0.244) (0.333)
∆Log(Mgrten) 0.147 0.116 0.174 0.140
(0.111) (0.218) (0.136) (0.221)
N 1033 971 1033 971 975 925 975 925
Adj-R2 0.076 0.173 0.085 0.179 0.108 0.218 0.106 0.227
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Table 1.4: Fund Flows Post-Regulatory Change
This table reports coefficients from panel regression of fund flows (Flow), for the period 2007 to
2010, (Flow) on lagged managerial ownership, fund, fund family and manager characteristics, with
cluster-robust standard errors, where clustering is by fund. Fund flows are measured by percentage
average monthly net inflow of money over the next year (Flow). Managerial ownership (Own(%))
is calculated at the start of every calendar quarter by dividing the dollar ownership with total net
assets of the fund, then average of quarterly percentage ownership is taken for each fund, so that
for each fund and for each year, there is one observation for managerial ownership. Log(Fundsize),
Log(Fundage), Log(Famassets), Log(Mgrten) are natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund,
fund age, fund family assets, and average manager tenure of all managers overseeing the fund,
respectively. Expratio and Turnratio are expense ratio and turnover ratio, respectively. Fundret(t)
is average monthly fund raw return in year t. All regressions include intercept and explanatory
variables are measured at the end of the calendar year t. The last two rows show number of
observations used (N) and adjusted-R2 (Adj-R2). P -values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: All Funds Panel B: Single Manager Funds
Flow(t+1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mgrten>1 Turnover>0.2 Mgrten>1 Turnover>0.2
Own(%)(t) 1.215 0.828 0.864 0.872 2.915 2.689 2.693 2.758
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fundret(t) 0.408 0.438 0.452 0.465 0.175 0.209 0.206 0.233
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.119) (0.071) (0.073) (0.072)
Turnratio(t) -0.015 -0.018 -0.033 -0.241 -0.240 -0.286
(0.835) (0.808) (0.653) (0.309) (0.311) (0.239)
Expratio(t) -0.278 -0.261 -0.259 -0.475 -0.474 -0.668
(0.126) (0.166) (0.185) (0.335) (0.336) (0.184)
Log(Fundsize)(t) -0.131 -0.122 -0.169 -0.233 -0.229 -0.385
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.115) (0.119) (0.010)
Log(Fundage)(t) -0.142 -0.133 -0.096 -0.141 -0.143 0.072
(0.068) (0.101) (0.254) (0.621) (0.616) (0.799)
Log(Famassets)(t) -0.602 -0.584 -0.629 -0.183 -0.183 -0.084
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.239) (0.242) (0.612)
Log(Mgrten)(t) -0.028 -0.048 -0.009 0.048 0.038 0.132
(0.646) (0.490) (0.888) (0.800) (0.843) (0.525)
TimeFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Obj FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
FamFE Y Y Y Y N N N N
MgrFE N N N N Y Y Y Y
N 4144 4115 3950 3627 1459 1447 1430 1270














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This table reports coefficients from panel regression of intended risk increase (IntdRiskInc), for the
period 2006 to 2009, on linear and piece-wise linear functions of managerial ownership, mid-year
objective-adjusted rank of a fund (Rank), interaction of ownership and rank, fund, fund family
and manager characteristics, with cluster-robust standard errors, where clustering is by fund.
IntdRiskInc is defined as ((σ2int-σ1)/σ1)*100, where σ2int is the intended risk taken in the second
half of the year and σ1 is the actual risk taken in the first half of the year. See text for further
details on intended risk increase. Managerial ownership (Own) is calculated at the start of every
calendar quarter by dividing the dollar ownership with total net assets of the fund, then average of
quarterly percentage ownership is taken for each fund, so that for each fund and for each year, there
is one observation for managerial ownership. For piecewise linear regressions, Own1 and Own2
are used (see text for details). For each year and for each fund, Rank is obtained by ranking funds
for each fund objective based on cumulative raw returns in the first half of the year. Ownership
variables and Rank are demeaned. Own*Rank is the interaction of demeaned Own and demeaned
Rank. Similarly, other interaction terms are obtained by first demeaning the variables. Turnratio
and Expratio are expense ratio and turnover ratio, respectively. Log(Fundsize), Log(Fundage),
Log(Famassets), Log(Mgrten) are natural logarithm of total net assets of the fund, fund age, fund
family assets, and average manager tenure of all managers overseeing the fund, respectively. All
regressions include intercept and explanatory variables are measured at the end of the calendar
year of year t. In Panel A, all funds are included, while in Panel B, only single-manager funds
are included. The last four rows show the umber of observations (N), adjusted-R2 (Adj-R2),
breakpoints used for Own1 and Own2, P -values for test of equality of coefficients on Own1 and
Own2. P -values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: All Funds
IntdRiskInc (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own -2.360 -2.375
(0.031) (0.032)
Own1 -5.873 -5.931 -4.879 -5.034
(0.013) (0.012) (0.021) (0.017)
Own2 0.724 0.837 0.795 1.174
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(0.719) (0.687) (0.738) (0.626)
Rank -3.757 -3.754 -3.714 -3.719 -3.721 -3.731







Turnratio 0.198 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.198 0.198
(0.594) (0.595) (0.596) (0.594) (0.594) (0.593)
Expratio 1.001 1.000 1.029 1.033 1.018 1.024
(0.395) (0.395) (0.381) (0.380) (0.386) (0.384)
Log(Fundsize) -0.083 -0.083 -0.139 -0.140 -0.130 -0.133
(0.743) (0.742) (0.591) (0.590) (0.615) (0.608)
Log(Fundage) -0.055 -0.054 -0.078 -0.078 -0.080 -0.077
(0.917) (0.918) (0.881) (0.881) (0.879) (0.882)
Log(Famassets) -0.036 -0.037 -0.044 -0.044 -0.058 -0.059
(0.977) (0.977) (0.973) (0.973) (0.964) (0.964)
Log(Mgrten) 0.227 0.227 0.316 0.316 0.298 0.300
(0.571) (0.570) (0.436) (0.435) (0.462) (0.458)
TimeFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
ObjFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
FamFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 4485 4485 4485 4485 4485 4485
Adj-R2 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644
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Own(%) BP 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60
PWald 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.11
Panel B: Single Manager Funds
IntdRiskInc (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own -3.267 -3.842
(0.366) (0.300)
Own1 -8.125 -7.572 -7.617 -7.315
(0.162) (0.198) (0.157) (0.178)
Own2 2.453 -0.005 4.132 1.363
(0.742) (1.000) (0.641) (0.888)
Rank -3.550 -3.446 -3.497 -3.379 -3.490 -3.365







Turnratio -1.048 -1.053 -1.066 -1.093 -1.081 -1.107
(0.606) (0.594) (0.597) (0.576) (0.591) (0.571)
Expratio -1.928 -1.948 -1.986 -1.985 -1.993 -1.983
(0.543) (0.539) (0.532) (0.532) (0.530) (0.532)
Log(Fundsize) -0.276 -0.288 -0.354 -0.357 -0.356 -0.357
(0.717) (0.706) (0.651) (0.648) (0.648) (0.647)
Log(Fundage) -0.345 -0.330 -0.265 -0.243 -0.269 -0.250
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(0.762) (0.771) (0.818) (0.833) (0.814) (0.827)
Log(Famassets) 0.522 0.551 0.521 0.599 0.521 0.593
(0.583) (0.560) (0.585) (0.535) (0.585) (0.537)
Log(Mgrten) 0.747 0.752 0.861 0.876 0.865 0.879
(0.538) (0.535) (0.489) (0.483) (0.487) (0.482)
TimeFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
ObjFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
FamFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1544 1544 1544 1544 1544 1544
Adj-R2 0.667 0.666 0.666 0.666 0.666 0.666
Own(%) BP 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60
PWald 0.34 0.52 0.33 0.50
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Table 1.7: Transition Probabilities: Managerial Ownership
This table reports transition probabilities of managerial ownership across consecutive years. First
managerial ownership is calculated at the start of every calendar quarter by dividing the dollar
ownership with total net assets of the fund, then average of quarterly percentage ownership is
taken for each fund, so that for each fund and for each year, there is one observation for manage-
rial ownership. Then at the end of the calendar year, funds are ranked into quartiles based on
managerial ownership. The horizontal rows report the average transition probabilities measured
across consecutive years for each quartile.
Own Rank (t+1)
Own Rank (t) 1 2 3 4
1 91.22 5.43 2.23 1.12
2 3.46 83.9 12.22 0.43
3 2.68 8.03 80.88 8.41
4 2.51 0.39 6.53 90.56
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Chapter 2: Portfolio Manager Ownership, Herding and Stock
Returns
2.1 Introduction
I analyze the “herding” (trading together) behavior of managers, conditional on
their ownership stakes in the funds they oversee. More specifically, funds are said to
herd when a disproportionate number of funds end up on the same side of the market
in their trades.1 Given the large holdings and trading volume of mutual funds, they
are a dominant force in influencing stock prices.2 Because the trading decisions are
under the control of managers, and if managers are agency influenced, then it is
likely to be reflected in stock prices. This issue is of economic importance because
informative prices in well-functioning markets affect the real economy through better
investment decisions (see, Wurgler (2000) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001)).
Earlier studies have thrown mixed evidence on the impact of institutional
herding on stock prices. For instance, studies such as Wermers (1999), Nofsinger
and Sias (1999), and Sias (2004) find that herding speeds up the process of price
adjustment by quickly incorporating news into prices and thus helps in making
markets more informationally efficient. While more recent studies, such as Puckett
1Kraus and Stoll (1972) is one of the earliest papers that examine simultaneous trading, which
they term as “parallel trading”.
2Institutional funds hold more than 60% of domestic equity and account for around 70% of
trading volume (Gompers and Metrick (2001), Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), Boehmer and
Kelley (2009)). According to the Investment Company Fact Book 2010, the total value of the U.S.
mutual fund assets at the end of 2009 is $11.1 trillion, of which approximately 33% are domestic
equity funds, and a vast majority of these funds are actively managed funds.
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and Yan (2008), Dasgupta, Prat, and Verado (2011a) and Brown, Wei, and Wermers
(2012) find that herding leads to reversal in stock prices, and thus destabilizes stock
prices.
One possibility that can explain the above findings is that there are different
managers with different underlying motivations. For instance, there are reputation-
ally concerned managers, as in Scharfstein and Stein (1990), who may not invest in
profitable investments according to their substantive private information, but would
rather go-with-the-herd for fear of loss of reputation from acting differently from the
herd.3 This kind of behavior is possible when managers are agency influenced and
would rather “share-the-blame”. In such cases, a rational manager may follow the
strategies of other managers like the positive-feedback trading strategy. It is also
possible that sometimes managers are not able to identify profitable investments,
but yet have to trade because managers’ active non-trading cannot be distinguished
from the lack of stock selection skill or shirking of responsibility (Dow and Gorton
(1997)). This particular kind of agency can also induce rational managers to employ
positive-feedback trading. Now consider another set of managers, whose behavior is
less likely to be agency influenced, such as the managers who have high ownership
stakes (for whatever reason) in the funds they oversee. It is costly for the high
ownership managers to ignore their substantive information and let go profitable
investments, because of their ownership stakes. And precisely because of the same
reason, it is again costly for them to engage in uninformed trading or engage in
positive-feedback trading unless it is backed with credible investment signal.
3Also see Dasgupta, Prat, and Verado (2011b). In addition, herding can occur due to infor-
mational cascades (Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)).
More recently, Khanna and Mathews (2011) show that under some conditions, informational cas-
cades can result in superior aggregate information. Herding can also occur in deciding whether
to investigate a piece of information that the manager believes others will also investigate, this is
commonly known as investigative herding (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), Hirshliefer, Sub-
rahmanyam, and Titman (1994)). There is also a body of literature that argues that managers
may herd because of their preferences towards securities with specific characteristics (Falkenstein
(1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001), Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003)). This list is by no means
exhaustive. For literature reviews, see Graham (1999), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Sias (2004).
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In the former case, when managers are agency influenced, herding may result
in non-informative stock prices in the sense that they do not reflect the fundamental
value of the firm and may exhibit reversal subsequent to herding. While in the latter
case, prices are more likely adjust in a stable manner, and improve informational ef-
ficiency of the market. Whether herding causes price reversal and increase volatility
or whether it aids in informational efficiency, depends on which herd of managers
dominates the other in influencing stock prices to a greater degree.
I obtain data on managerial ownership from multiple sources for the period
from 2006 to 2009. Managerial ownership is disclosed in the Statement of Additional
Information (SAI). Specifically, funds are required to disclose the dollar ownership
of fund manager in ranges of $0, $1-$10,000, $10,001-$50,000, $50,001-$100,000,
$100,001-$500,000, $500,001-$1,000,000 and greater than $1,000,000.4 Managers
may have ownership in their funds for various reasons. For instance, it can be their
personal decision because their risk-preferences are better aligned with particular
funds or they may have superior information about the expected performance of
their fund (Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007)). They may also be required by
fund companies to own stakes in their funds to better align their incentives with
that of fund investors or to give signal to the investors about managers’ ability.5
4Following the late trading and market timing scandals, to increase transparency, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated mutual funds to disclose dollar ownership levels of
portfolio managers in the funds they oversee. This disclosure is required of all funds filing their
disclosures after February 2005. According to the SEC, managerial ownership is a direct indication
of incentive alignment between the manager and fund investors. See U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 17 Code of Federal Regulation Parts 239, 249, 270 and 274, File No. S7-12-04,
Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment Companies.
5For instance, in its disclosure, American Century mentions the following:
AMERICAN CENTURY HAS ADOPTED A POLICY THAT, WITH LIMITED
EXCEPTIONS, REQUIRES ITS PORTFOLIO MANAGERS TO MAINTAIN IN-
VESTMENTS IN THE POLICY PORTFOLIOS THEY OVERSEE. HOWEVER,
BECAUSE THIS PORTFOLIO MANAGER SERVES ON A TEAM THAT OVER-
SEES A NUMBER OF FUNDS IN THE SAME BROAD INVESTMENT STRAT-
EGY, THE PORTFOLIO MANAGER IS NOT REQUIRED TO INVEST IN EACH
SUCH FUND.
The complete disclosure can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100334/000010033406000048/pea118-2006.htm.
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For the purpose of this study, it does not matter what the actual reason is for
managers to have ownership. What is important is to realize is that once managers
have ownership in their funds, for whatever reason, they also bear the cost of their
agency influenced decisions. This may moderate their agency driven trading, and
also impact stock prices in a more stable manner.
There are other studies which also suggest that the portfolio decisions of lower
ownership managers may be agency influenced. Khorana, Servaes, andWedge (2007)
first calculate percentage ownership of the manager in a fund, and show that funds
with higher managerial ownership subsequently perform better. They attribute
better performance of higher ownership managers to their superior information or
agency alleviation or both. Evans (2008) also finds similar evidence, and attributes
it to agency alleviation.6 Following Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007), I work
with the percentage ownership of managers in their funds. Also, the agency based
arguments rely on percentage ownership (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
Whether higher ownership managers exert more effort because of greater in-
centives to form investment signals for profitable trades or have sources of superior
information, they are less likely to ignore their investment signals/information, and
engage in uninformed positive-feedback trading. Further, different high ownership
managers may attach different value to similar information about a stock, depend-
ing upon their subjective precision, thus lower levels of herding may be observed
Also see, “Which Fund Families Top the Manager Ownership Charts?” at
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=251746
In the context of director ownership, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2008) find that family-wide
policies, such as deferred compensation plans, are important in determining director ownership.
Also see Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout, and Weinbaum (2009).
6There is also a large corporate finance literature on the relationship between ownership and
performance, however, the evidence from these studies is mixed. Some studies, such as Demsetz
and Kenneth (1985), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Claudio and Martin (1997), Himmelberg,
Hubbard, and Palia (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), among others, suggest that ownership
has little effect on firm performance, perhaps because it is optimally set based on each firm’s own
circumstances. On the other hand, the evidence in Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell
and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), McConnell, Servaes, and Lins (2008) suggests
that ownership alters the value of a firm.
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among such managers. On the whole, I expect lower ownership managers - (i) to
exhibit higher levels of herding, (ii) to exhibit a pronounced tendency to employ
positive-feedback or momentum trading strategies, and (iii) to cause greater stock
price reversal post-herding.
I test the above hypotheses using Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)’s
(henceforth, LSV) stock specific herding measure used in many studies (see, for ex-
ample, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Wermers (1999), Puckett and Yan
(2008), Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2012)). It measures correlated trades of funds
adjusted for correlated trades by chance. Using LSV’s herding measure, I find that,
first, the low ownership managers herd more than the high ownership managers. Sec-
ond, the low ownership funds buy-herd (sell-herd) in high (low) past return stocks,
confirming that the low ownership funds use positive-feedback trading strategies. I
find no such evidence for the high ownership funds. In fact, the past returns of the
stocks buy- and sell-herded by the high ownership funds are indistinguishable.
Third, I also conduct additional analysis of returns subsequent to herding and
find return reversals in stocks herded by the low ownership funds. In contrast, there
is almost no reversal in stocks herded by the high ownership funds. The above
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that herding among the lower ownership
funds is driven by agency. In return differential tests, I find that there is greater
return reversal post-herding in stocks herded by the lower ownership funds, and the
difference is statistically and economically significant for up to two quarters post-
herding. The difference between the two long-short portfolios, one that is long on the
intensely buy-herded stocks and short on the intensely sell-herded stocks by the low
ownership managers and a similar long-short portfolio for the high ownership funds,
yields a characteristic-adjusted (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997))
return from -4.10% to -5.94% in two quarters following herding, depending upon
the degree of ownership difference between the low and high ownership managers.
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Fourth, when I examine herding among all funds without conditioning on
managerial ownership, as done in earlier studies, I find that the return pattern is
similar to the return on the stocks herded by the low ownership funds. This can be
seen very clearly in Figure 2.1. It shows the mean characteristic-adjusted cumulative
returns on a long-short portfolio of stocks that is long on the buy-herded stocks and
short on the sell-herded stocks by all funds (solid line), the low ownership funds
(dotted line), and the high ownership funds (dashed line). The portfolio is formed
during the herding quarter, and then returns are tracked on this portfolio for two
quarter before and four quarter ahead of the herding quarter. From the figure,
it is clear that the portfolio herded by the low ownership funds exhibit high past
return, while the similar portfolio herded by the high ownership funds exhibit close
to zero past return. That is, the low ownership funds strongly use positive-feedback
trading strategy, while the past returns on the buy- and sell-herded stocks by the
high ownership funds are indistinguishable. It also shows that the cumulative return
going forward stays close to zero on the portfolio herded by the high ownership
funds. But for the portfolio herded by the low ownership funds, the cumulative
return continuously declines and becomes highly negative post-herding. Finally, the
return pattern on the portfolio herded by all funds and the low ownership funds is
very similar. On the whole, the figure shows that there are two herds in the market
with different herding motivations and different consequences on stock prices, and
that the low ownership herd dominates the high ownership herd in influencing stock
prices.
My final tests examine how the impact on stock prices due to herding by the
low and high ownership funds is related to firm size. Because smaller stocks are
less liquid and if herding is motivated by agency, then it could lead to greater stock
price reversal following herding. I find supportive results. I also find that the high
ownership funds avoid trading in very small stocks probably because it is difficult to
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form precise investment signals and also the trading costs associated in such stocks
are high. I obtain similar results regardless of whether I use portfolio or regression
analysis.
In summary, I show that mutual funds are heterogeneous in their herding
behavior. There are different herds in the market with different underlying motiva-
tions. The results help in reconciling seemingly contradictory empirical findings in
the herding literature. Earlier empirical mutual fund literature on herding (Wermers
(1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Sias (2004)) shows that herding is primarily moti-
vated by information and that it makes market more informationally efficient. Later
papers (Puckett and Yan (2008), Dasgupta, Prat, and Verado (2011a), Brown, Wei,
and Wermers (2012)) find that herding leads to reversal in stock prices, suggesting
that it could be motivated by agency. I show that both herds, a “non-agency herd”,
primarily of high ownership funds, and an “agency herd”, primarily of low owner-
ship funds, are present in the market and that, in the earlier studies, the effect of
non-agency herds could have dominated the effect of agency-herds and vice-versa, as
seen in latter studies. Note that even though the high ownership managers may be
acting on similar information, I call their herd, a non-agency herd, because they are
less likely to ignore their investment signals/information, and engage in uninformed
positive-feedback trading.
Dasgupta, Prat, and Verado (2011a) and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2012)
find that herding causes reversal only in the second half of their sample period.
They argue that it is due to greater institutional holding in the later period. I add
to their findings by showing that even during the later period, there are funds among
which herding is non-agency driven and it causes less reversal post-herding. That
is, there are multiple types of herd in the mutual fund market. Each herd has its
own distinct trading style and different qualitative and quantitative effect on stock
prices.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the method-
ology used to construct herding measures. Section 2.3 describes the data and port-
folio manager ownership in detail. Section 2.4 presents main results on herding,
conditional on ownership and its impact on the stock prices. Section 2.5 concludes
the paper.
2.2 Herding Measures
To measure herding, I use the measure proposed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1992) (henceforth, LSV), used extensively in the literature (see for example, Grin-
blatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Wermers (1999), Sharma, Easterwood, and
Kumar (2006), Puckett and Yan (2008), Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2012)). It
measures the correlated trading by funds in a particular stock adjusting for the
correlated trading occurring by chance. For a stock i in quarter t, LSV herding
measure, HMit, is defined as
HMit = |pit − E(pit)| − E|pit − E(pit)| (2.1)
where pit is the proportion of funds buying stock i in quarter t relative to the
total number of funds trading (buying and selling) that particular stock in the same
quarter. E(pit) is the expected proportion of stock i buys in quarter t, proxied by
the total number of funds buying in quarter t relative to the total number of funds
trading in quarter t aggregated across all stocks. Thus, the first term, |pit−E(pit)|,
represents excess buying or selling in stock i in quarter t relative to the average
buying or selling in the stock in the same quarter. The second term, E|pit−E(pit)|,
is an adjustment factor that accounts for the fact that the first term is always greater
than zero. It can be easily calculated if the number of stock-buys and stock-sells in a
stock-quarter are assumed to be outcomes of a binomial process (see LSV for further
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details). Under the null hypothesis of no herding, that is, random and independent
trading by funds, one would expect that HM it is not significantly different from
zero. As in Wermers (1999), I require that a stock to be traded by at least five
funds in a quarter to be included in the sample to have a meaningful measure of
herding.
Note that HM it is a directionless measure of herding, that is, it does not
distinguish between the buy-side and sell-side herds. To distinguish between the
buy- and sell-side herds, I use conditional herding measures, as in Wermers (1999).
First, stocks are segregated into two groups, depending upon whether they have a
higher or lower proportion of buyers than the average stock in the same quarter.
Then herding measure is calculated as before. The adjustment factor is recalculated
depending upon pit > E(pit) or pit < E(pit) for BHM it or SHM it, respectively.
BHMit = HM it|pit > E(pit)
SHMit = HM it|pit < E(pit)
(2.2)
Finally, as in Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2012), I create a signed adjusted
herding measure, ADJHERD, which combines the buy- and sell-herding measures.
For each stock-quarter, I calculate the adjusted-BHM (SHM), by first subtracting
the minimum BHM (SHM) for that quarter from the stock’s BHM (SHM). This
results in a non-negative herding measure. Then ADJHERD is set to adjusted-
BHM if a stock is buy-herded during that quarter or -1 times adjusted-SHM if a
stock is sell-herded during that quarter. Thus, a high (low) value of ADJHERD
implies that a stock is heavily buy-herded (sell-herded) during that quarter.
The herding measures described above are simple count measures of more than
expected proportion of managers trading in the same direction irrespective of the size
of the trades. A large number of funds trading a particular stock may reveal more
about their underlying motivation. Also, Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) mention
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that contemporaneous returns are more strongly related to changes in the number
of institutional investors than changes in the fraction of shares held by institutions.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Sample Selection
I obtain data on diversified open-ended actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds
from CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database. CRSP funds are matched
with the Thomson funds by MFLINKS dataset (see 1.2.1 for further details). I
exclude all funds that can’t be linked by MFLINKS dataset. I further require
that the total net assets of a fund should be at least $5 million at the start of a
calendar quarter. I then categorize funds into five investment objective categories
- Aggressive Growth, Growth, Growth and Income, Equity Income, and Capital
Gains (see 1.2.1).
I obtain “snapshots” of quarterly holdings of funds from Thomson Reuters
mutual fund holdings database. For funds which do not report quarterly, I bring
forward their last quarter holdings to the current quarter. This is done for at most
one quarter. Further, I move all holdings to the calendar quarter end, if a fund
reports holding before the calendar quarter end. Using these quarterly holdings, I
infer buy and sell trades from changes in two consecutive quarterly portfolio hold-
ings. To make sure the changes in quarterly holdings do not capture stock splits,
I first reverse split the quarterly holdings of the latter quarter and then calculate
the change in holdings. While calculating trades, I also exclude all stocks that are
issued in the past one year because funds may trade such stocks for reasons related
with new IPO issues in the market.
Portfolio manager ownership data is obtained from Morningstar and the SAI
disclosure filed by funds with the SEC. The SAIs are obtained from the SEC
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Edgar. The CRSP-Thomson matched dataset is then combined with the Morn-
ingstar dataset. Thus, I create a dataset having information on fund returns, vari-
ous fund, fund family and manager characteristics. The ownership data used in this
study covers the period from 2006 to 2009.
2.3.2 Recorded Ownership Over Time
The data on portfolio managerial ownership was obtained from Morningstar in Jan-
uary 2009. Since ownership data is declared annually and most funds file this infor-
mation in the later half of a year, the ownership data obtained corresponds to the
year 2008. Unfortunately, Morningstar does not achieve historical data on owner-
ship. This creates a big data challenge because the ownership disclosure is not made
in any standard format in the SEC filings, and thus can’t be extracted through a
script.
To overcome the data challenge, I use Morningstar data for 2008, hand-
collected data and ownership estimates to build a dataset consisting of managerial
ownership from 2006 to 2009. I hand-collect ownership data for a sample of funds
for 2006, 2007, and 2009 and compare it with the ownership of the same manager for
2008. In unreported results, I confirm that the sample selected from 2008 is unbiased
as far as the ownership is concerned. I compare difference-in-mean in percentage
ownership of selected sample and the remaining sample from 2008 and found it not
to be statistically significant even at 10% level. In the hand-collected sample, there
are 449 unique managers of 166 funds, who managed the same fund in both 2007
and 2008 (see Table 2.1). I find no change in managerial ownership for 92% of the
managers. 97% of the managers show no change in ownership level or change of just
one level in ownership. Thus, there is strong consistency in managerial ownership
across consecutive 2007 and 2008.
When I compare ownership of same managers for 2006 and 2008, I find no
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change, or change of just one level in dollar ownership for 88.4% of the managers,
which is still almost 9/10th of the hand-collected sample. For 2008 and 2009, the
corresponding percentage is 90.2%. So, even across 2006/2008, and 2008/2009, I find
strong consistency in managerial ownership. This finding is also consistent with the
slow changes in top executive ownership of corporations over the years as reported by
Zhou (2001). Thus, for 2006, 2007, and 2009, where the same manager manages the
fund in 2008 as well, I estimate ownership from 2008. Sometimes the ownership data
is not available, just because of the timing of disclosure. For instance, if a manager
left the fund on July 31, 2007 and the fund filed its disclosure on October 31, 2007,
then the ownership data for that particular manager is not available for 2007. In
such cases, where possible, I bring forward their ownership from the previous year.
This is reasonable given that ownership doesn’t change much across years. Thus, I
am able to build a dataset consisting of managerial ownership from 2006 to 2009.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
My final sample consists of 1463 distinct funds and 4673 fund-years. The total dollar
managerial ownership is calculated using mid-points of the reported ranges, except
for the last range, greater than $1 million, where I take $1 million as ownership,
and then summing ownership of all managers in case of multi-manager funds. I
follow Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) and measure ownership as percentage of
shares outstanding. Because I am interested in agency influenced trading, I calculate
ownership for each fund at the start of each calendar quarter. It is thus important
to know which managers oversee the fund during any particular quarter. There
are 44,010 fund-quarter-managers in the sample, out of which I am able to obtain
ownership data on 41,203 fund-quarter-managers, which is almost 94%. Thus, for
the sample considered, I have comprehensive data on managerial ownership. For
summary statistics in Table 2.2, I take average ownership over the four quarter in
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each year.
Panel A shows that, on an average, around 27% of the funds have zero owner-
ship. Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) report a figure of 57%, but they include
bond funds as well. They also find that ownership is higher in equity funds than
in bond funds. Thus, ownership numbers seem consistent with that of Khorana,
Servaes, and Wedge (2007). The mean and median ownership in my sample is
around $500,000 and $250,000, respectively, which translates into roughly 0.420%
and 0.030% of total net assets, after taking average over the four years. Khorana,
Servaes, and Wedge (2007)’s sample has 606 fund-years for domestic equity funds
(their total sample consists of 1406 fund-years including bond, international, sector
and balanced funds) and report a mean of $226,000 which is half of what I find. This
could be because of the differences in the sample. Given consistency in individual
managerial ownership across years, I find almost no variation in mean and median
total ownership (that is, total ownership of all managers overseeing a fund) across
years either if it is measured in dollar terms or in percentage terms.
Panel B shows ownership by fund segment. Both mean and median dollar
ownership is highest among the Capital Gains fund segment. While in percentage
terms, mean and median ownership is highest for the Equity Income funds and
Aggressive Growth funds, respectively. There is considerable variation in percentage
ownership across fund segments. For instance, the mean percentage ownership in





I first examine the herding behavior of funds, conditional on ownership. I calculate
the LSV herding measure for every stock-quarter. The LSV measure is a simple
measure of the disproportionate number of funds trading in a stock on the same
side of the market. After calculating the LSV measure for each stock-quarter, I
take the average as done in other studies (such as Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1992), Wermers (1999)). Table 2.3 reports results on herding in stocks by funds
conditional on ownership. To contrast the effect of managerial ownership, I divide
the sample into Low and High ownership funds based on the median ownership
at the start of each calendar quarter for each fund segment. All refers to the full
sample, i.e., when no distinction is made between funds by ownership. At the
start of each calendar quarter, firms are allocated into one of the five size quintiles.
Firm size quintile break points are calculated at the start of each calendar quarter
based on the market capitalization of firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. In
calculating the firm size quintile break points, only stocks with sharecode of 10 or
11 are included. These quintiles are represented by S1 (small stocks) to S5 (large
stocks).
First column reports the mean herding measure for the full sample and sep-
arately for the low and high ownership funds. For the overall sample, the herding
measure is 4.026. That is, if 100 funds trade a stock in any quarter, then around 4
more funds trade on the same side of the market than would be expected if they were
independently trading. The number in parentheses is the number of stock-quarters
used to calculate the mean herding measure. It represents how widespread herding
is. All mean herding levels are statistically significant at 1% significance level, ex-
cept for the mean herding level for the high ownership funds in size quintile 2, which
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is significant at 5% level. There are no observations for the high ownership herd in
stock size quintile 1.7 It thus appears that the high ownership funds avoid trading
in smaller stocks, where it is more difficult to form precise investment signals, and
the associated trading are higher.
Three features stand out when I compare herding among the low and high
ownership funds. First, the low ownership funds herd more than the high ownership
ones. The difference-in-mean is 1.758, which is statistically and economically signif-
icant, given that the overall mean herding level is 4.026. This is consistent with the
view that the low ownership funds herd on public information which tends to be
more uniformly observed, while the high ownership funds could be following similar
signals from their private information which tends to be more disperse or they could
be analyzing public information in similar ways but distinct from the low ownership
funds. Second, while herding by the low ownership funds in stocks increases as firm
size decreases, there is no such pattern for the high ownership funds. This could be
because the low ownership managers employ the same technical strategy of trading
in smaller stocks because they are associated with better returns. On the other
hand, there is no large variation in herding levels among the high ownership funds
across different size quintiles. Thus, it does not appear that they are following any
technical strategy that would result in their higher herding level in any particular
size quintile except for size quintiles 1 and 2, which they generally seem to avoid,
because of the reasons mentioned above. Third, the herding levels among the low
ownership funds are very similar to the overall herding level in the full sample (first
row). This implies that the herding in the full sample is greatly influenced by the
low ownership funds.
7There are just 32 stock-quarters in size quintile 1 for the high ownership. It implies that on
an average only 2 stocks are herded in size quintile 1 by high ownership funds in each quarter.
This is very little information to conclude anything with confidence about their herding behavior.
I thus exclude these observations from the sample because it may lead to erroneous conclusion.
Including these observations does not alter the results.
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Some other findings in Table 2.3 are interesting. One, herding is more widespread
among the low ownership funds. The number in parentheses, stock-quarters, are
much higher for the low ownership funds than that for the high ownership funds.
Two, it is very unlikely that the high ownership funds are providing liquidity to the
low ownership funds. If they were, one would find herding to be more widespread
than what it is in smaller stocks. For instance, the number of stocks traded by
the low ownership funds belonging to the size quintile S2 is 2308, while the corre-
sponding number for the high ownership funds is only 224. These numbers would
roughly be the same if the high ownership funds were providing liquidity to the low
ownership funds. Third, looking at the number of stock-quarters corresponding to
the low and high ownership managers, one can see that some of the stocks herded
are common. This is expected because each fund typically has more than 100 stocks
in its portfolio, so some of the stocks will be common between different funds. I
do not discard the commonly traded stocks. The reason is that the high ownership
funds may herd into a high past return stock because it may be backed by good in-
vestment information. On the other hand, the low ownership funds may herd in the
same high past return because of entirely different reasons, such as the reputational
concerns. Throwing away such stock-quarters means that one cannot understand
the herding behavior of managers, specially of the high ownership managers. More-
over, by including commonly herded stocks, I am biasing against finding different
herding behavior among the low and high ownership managers.
2.4.2 Buy- and Sell-Herding
The above results on herding do not differentiate between the buy- and sell-side
herding. To investigate the differences in the buy- and sell-herding behavior of
managers, conditional on ownership, I follow Wermers (1999). I calculate the buy-
and sell-herding measures as described in the Section 2.2. Panels A and B of Ta-
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ble 2.4 report results on the buy- and sell-herding, respectively. Funds are classified
into low and high ownership categories as before. Firm size quintiles are also formed
as mentioned earlier in the preceding Section 2.4.1.
Because all results are very similar as in the case of direction-less herding,
I only briefly discuss buy- and sell-herding results. All mean herding levels are
statistically significant at 1% significance level, except for the mean herding level
for the high ownership funds in size quintile 2, which is significant at 10% level on
the buy-side and insignificant on the sell-side. I find that both the buy- and sell-
herding measures for the low ownership funds are greater than the buy- and sell-
herding measures for the high ownership funds, respectively. The difference-in-mean
herding level on the buy-side between the low and high ownership funds is 2.100,
while it is 1.351 on the sell-side. For both the buy- and sell-herding, the difference
generally increases as firm size decreases. Further, as in the case of direction-less
herding, the buy- and sell-herding levels among the low ownership managers are
similar to the herding levels in the full sample. There is no clear pattern in herding
among the high ownership funds, although it is slightly elevated among large sized
firms. The mean buy- and sell-herding levels in size quintile S5 are 2.294 and 2.299,
respectively. As before, the high ownership funds avoid trading in smaller stocks
(size quintiles S1 and S2).
2.4.3 Herding and Stock Returns
2.4.3.1 Full Sample
To analyze the trading strategies and the impact of herds on stock returns, I em-
ploy the calendar-time portfolio approach. Each calendar quarter, the buy- and
sell-herded stocks by all funds or of a particular ownership category, low or high,
are classified into two portfolios, Buy and Sell, by buy- and sell-herding measures,
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respectively. The stocks in the Buy and Sell portfolios are further sorted into ter-
ciles by the buy-herding and sell-herding measures (see Section 2.2 for details on
calculation of BHM and SHM ). This results in classification of stocks herded into
six portfolios in each quarter, Buy1 (stocks lightly buy-herded) to Buy3 (stocks
heavily buy-herded) and Sell1 (stocks lightly sell-herded) to Sell3 (stocks heavily
sell-herded). For each stock in each portfolio, the DGTW-adjusted return (Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)) is first calculated and then equal-weighted
return is obtained for all portfolios for seven quarters: Q0 (herding quarter), 2 quar-
ters prior (Q-2 and Q-1), 4 quarters ahead (Q+1, Q+2, Q+3, Q+4) of the herding
quarter. Finally, the time-series mean DGTW-adjusted return is calculated for all
portfolios.
Before I get into the details, I try to understand and present the big picture by
plotting the long-short portfolio returns in Figure 2.1. It shows the mean DGTW-
adjusted cumulative returns on the long-short portfolio of stocks, that is long on
the buy-herded stocks (Buy) and short on the sell-herded stocks (Sell) by all funds,
and the low and high managerial ownership funds. The figure shows the cumulative
return for two quarters before the herding quarter, and up to four quarters after the
herding quarter. For the herding quarter, only that quarter (Q0) return is shown.
That is, for Q-2, Q0, and Q1, only the single quarter returns are shown. For Q-1, the
cumulative return of Q-2 and Q-1 is shown. For Q+2, the cumulative return of Q+1
and Q+2 is shown. And similarly for the quarters Q+3 and Q+4, the cumulative
returns for three and four port-herding quarter returns are shown.
Three features stand out in Figure 2.1. One, the portfolio herded by the
low ownership funds exhibit high past return, while the similar portfolio herded by
the high ownership funds exhibit close to zero past return. It thus appears that
the low ownership funds strongly use positive-feedback trading strategy, while the
past returns on the buy- and sell-herded stocks by the high ownership funds are
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indistinguishable. Two, the cumulative return going forward stays close to 0% on
the portfolio herded by the high ownership funds. But for the portfolio herded by low
ownership funds, the cumulative return continuously declines and becomes highly
negative post-herding, around -4.00%. Third, the return on the portfolio herded
by all funds and low ownership funds are very similar. These findings suggest that
there are two herds in the market with different herding motivations and different
consequences on stock prices, and that the low ownership herd dominates the high
ownership herd in the full sample.
As the benchmark case, Table 2.5 shows the impact of herding on stock returns
when no distinction is made between funds by ownership, as done in earlier studies.
It reports the mean DGTW-adjusted returns on the Buy and Sell portfolios, and
also on the zero-investment portfolio, that is long on the Buy portfolio and short on
the Sell portfolio. It also reports the mean DGTW-adjusted returns on portfolios
formed by herding intensities, and also on the zero-investment, portfolio that is long
on the Buy3 portfolio and short on the Sell3 portfolio. P -values are reported in
parentheses.
I find results consistent with that of earlier studies. First, funds buy- and
sell-herd in stocks with high and low past return, respectively. For instance, the
quarter Q-2 return for the Buy portfolio, call it Buy:Q-2, is 3.34%, and the return
on Buy:Q-1 is 4.37%. The Sell:Q-1 return is -1.45%. All of these returns are highly
statistically significant. The Sell:Q-2 return is not statistically significant. The
Buy-Sell portfolio return for Q-2 and Q-1 is 3.19% and 5.82%, respectively, both of
which are highly statistically significant. Second, the herding portfolios experience
high return during Q0. The Buy-Sell portfolio return for the herding quarter is
4.38% (P -value 0.00). Third, post-herding there is return reversal in Q+3 and Q+4
quarters. The Buy-Sell returns for quarters Q+3 and Q+4 are -0.98% (P -value
0.03) and -0.70% (P -value 0.07), respectively.
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When portfolios are formed by herding intensities, I get qualitatively similar
results. First, funds use positive-feedback trading strategies. Second, returns in the
herding quarter are related strongly with the direction of herding in stocks. Third,
there is return reversal in subsequent quarters, and it is statistically significant
during Q+3. On the whole, when the past returns of herded portfolios and the
impact of herding on future returns is analyzed by treating all funds as a homogenous
group, I find results that are consistent with recent studies that show that the
herding destabilizes stock prices (Puckett and Yan (2008), Dasgupta, Prat, and
Verado (2011a), Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2012)).
2.4.3.2 Low Vs High Ownership Funds
I now analyze the past returns of buy- and sell-herded stocks and the effect of herding
on future returns, conditional on managerial ownership. I divide the sample into
Low and High ownership funds based on the median ownership at the start of each
calendar quarter for each fund segment. Apart from this distinction, the portfolios
are formed in exactly the same way, as before in Table 2.5. Table 2.6 reports returns
on portfolios of buy- and sell-herded stocks by the low ownership funds in Panel A,
high ownership funds in Panel B, and difference in returns in Panel C.
I find that the returns on stocks herded by low ownership funds in Panel A,
and all funds (in Table 2.5) are very similar. This is consistent with the results on
the mean herding levels in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, where it was observed that the mean
herding levels among all funds and low ownership funds are similar. Here I find
that, first, the low ownership funds employ positive-feedback trading strategies.
For instance, Buy:Q-2 and Buy:Q-1 returns are 3.46% and 4.66%, respectively,
and Sell:Q-1 return is -1.78%, all of these returns are statistically significant. The
Sell:Q-2 return is not statistically significant. The Buy-Sell portfolio return for
Q-2 and Q-1 is 3.44% and 6.44%, respectively, both of which are highly statistically
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significant. Second, the herding portfolios experience high return during the herding
quarter. The Buy-Sell portfolio return for the herding quarter is 4.13% (P -value
0.00). Third, post-herding there is return reversal in all quarters, but statistically
significant in Q+3 quarter. The Buy-Sell returns for quarter Q+3 is -0.97% (P -value
0.02). This was -0.98% (P -value 0.03) when herding by all funds was considered in
Table 2.5.
When portfolios are formed by herding intensities, I find similar results. First,
low ownership funds use positive-feedback trading strategies. Second, returns in the
herding quarter are related strongly with the direction of herding in stocks. Third,
there is return reversal in subsequent quarters, and like in the case of full sample,
it is statistically significant in Q+3 quarter. The Buy3-Sell3 portfolio returns for
the quarters Q+1, Q+2, and Q+3 are -2.25% (P -value 0.18), -1.88% (P -value 0.30)
and -1.92% (P -value 0.05), respectively. The corresponding returns for the quarters
Q+1, Q+2, and Q+3 in Table 2.5 are -1.68% (P -value 0.39), -1.81% (P -value 0.33)
and -2.00% (P -value 0.07), respectively. Thus, one can see that the return pattern
in the full sample is very similar to the return pattern for the stocks herded by low
ownership funds.
The empirical findings presented above are consistent with the view that the
herding behavior of low ownership funds is agency influenced, as in Scharfstein and
Stein (1990). In their model, managers fear loss of reputation from acting differently
from the herd and thus may mimic others. Thus a rational manager may follow the
strategies of other managers, like the positive-feedback trading strategy. It is also
consistent with the agency identified by Dow and Gorton (1997), when managers
may engage in uninformed trading because doing nothing might be seen as lack of
stock selection skill or shirking of responsibility.
In contrast to the above findings on returns on the stocks herded by all and the
low ownership funds, the returns on the stocks herded by the high ownership funds
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present a very different picture in Panel B. First, past returns are weakly related
with the direction of herding. Buy:Q-2 and Buy:Q-1 returns are 2.19% and 2.55%,
respectively. Sell:Q-2 and Sell:Q-1 returns are 2.87% and 1.39%, respectively. All
of these returns are statistically significant. But the return difference is not statis-
tically significant for Q-2 quarter and very low in magnitude for Q-1 quarter. The
Buy-Sell portfolio return for Q-2 is -0.68% (P -value 0.15), and for Q-1 it is 1.16%
(P -value 0.00). Thus, unlike the low ownership funds, high ownership funds do not
employ short term positive-feedback strategies very strongly. Second, the herding
portfolios experience high return during Q0. The Buy-Sell portfolio return for the
herding quarter is 3.04% (P -value 0.00). Third, there is no return reversal in sub-
sequent quarters. In unreported results, I find that even the cumulative return of
four quarters post-herding is neither economically nor statistically significant. Its
magnitude is only -0.05% (P -value 0.96). I find similar results, when portfolios are
formed by the herding intensities.
Hence, it appears unlikely that the trades of the high ownership managers
are agency driven. In contrast to the low ownership managers, the cost imposed
on high ownership managers, because of their ownership stakes acts as a deterrent
against ignoring their investment signals and follow the share-the-blame approach
or engaging in uninformed trading. It is difficult to say whether their herding
behavior conforms to any theory. It is possible that the high ownership funds may be
analyzing public information in similar ways, and it is a chance phenomenon that
they form a herd. Alternatively, they may be uncovering information early from
analyzing the same set of stocks, as in Hirshliefer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman
(1994).
Panel C shows difference in returns on the stocks herded by the low and high
ownership funds. For the sake of brevity, I only report the return difference on
the Buy, Sell, Buy-Sell, and the intensely herded portfolios. First note that there
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is a very clear contrast in trading strategies of the low and high ownership funds.
The past returns on the stocks herded by the low ownership funds are very high,
both economically and statistically, as compared to the stocks herded by the high
ownership funds. The difference in the total past return on the Buy portfolio is 3.37%
(P -value 0.00), while it is -6.03% (P -value 0.00) on the Sell portfolio. Similarly, the
difference on Buy-Sell is economically and statistically very significant.
For the post-herding returns, I find that the stocks herded by the low ownership
funds experience greater return reversal. On the buy-side, there is an increased
return reversal, specially in Q+3 quarter. Its magnitude is -0.34% with a P -value of
0.09. There appears to be even greater reversal on the sell-side. The return difference
on the Sell portfolio in Q+2 is 0.67% (P -value 0.00), and it is 0.64% (P -value 0.04)
in Q+3. Perhaps, the low ownership funds herd out of stocks to a greater degree
following consensus analyst downgrades (see Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2012)).
The difference in Buy3-Sell3 portfolio returns for the stocks herded by the
low and high ownership funds also suggests that the lower ownership funds employ
positive-feedback trading strategies to a greater degree, and their herding is followed
by greater return reversal. For instance, the Q-2 and Q-1 quarter return on Buy3-
Sell3 is 4.12% (P -value 0.00) and 5.28% (P -value 0.00), respectively. Post-herding,
the Q+2 and Q+3 quarter return is -0.74% (P -value 0.02) and -0.99% (P -value
0.00), respectively.8 I find similar results for the return difference when portfolios
are formed by herding intensities.
To bring a more clear contrast in the herding strategies and their impact on
stock prices, I separate low and high ownership funds based on terciles at the start of
each quarter and each fund segment. That is, at the start of each calendar quarter
for each fund segment, I sort funds into terciles based on managerial ownership.
The funds in the lowest and highest terciles are now termed as the low and high
8I also checked if the greater return reversal in stocks herded by lower ownership funds is also
reflected in the post-herding cumulative returns. I find supportive results.
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ownership funds. Table 2.7 reports results corresponding to the results in Table 2.6.
I focus only on the key differences in Tables 2.7 and 2.6. First, it is more clear
now that the past returns on stocks buy- and sell-herded by high ownership are
indistinguishable. For instance, the past returns on Buy-Sell and Buy3-Sell3 are
statistically insignificant. There is now even greater evidence of increased return
reversal due to herding by the lower ownership funds. This can be seen in post-
herding returns on Buy-Sell and Buy3-Sell3 in Panel C. For instance, the Q+1
quarter return on Buy3-Sell3 is -3.65 (P -value 0.04), and it is -2.28 (P -value 0.02)
for Q+2 quarter. That is, the stocks herded by the low ownership funds exhibit
about 6.00% greater return reversal than the stocks herded by the high ownership
funds. Overall, I find that the results are robust to separation of funds into low and
high categories based on terciles of ownership, and in fact brings out a more clear
contrast in herding strategies and post-herding return impact.
The above results show that the post-herding return reversal observed in the
full sample appears to be driven mainly due to the agency influenced herding by
the low ownership funds. That is, the low ownership herd dominates the high
ownership herd in its impact on stock prices in the full sample. The big picture
that emerges from the above results is that there are multiple herds in the mar-
ket. There is an “agency herd”, primarily of low ownership funds, and there is
a “non-agency herd”, primarily of high ownership funds. Note that even though
the high ownership managers may be trading on similar fundamental information,
I call their herd, a non-agency herd, because they do not ignore their investment
signals/information, or engage in uninformed positive-feedback trading. Each of
these agency and non-agency herds has its own distinct trading style and different
qualitative and quantitative effect on stock prices.
The above findings also offer an explanation and reconcile seemingly contra-
dictory empirical findings in the literature. The earlier studies use data only until
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1997 and find that the herding speeds up the process of price adjustment by quickly
incorporating news into prices and thus make markets more informationally efficient.
For instance, Wermers (1999) uses quarterly mutual fund holdings from December
1974 to December 1994, and finds that funds use positive-feedback trading and that
prices adjust permanently post-herding. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) use yearly data
from 1977 to 1995 and find that institutional herding appears to be related with
momentum trading. They also find no evidence of return reversal in the year follow-
ing herding. Sias (2004) uses quarterly ownership data of institutions from 1983 to
1997 and find weak positive correlation between herding in the current quarter and
returns over the next year. But the later studies, which use more recent data, such
as, Puckett and Yan (2008), Dasgupta, Prat, and Verado (2011a) and Brown, Wei,
and Wermers (2012) find that the herding leads to reversal in stock prices, and thus
destabilizes stock prices. According to the Investment Company Fact Book 2010,
there were only 4468 funds at the end of 1997, but this number has grown to around
12,000 by 2007. It could be the case that a higher proportion of all managers are
agency influenced in the later years. Thus, one possible explanation for the seem-
ingly contradictory findings is that the agency herd dominates the non-agency herd
in the overall market in the later years, while the reverse could be true in the earlier
years.
Note that this explanation is different from that of Dasgupta, Prat, and Verado
(2011a) and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2012). They argue greater reversal in later
years is because of greater institutional holding in the later years, and thus greater
trading in an average stock. Therefore, institutional herding may have a larger
impact in the later years. The primary difference between their explanation and my
explanation is that I treat fund managers as a heterogenous group. Using managerial
ownership, I am able to separate out the managers who are more likely to be agency
influenced, and it is primarily these managers who cause reversal in stock prices
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post-herding.
2.4.3.3 Small Vs Large Stocks
Because smaller stocks are less liquid and if herding is motivated by agency, then it
could lead to greater stock price reversal following herding. I test this hypothesis in
Table 2.8. As earlier, I form the Buy and Sell portfolios, depending upon whether
a stock is buy- or sell-herded. This is done for the full sample of funds, and also for
the stocks herded by the low and high ownership funds. I then further divide the
stocks in the Buy and Sell portfolios into three groups by firm size at the start of
each quarter. Thus, there are six portfolios each at the start of each quarter. For
each stock in each portfolio, I calculate the DGTW-adjusted abnormal return and
then I obtain equal-weighted return for all portfolios for seven quarters: Q0 (herding
quarter), 2 quarters prior (Q-2 and Q-1), 4 quarters ahead (Q+1, Q+2, Q+3, Q+4)
of the herding quarter. From the six portfolios above, three zero-investment Buy-
Sell portfolios are constructed for each firm size group: small, medium and big.
Firm size tercile break points are calculated at the start of each calendar quarter
based on the market capitalization of firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq.
In calculating the firm size tercile break points, only stocks with sharecode of 10 or
11 are included. Table 2.8 reports the mean DGTW-adjusted quarterly returns on
these three Buy-Sell portfolios by firm size for all, low and high ownership funds
in Panels A, B and C, respectively. Panel D shows the return difference between
the Panels B and C. The funds are classified into low and high ownership categories
based on median ownership for each segment at the start of each calendar quarter.
I again find that the results are very similar for the stocks herded by all and the
low ownership funds. On the other hand, the results on the stocks herded by high
ownership funds present a very different picture. In Panel A, first, as the firm size
decreases, for the stocks herded by all funds, the total past return for the quarters
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Q-2 and Q-1 increases from 4.93% for big stocks to 21.38% for small stocks, both
of which are highly statistically significant. Second, the contemporaneous return
decreases from 4.38% to statistically insignificant 0.40%. Third, there is greater
return reversal in smaller stocks. For instance, Q+3 and Q+4 quarter return for
big stocks is -0.65% (P -value 0.07) and statistically insignificant -0.40% (P -value
0.23), respectively, while it is -4.99% (P -value 0.05) and -5.12% (P -value 0.01),
respectively, for the small stocks. In Panel B, where I analyze the return on the
stocks herded by the low ownership funds, the return pattern is very similar to the
return pattern in Panel A. Overall, I find that there is greater return reversal in
smaller stocks herded by all funds and also by the low ownership funds.
Panel C provides a very different picture. First, as firm size decreases from
low to medium (the high ownership funds avoid trading in small stocks), I find
that for the stocks herded by the high ownership funds, the past return for Q-2 is
statistically insignificant 0.08% for big stocks, and for Q-1 is 3.03% (P -value 0.00)
for medium sized stocks. These past returns are very low as compared to the past
returns on stocks herded by the low ownership funds. Second, contemporaneous
return increases from 2.63% for big stocks to 4.37% for medium sized stocks. Third,
there is no return reversal post-herding. Note that the high ownership funds avoid
trading in small stocks. As explained earlier, possible reasons could be that the
small stocks are thinly traded and have higher associated trading costs, and it is
more difficult to form precise investment signals in such stocks.
Panel D shows the return difference on stocks herded by the low and high
ownership funds for medium and large stocks. I find that the low ownership funds
have a greater tendency to employ short-term positive-feedback trading strategy,
and this tendency increases as firm size decreases. There is evidence of greater
return reversal post-herding in all quarters, although it is statistically significant
only for Q+2 for big stocks. However, when I use the tercile separation for the
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low and high ownership funds, and compare the return difference in Panel E, I find
more clear evidence of return reversal. The difference in Buy-Sell return for the
Q+2 quarter for the big firms is -1.06% (P -value 0.04), and it is -3.08% (P -value
0.05) for the Q+1 quarter for medium sized firms. In summary, the above results
show that as firm size decreases, there is greater return reversal post-herding in the
overall market, which is primarily driven by agency influenced low ownership funds.
2.4.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis
To test robustness of the results, I now examine the impact of herding on future
stock returns using multivariate regression analysis. Specifically, I want to confirm
that the herding by the lower ownership funds leads to greater price reversal post-
herding, controlling for stock characteristics that may influence future return. I
follow the tercile ownership separation because it brings out more clear contrast in
the return patterns of stocks herded by the low and high ownership funds. Table 2.9
reports the mean coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of DGTW-adjusted
quarterly return on ADJHERD, DLow, ADJHERD*DLow and stock characteristics.
See Section 2.2 for calculation of ADJHERD. It is a signed herding measure, where
a low (high) value of ADJHERD indicates that a stock is heavily sell-herded (buy-
herded). DLow is a dummy variable for the stocks herded by the low ownership
funds. ADJHERD*DLow is the interaction of ADJHERD and DLow. It captures
the incremental effect of herding due to the low ownership funds on stock returns
in addition to the effect of herding due to the high ownership funds. It is the main
variable of interest in regressions. The stock characteristics included are DivYield,
which is calculated as cash dividends for the fiscal year ended before the end of
the herding quarter divided by the size of the stock at the end of the herding
quarter. Log(Vol) is the natural logarithm of standard deviation of daily returns of
the stock during the herding quarter, Turnover is the volume divided by the shares
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outstanding at the end of herding quarter, Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of firm
size in $millions at the end of the herding quarter, Log(BM) is the natural logarithm
of book-to-market ratio9, and Qret is the raw quarterly return during the herding
quarter.
Panel A shows results for all herded stocks. Consistent with the portfolio
analysis, I find that there is greater stock return reversal post-herding due to the low
ownership funds. The coefficients on ADJHERD*Dlow for Q+1 and Q+2 quarters
are -5.85 (P -value 0.06) and -3.93 (P -value 0.00), respectively. It shows that on an
average, a 10% increase in the same side trading by the low ownership funds that
trade the stock during that quarter results in 0.585% increased reversal in Q+1,
as compared to the similar 10% increase in trading by the high ownership funds.
Similarly for the quarter Q+2, a 10% increase in the same side trading by the low
ownership funds that trade the stock during that quarter results in 0.393% increased
reversal, as compared to the similar 10% increase in trading by the high ownership
funds.
Panels B and C show results for the buy- and sell-herded stocks, respectively.
In Panel B, the coefficients on ADJHERD*Dlow for the quarters Q+1 and Q+2
are -6.91 (P -value 0.05) and 0.35 (P -value 0.86), respectively. It suggests that a
10% increase in buy-side trading by the low ownership funds that buy the stock
during that quarter results in a 0.691% increased reversal in Q+1, as compared to
the similar 10% increase in trading by the high ownership funds. For the sell-side
herding in Panel C, the coefficients on ADJHERD*Dlow for the quarters Q+1 and
Q+2 are -4.55 (P -value 0.42) and -7.65 (P -value 0.05), respectively. Thus, herding
by the low ownership funds results in greater return reversal on both buy- and sell-
side. Overall, I find that the results from the multivariate analysis are consistent
9Book-to-market ratio is based on the market value of equity in December of year t-1, and
book value of equity is calculated as in Daniel and Titman (2006). The book-to-market ratio thus
obtained is applied from July of year t through June of year t+1.
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with that from the portfolio analysis. In further unreported robustness tests, I also
run panel regression and find similar results.
2.5 Conclusion
Using a new dataset on portfolio manager ownership, I analyze the herding behavior
of managers, conditional on their ownership stakes in the funds they manage. The
herding behavior of the low and high ownership funds is very different. Each herd
has its own distinct trading style and different qualitative and quantitative effect on
stock prices. Low ownership funds herd more and employ positive-feedback trading
strategy, while the past returns of the buy- and sell-herded stocks by high ownership
funds are indistinguishable. In other words, there is no evidence to suggest that
high ownership funds use positive-feedback trading strategy. Low ownership funds
herding is followed by stock price reversal, while high ownership funds herding is
followed by more stable price adjustments.
The empirical findings are consistent with the view that herding among the
low ownership funds is more likely to be agency driven, as in Scharfstein and Stein
(1990). These managers may ignore their information and mimic other managers
for fear of loss of reputation. It is also possible that when the low ownership man-
agers are not able to identify profitable investments, they may yet have to trade
because active non-trading cannot be distinguished from lack of stock selection skill
or shirking of responsibility (Dow and Gorton (1997)). This can also induce the low
ownership managers to employ positive-feedback trading. On the other hand, there
is a cost associated for the high ownership managers for ignoring their investment
signals/information, or engaging in uninformed positive-feedback trading because of
their ownership in the funds.
The results also show that the post-herding return reversal observed in the full
sample appears to be driven mainly due to the herding among the low ownership
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funds. Overall, I find that there are multiple herds with different underlying mo-
tivations. There is an “agency herd”, primarily of low ownership funds, and there
is a “non-agency herd”, primarily of high ownership funds. In the full sample, the
agency herd dominates the non-agency herd in impacting stock prices.
The above findings also offer an explanation and reconcile seemingly contra-
dictory empirical findings in the literature. The earlier empirical studies, such as
Wermers (1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Sias (2004), find that herding is followed
by permanent price adjustment and that it makes market more informationally effi-
cient. However, the later studies, such as Puckett and Yan (2008), Dasgupta, Prat,
and Verado (2011a), Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2012), find that herding leads to
reversal in stock prices. Based on the empirical findings in this study, one explana-
tion is that just as the agency herd dominates the non-agency herd in the overall
market in the later years, while the reverse could be true in earlier years.
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Figure 2.1: Managerial Ownership, Herding and Stock Returns
This figure shows mean DGTW-adjusted cumulative returns on a long-short portfolio of stocks
that is long on buy-herded stocks (Buy) and short on sell-herded stocks (Sell) by all, low and high
managerial ownership funds. Funds are classified into low and high ownership categories based on
median ownership at the start of each calendar quarter for each fund segment. See text for more
details. Cumulative return is shown for two quarters before the herding quarter, and up to four
quarters after the herding quarter. For the herding quarter, only that quarter return is shown.
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Table 2.1: Recorded Managerial Ownership Over Time
This table reports statistics from comparison of managerial ownership for the same manager for
different years for the hand-collected sample. Nfunds is the number of funds compared across two
years, such as for 2007 and 2008 this number is 166. NMgrs is the number of managers compared
across two years, and Diff(Own Range) is the difference in managerial ownership range reported
by the fund for two years. For instance, if a fund manager has disclosed dollar range of $1-$10,000
in 2006 and $50,001-$100,000 in 2007, then Diff(Own Range) for that fund manager is 2.
2008-2007 2008-2006 2008-2009
Nfunds 166 153 170
Diff(Own Range) NMgrs Percent NMgrs Percent NMgrs Percent
-6 0 0.00 0 0 2 0.38
-5 0 0.00 1 0.28 2 0.38
-4 4 0.89 4 1.13 5 0.96
-3 0 0.00 0 0.00 5 0.96
-2 5 1.11 8 2.26 22 4.23
-1 10 2.23 12 3.39 32 6.15
0 415 92.43 268 75.71 397 76.35
1 10 2.23 33 9.32 40 7.69
2 1 0.22 15 4.24 8 1.54
3 3 0.67 5 1.41 1 0.19
4 1 0.22 6 1.69 5 0.96
5 0 0.00 1 0.28 1 0.19
6 0 0.00 1 0.28 0 0.00
Total 449 100.00 354 100.00 520 100.00
79
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics on managerial ownership by year in Panel A, and by
fund segment in Panel B. In Panel A, N and Zero represents the number of funds, and number
of funds with zero managerial ownership, respectively. In Panel B, N and Zero represents the
number of fund-years, and number of fund-years with zero managerial ownership, respectively.
Mean and median of dollar ownership, and dollar ownership as percentage of total net assets is
also reported. Dollar ownership is calculated by first taking the midpoint of range of managerial
ownership reported by the fund in the SEC filings and then summed across all managers in case of
multi-manager funds. For the last range, greater than $1 million, $1 million is taken as ownership.
Percentage ownership is calculated at the start of every calendar quarter by dividing the dollar
ownership by total net assets of the fund, then average of quarterly percentage ownership over an
year is taken for each fund, so that for each fund and for each year, there is one observation for
percentage ownership.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by year
Mgr Own($) Mgr Own(% of TNA)
Year N Zero Mean Median Mean Median
2006 1139 306 536351 250000 0.422 0.031
2007 1144 311 505013 250000 0.390 0.025
2008 1244 352 503525 250000 0.421 0.026
2009 1146 303 504921 250000 0.437 0.038
Total fund-years 4673
Total funds 1463
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Fund Segment
Mgr Own($) Mgr Own(% of TNA)
Fund Segment N Zero Mean Median Mean Median
Equity Inc (EI) 237 46 431461 250000 0.538 0.025
Growth (G) 2964 822 514101 250000 0.451 0.033
Growth & Inc (GI) 1020 293 523511 250000 0.386 0.021
Capital Gains (CG) 269 71 559261 280000 0.273 0.032
Agg Growth (AG) 183 40 454590 250000 0.111 0.034
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Table 2.3: Herding Measures by Managerial Ownership
This table reports the overall mean herding level of funds and mean herding level of funds by firm
size. See Section 2.2 for details on calculation of herding measure. Low and High refers to the
sample of funds belonging to the low and high managerial ownership categories. These categories
are determined based on the median ownership at the start of each calendar quarter for each fund
segment. Managerial ownership is calculated at the start of every calendar quarter by dividing the
dollar ownership (summed across all managers) with total net assets of the fund. Dollar ownership
is calculated by first taking the midpoint of range of managerial ownership reported by the fund in
the SEC filings and then summed across all managers in case of multi-manager funds. For the last
range, greater than $1 million, $1 million is taken as ownership. All refers to the full sample, i.e.,
when no distinction is made among funds by ownership. At the start of every calendar quarter,
firms are allocated into one of the five size quintiles. Firm size quintile break points are calculated
at the start of every calendar quarter based on market capitalization of firms listed on NYSE,
AMEX and Nasdaq. In calculating firm size quintile break points, only stocks with sharecode of
10 or 11 are included. These quintiles are represented by S1 (small stocks) to S5 (large stocks). All
P -Values for mean herding levels are less than 0.01, except for high ownership funds in S2 quintile
where it is 0.014. There are no observations for high ownership funds herding in size quintile S1.
Numbers in parentheses are the number of stock-quarters used to calculate mean herding level.
Last row shows difference-in-mean herding level between low and high ownership funds and the
associated P -values.
Overall S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
All 4.026 17.656 7.860 4.152 3.079 3.396
(48912) (710) (3801) (11379) (15330) (17692)
Low 3.972 21.404 10.096 4.481 2.883 3.351
(43723) (432) (2308) (9356) (14490) (17137)
High 2.214 - 2.207 2.122 2.085 2.310
(28209) (224) (2796) (9661) (15528)
Low-High 1.758 - 7.889 2.359 0.798 1.041
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 2.4: Buy- and Sell- Herding Measures by Managerial Ownership
This table reports mean buy- and sell-herding levels in Panels A and B, respectively. See Section 2.2
for details on calculation of buy- and sell-herding measures. Low and High refers to the sample
of funds belonging to the low and high managerial ownership categories. These categories are
determined based on the median ownership at the start of each calendar quarter for each fund
segment. Managerial ownership is calculated at the start of every calendar quarter by dividing the
dollar ownership (summed across all managers) with total net assets of the fund. Dollar ownership
is calculated by first taking the midpoint of range of managerial ownership reported by the fund in
the SEC filings and then summed across all managers in case of multi-manager funds. For the last
range, greater than $1 million, $1 million is taken as ownership. All refers to the full sample, i.e.,
when no distinction is made among funds by ownership. At the start of every calendar quarter,
firms are allocated into one of the five size quintiles. Firm size quintile break points are calculated
at the start of every calendar quarter based on market capitalization of firms listed on NYSE,
AMEX and Nasdaq. In calculating firm size quintile break points, only stocks with sharecode of
10 or 11 are included. These quintiles are represented by S1 (small stocks) to S5 (large stocks). All
P -Values for mean herding levels are less than 0.01, except for high ownership funds in S2, where it
is 0.067 for buy-herding, and 0.136 for sell-herding. There are no observations for high ownership
funds buy- and sell-herding in size quintile S1. Numbers in parentheses are the number of stock-
quarters used to calculate mean buy- and sell-herding levels. Last row shows difference-in-mean
herding level between low and high ownership funds and the associated P -values.
Panel A: Buy-Herding
Overall S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
All 4.357 15.776 9.710 5.046 3.209 3.141
(26618) (311) (2310) (6659) (8520) (8818)
Low 4.317 18.962 12.250 5.574 3.161 2.898
(23717) (176) (1448) (5656) (8186) (8251)
High 2.217 - 2.314 2.162 2.108 2.294
(14967) (113) (1470) (5127) (8257)
Low-High 2.100 - 9.936 3.412 1.053 0.604
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: Sell-Herding
Overall S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
All 3.604 18.262 5.076 2.941 2.890 3.597
(22294) (399) (1491) (4720) (6810) (8874)
Low 3.555 22.224 6.409 2.892 2.547 3.733
(20006) (256) (860) (3700) (6304) (8886)
High 2.204 - 1.812 2.177 2.070 2.299
(13242) (111) (1326) (4534) (7271)
Low-High 1.351 - 4.596 0.714 0.477 1.433
(0.000) (0.002) (0.075) (0.030) (0.000)
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Table 2.5: Herding and Stock Returns: All Funds
This table reports mean DGTW-adjusted (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)) quar-
terly return in percent on stocks buy- and sell-herded by all funds. Each calendar quarter stocks
buy- and sell-herded by funds are classified into two portfolios, Buy and Sell. Stocks in Buy and
Sell portfolios are further sorted by buy-herding measure (BHM) and sell-herding measure (SHM)
(See Section 2.2 for details on calculation of BHM and SHM ). This results in classification of stocks
herded into six portfolios in each quarter. Buy1 (stocks lightly buy-herded) to Buy3 (stocks heavily
buy-herded) and Sell1 (stocks lightly sell-herded) to Sell3 (stocks heavily sell-herded), in addition
to Buy and Sell portfolios. For each stock in each portfolio DGTW-adjusted return is first calcu-
lated and then equal-weighted return is obtained for all portfolios for seven quarters: Q0 (herding
quarter), 2 quarters prior (Q-2 and Q-1), 4 quarters ahead (Q+1, Q+2, Q+3, Q+4) of herding
quarter. Time-series DGTW-adjusted return on portfolios is reported. Returns are also reported
on two long-short portfolios, Buy-Sell, which is long on Buy and short on Sell, and Buy3-Sell3,
which is long on Buy3 and short on Sell3. Heteroscedasticity-consistent P -values are reported in
parentheses.
Portfolio Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Buy 3.340 4.376 2.705 0.312 0.311 0.128 0.622
(0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.449) (0.463) (0.854) (0.309)
Sell 0.143 -1.451 -1.684 1.058 1.064 1.118 1.325
(0.703) (0.003) (0.024) (0.320) (0.309) (0.155) (0.114)
Buy-Sell 3.197 5.827 4.389 -0.746 -0.752 -0.989 -0.703
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.375) (0.293) (0.030) (0.070)
Buy3 5.172 7.638 4.952 -0.039 -0.123 0.242 0.049
(0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.917) (0.670) (0.758) (0.934)
Buy2 3.005 3.802 2.571 0.064 0.146 -0.025 0.837
(0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.819) (0.719) (0.969) (0.221)
Buy1 1.979 1.977 0.743 0.924 0.906 0.184 0.933
(0.033) (0.025) (0.115) (0.235) (0.251) (0.806) (0.188)
Sell1 0.731 0.438 -0.229 0.755 1.153 0.327 1.360
(0.175) (0.461) (0.646) (0.412) (0.088) (0.627) (0.079)
Sell2 0.983 -0.794 -1.167 0.833 0.527 1.052 1.509
(0.009) (0.023) (0.120) (0.213) (0.557) (0.092) (0.125)
Sell3 -1.747 -4.773 -4.290 1.648 1.694 2.251 0.955
(0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.403) (0.381) (0.089) (0.285)
Buy3-Sell3 6.919 12.410 9.241 -1.688 -1.818 -2.009 -0.907
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.397) (0.335) (0.071) (0.192)
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Table 2.6: Herding and Stock Returns: Low Vs High Ownership Funds
(Median Separation)
This table reports mean DGTW-adjusted (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)) quar-
terly return in percent on stocks buy- and sell-herded by low and high ownership funds. Funds are
classified into low or high ownership categories at the start of each calendar quarter based on the
median ownership for each fund segment. Managerial ownership is calculated at the start of each
calendar quarter by dividing the dollar ownership (summed across all managers) with total net as-
sets of the fund. Dollar ownership is calculated by first taking the midpoint of range of managerial
ownership reported by the fund in the SEC filings and then summed across all managers in case of
multi-manager funds. For the last range, greater than $1 million, $1 million is taken as ownership.
Each calendar quarter stocks buy- and sell-herded by low ownership funds are classified into two
portfolios, Buy and Sell. Stocks in Buy and Sell portfolios are further sorted by buy-herding
measure (BHM) and sell-herding measure (SHM) (See Section 2.2 for details on calculation of
BHM and SHM ). This results in classification of stocks herded into six portfolios in each quarter.
Buy1 (stocks lightly buy-herded) to Buy3 (stocks heavily buy-herded) and Sell1 (stocks lightly
sell-herded) to Sell3 (stocks heavily sell-herded), in addition to Buy and Sell portfolios. For each
stock in each portfolio DGTW-adjusted return is first calculated and then equal-weighted return
is obtained for all portfolios for seven quarters: Q0 (herding quarter), 2 quarters prior (Q-2 and
Q-1), 4 quarters ahead (Q+1, Q+2, Q+3, Q+4) of herding quarter. Time-series DGTW-adjusted
return on portfolios is reported. Returns are also reported on two long-short portfolios, Buy-Sell,
which is long on Buy and short on Sell, and Buy3-Sell3, which is long on Buy3 and short on
Sell3. Panel A reports returns on stocks herded by low ownership funds, while Panel B reports
returns on stocks herded by high ownership funds. Panel C compared returns in Panels A and B.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent P -values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Low Ownership Funds
Portfolio Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Buy 3.465 4.660 2.542 0.121 0.260 0.140 0.644
(0.013) (0.002) (0.004) (0.718) (0.539) (0.839) (0.262)
Sell 0.020 -1.788 -1.591 1.060 1.048 1.112 1.247
(0.951) (0.001) (0.020) (0.314) (0.316) (0.172) (0.160)
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Buy-Sell 3.445 6.448 4.133 -0.940 -0.788 -0.972 -0.603
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.294) (0.262) (0.024) (0.222)
Buy3 5.468 7.823 4.502 -0.214 0.001 -0.037 0.207
(0.010) (0.002) (0.000) (0.531) (0.998) (0.963) (0.737)
Buy2 3.255 4.343 2.674 0.081 0.152 0.182 0.562
(0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.844) (0.730) (0.779) (0.375)
Buy1 1.806 2.111 0.580 0.483 0.602 0.249 1.132
(0.089) (0.002) (0.261) (0.370) (0.328) (0.749) (0.072)
Sell1 0.682 0.027 -0.487 0.776 0.558 0.893 1.794
(0.206) (0.968) (0.276) (0.397) (0.452) (0.327) (0.078)
Sell2 1.120 -1.118 -1.600 0.596 0.854 0.748 1.040
(0.001) (0.013) (0.005) (0.533) (0.245) (0.202) (0.246)
Sell3 -2.255 -4.887 -2.983 2.040 1.881 1.886 0.821
(0.001) (0.000) (0.023) (0.201) (0.331) (0.114) (0.327)
Buy3-Sell3 7.723 12.709 7.486 -2.254 -1.880 -1.923 -0.614
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.188) (0.305) (0.056) (0.296)
Panel B: High Ownership Funds
Portfolio Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Buy 2.196 2.558 2.309 0.323 0.334 0.486 0.885
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.421) (0.394) (0.466) (0.240)
85
Sell 2.877 1.394 -0.734 0.293 0.376 0.469 0.849
(0.000) (0.018) (0.184) (0.615) (0.690) (0.508) (0.227)
Buy-Sell -0.681 1.164 3.043 0.030 -0.041 0.018 0.036
(0.151) (0.007) (0.000) (0.926) (0.954) (0.960) (0.869)
Buy3 2.216 3.340 3.532 0.537 0.230 -0.162 0.297
(0.025) (0.018) (0.003) (0.332) (0.636) (0.814) (0.750)
Buy2 2.937 2.217 1.838 0.175 0.110 0.744 0.864
(0.010) (0.000) (0.005) (0.635) (0.753) (0.259) (0.170)
Buy1 1.342 2.200 1.654 0.236 0.683 0.880 1.503
(0.014) (0.004) (0.008) (0.624) (0.250) (0.259) (0.081)
Sell1 2.456 2.045 0.956 0.465 0.877 0.340 0.908
(0.000) (0.038) (0.163) (0.525) (0.375) (0.619) (0.299)
Sell2 3.010 1.969 -0.855 0.070 -0.100 0.212 0.627
(0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.885) (0.878) (0.752) (0.378)
Sell3 3.206 -0.016 -2.512 0.344 0.453 0.910 1.094
(0.001) (0.977) (0.009) (0.677) (0.750) (0.368) (0.088)
Buy3-Sell3 -0.990 3.356 6.044 0.193 -0.222 -1.072 -0.797
(0.203) (0.010) (0.000) (0.723) (0.865) (0.237) (0.169)
Panel C: Low Minus High
Portfolio Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Buy 1.269 2.101 0.233 -0.202 -0.074 -0.346 -0.242
(0.055) (0.006) (0.442) (0.503) (0.717) (0.092) (0.485)
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Sell -2.857 -3.182 -0.857 0.767 0.672 0.644 0.398
(0.000) (0.000) (0.085) (0.169) (0.008) (0.044) (0.167)
Buy-Sell 4.126 5.283 1.089 -0.969 -0.746 -0.990 -0.639
(0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.218) (0.026) (0.037) (0.284)
Buy3 3.252 4.482 0.970 -0.750 -0.229 0.125 -0.090
(0.014) (0.001) (0.151) (0.205) (0.564) (0.790) (0.892)
Sell3 -5.461 -4.871 -0.471 1.697 1.428 0.976 -0.273
(0.000) (0.000) (0.597) (0.083) (0.063) (0.095) (0.500)
Buy3-Sell3 8.713 9.353 1.442 -2.447 -1.657 -0.850 0.183
(0.000) (0.000) (0.281) (0.094) (0.067) (0.320) (0.834)
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Table 2.7: Herding and Stock Returns: Low Vs High Ownership Funds
(Tercile Separation)
This table reports mean DGTW-adjusted (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)) quar-
terly return in percent on stocks buy- and sell-herded by low and high ownership funds. Funds are
classified into low or high ownership categories at the start of each calendar quarter based on the
lowest and highest tercile ownership for each fund segment. Managerial ownership is calculated at
the start of each calendar quarter by dividing the dollar ownership (summed across all managers)
with total net assets of the fund. Dollar ownership is calculated by first taking the midpoint of
range of managerial ownership reported by the fund in the SEC filings and then summed across
all managers in case of multi-manager funds. For the last range, greater than $1 million, $1 mil-
lion is taken as ownership. Each calendar quarter stocks buy- and sell-herded by low ownership
funds are classified into two portfolios, Buy and Sell. Stocks in Buy and Sell portfolios are fur-
ther sorted by buy-herding measure (BHM) and sell-herding measure (SHM) (See Section 2.2 for
details on calculation of BHM and SHM ). This results in classification of stocks herded into six
portfolios in each quarter. Buy1 (stocks lightly buy-herded) to Buy3 (stocks heavily buy-herded)
and Sell1 (stocks lightly sell-herded) to Sell3 (stocks heavily sell-herded), in addition to Buy and
Sell portfolios. For each stock in each portfolio DGTW-adjusted return is first calculated and
then equal-weighted return is obtained for all portfolios for seven quarters: Q0 (herding quarter),
2 quarters prior (Q-2 and Q-1), 4 quarters ahead (Q+1, Q+2, Q+3, Q+4) of herding quarter.
Time-series DGTW-adjusted return on portfolios is reported. Returns are also reported on two
long-short portfolios, Buy-Sell, which is long on Buy and short on Sell, and Buy3-Sell3, which is
long on Buy3 and short on Sell3. Panel A reports returns on stocks herded by low ownership
funds, while Panel B reports returns on stocks herded by high ownership funds. Panel C compared
returns in Panels A and B. Heteroscedasticity-consistent P -values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Low Ownership Funds
Portfolio Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Buy 3.793 4.890 2.588 0.005 0.141 0.175 0.738
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.986) (0.728) (0.816) (0.237)
Sell 0.237 -1.620 -1.399 1.054 0.948 0.939 1.191
(0.533) (0.000) (0.042) (0.310) (0.309) (0.240) (0.177)
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Buy-Sell 3.556 6.510 3.988 -1.049 -0.808 -0.764 -0.453
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.209) (0.033) (0.257)
Buy3 5.560 7.962 4.610 -0.489 -0.258 -0.180 0.240
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.209) (0.489) (0.825) (0.712)
Buy2 3.497 4.327 2.844 0.546 0.033 0.422 0.714
(0.013) (0.000) (0.003) (0.248) (0.945) (0.558) (0.179)
Buy1 2.431 2.614 0.448 -0.108 0.589 0.268 1.247
(0.020) (0.003) (0.361) (0.784) (0.394) (0.769) (0.178)
Sell1 0.740 -0.051 -0.428 0.901 0.848 0.528 1.745
(0.149) (0.888) (0.419) (0.263) (0.308) (0.455) (0.069)
Sell2 1.174 -0.412 -0.935 0.338 0.606 0.793 0.873
(0.024) (0.215) (0.092) (0.710) (0.358) (0.316) (0.357)
Sell3 -1.536 -4.965 -3.158 2.126 1.450 1.628 0.950
(0.006) (0.000) (0.008) (0.208) (0.333) (0.112) (0.287)
Buy3-Sell3 7.097 12.928 7.767 -2.615 -1.708 -1.808 -0.710
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.153) (0.296) (0.028) (0.250)
Panel B: High Ownership Funds
Portfolio Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Buy 2.541 2.047 2.549 0.389 0.455 0.321 0.727
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.361) (0.431) (0.607) (0.377)
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Sell 3.184 1.807 -0.957 -0.035 0.195 0.515 1.091
(0.000) (0.000) (0.111) (0.949) (0.779) (0.540) (0.125)
Buy-Sell -0.643 0.240 3.506 0.423 0.260 -0.194 -0.364
(0.252) (0.421) (0.000) (0.186) (0.453) (0.698) (0.292)
Buy3 2.308 2.083 4.108 0.896 0.516 0.073 -0.205
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.150) (0.221) (0.916) (0.812)
Buy2 2.403 2.163 1.737 -0.089 -0.273 0.545 0.622
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.780) (0.679) (0.404) (0.337)
Buy1 2.987 1.925 1.791 0.371 1.104 0.273 1.758
(0.014) (0.048) (0.011) (0.480) (0.175) (0.729) (0.116)
Sell1 2.758 2.222 0.090 -0.167 1.192 0.548 1.579
(0.002) (0.001) (0.868) (0.798) (0.160) (0.533) (0.082)
Sell2 3.128 2.044 -0.746 0.212 -0.542 0.270 0.450
(0.000) (0.000) (0.213) (0.740) (0.266) (0.744) (0.360)
Sell3 3.693 1.041 -2.383 -0.146 -0.056 0.794 1.311
(0.000) (0.108) (0.014) (0.809) (0.959) (0.458) (0.149)
Buy3-Sell3 -1.385 1.043 6.491 1.043 0.572 -0.721 -1.515
(0.146) (0.196) (0.000) (0.058) (0.566) (0.510) (0.005)
Panel C: Low Minus High
Portfolio Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Buy 1.252 2.843 0.039 -0.384 -0.315 -0.146 0.012
(0.090) (0.007) (0.927) (0.161) (0.336) (0.581) (0.976)
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Sell -2.947 -3.427 -0.442 1.089 0.753 0.424 0.100
(0.000) (0.000) (0.396) (0.093) (0.046) (0.207) (0.756)
Buy-Sell 4.199 6.270 0.481 -1.473 -1.068 -0.570 -0.089
(0.000) (0.000) (0.478) (0.068) (0.072) (0.252) (0.888)
Buy3 3.252 5.879 0.502 -1.386 -0.773 -0.253 0.444
(0.028) (0.017) (0.574) (0.047) (0.159) (0.602) (0.507)
Sell3 -5.230 -6.006 -0.774 2.272 1.506 0.834 -0.360
(0.000) (0.000) (0.440) (0.074) (0.033) (0.163) (0.461)
Buy3-Sell3 8.482 11.885 1.276 -3.658 -2.280 -1.088 0.805
(0.000) (0.000) (0.415) (0.043) (0.020) (0.163) (0.284)
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Table 2.8: Herding and Stock Returns: Small Vs Large Stocks
This table reports mean DGTW-adjusted (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)) quarterly return in
percent on long-short portfolio of stocks, which is long on Buy portfolio (stocks sell-herded) and short on Sell
portfolio (stocks sell-herded), herded by all funds in Panel A and by low and high managerial ownership funds in
Panel B and C, respectively, by firm size. Panel D compares returns on stocks herded by low and high ownership
funds, where funds are categorized into low and high categories as in Table 2.6. Panel E compares returns on stocks
herded by low and high ownership funds, where funds are categorized into low and high categories as in Table 2.7.
Each calendar quarter stocks buy- and sell-herded by low ownership funds are classified into two portfolios, Buy
and Sell. Stocks in Buy and Sell portfolio are further divided into three groups by firm size at the start of each
quarter. Firm size tercile break points are calculated at the start of each calendar quarter based on the market
capitalization of firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. In calculating the firm size tercile break points, only
stocks with sharecode of 10 or 11 are included. Thus, there are six portfolios each at the start of each calendar
quarter, Buy:Small, Buy:Medium, Buy:Big, and Sell:Small, Sell:Medium, Sell:Big. For each stock in each portfolio
DGTW-adjusted return is calculated and then equal-weighted return is obtained for all portfolios for seven quarters:
Q0 (herding quarter), 2 quarters prior (Q-2 and Q-1), 4 quarters ahead (Q+1, Q+2, Q+3, Q+4) of herding quarter.
From six portfolios above, three Buy-Sell portfolios are constructed for each firm size group - small, medium and
big. The table below in each panel reports mean DGTW-adjusted returns on these three Buy-Sell portfolios by
firm size. Heteroscedasticity-consistent P-values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: All Funds
Firm Size Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Small 9.983 11.398 0.402 -3.167 -2.229 -4.996 -19.987
(0.003) (0.000) (0.900) (0.387) (0.535) (0.057) (0.038)
Medium 4.904 9.411 4.884 -1.078 -1.059 -1.314 -5.358
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.429) (0.244) (0.119) (0.037)
Big 1.383 3.548 4.386 -0.028 -0.402 -0.653 -1.725
(0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.956) (0.371) (0.074) (0.058)
Panel B: Low Ownership Funds (Median Separation)
Firm Size Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Small 10.238 7.728 0.690 -0.692 -3.967 -8.621 -13.789
(0.007) (0.023) (0.916) (0.884) (0.479) (0.064) (0.316)
Medium 5.439 10.202 4.855 -1.618 -1.258 -1.505 -6.518
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.331) (0.196) (0.142) (0.048)
Big 1.940 4.627 4.051 -0.215 -0.422 -0.583 -2.099
(0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.741) (0.342) (0.070) (0.047)
Panel C: High Ownership Funds (Median Separation)
Firm Size Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Medium -1.325 3.036 4.370 -0.943 -0.580 0.148 -1.470
(0.169) (0.002) (0.003) (0.245) (0.733) (0.783) (0.567)
Big -0.555 0.638 2.630 0.276 0.143 -0.033 0.302
(0.243) (0.112) (0.000) (0.330) (0.789) (0.930) (0.740)
Panel D: Low Minus High (Median Separation)
Firm Size Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Medium 6.764 7.166 0.485 -0.675 -0.678 -1.653 -5.048
(0.001) (0.001) (0.718) (0.626) (0.539) (0.161) (0.118)
Big 2.495 3.989 1.420 -0.491 -0.565 -0.550 -2.400
(0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.365) (0.090) (0.214) (0.036)
Panel E: Low Minus High (Tercile Separation)
Firm Size Q-2 Q-1 Q0 Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4
Medium 6.201 9.043 -1.876 -3.081 -0.051 -2.721 -4.000
(0.000) (0.009) (0.347) (0.050) (0.977) (0.177) (0.391)
Big 2.791 4.489 0.895 -0.586 -1.063 -0.052 -2.238














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3: Customized Mutual Fund Peers
3.1 Introduction
Money managers in the U.S. manage over $13 trillion in assets, of which $11.6
trillion is held in open-ended mutual funds. As of December 2011, there are 7,634
open-ended mutual funds, 4,581 of which invest primarily in equity. The shares
held by mutual funds represent 29% of outstanding shares in the U.S. market (ICI
Factbook, 2012).
Funds pursue varying investment objectives. Some funds invest in growth
stocks while others seek income from dividend paying stocks or invest in specific
sectors such as natural resources. Fund managers have broad latitude in setting
investment strategies to attain their stated targets. Given these variation in fund
objectives and investment strategies, academics and practitioners classify funds into
a small number of investment “styles.” For instance, the Thomson Reuters Lipper
classification system lists 14 styles for U.S. diversified equity funds. Brown and
Goetzmann (1997) identify 8 distinct equity investing styles.
A primary purpose of style classifications is to help investors evaluate fund
performance. Fund managers are compensated, hired, and fired based on their
returns relative to peer funds following similar styles. Individual investors face a
complex search process when choosing among thousands of funds. Informative style
classifications reduce the search costs for such investors. Misclassified peers can hurt
investors because investor flows chase peer-adjusted returns even when the peers are
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imperfect (Sensoy (2009)). Thus, Brown and Goetzmann (1997) seek “... objectively
and empirically determined style benchmarks that are consistent across managers
and related to a manager’s strategy.” We develop methods to identify fund peers.
A key feature of our classification system is that the fund peers we generate are
customized and fund-specific. Thus, no two funds need have the same set of peers.
There are currently two main approaches towards specifying fund style bench-
marks. One approach uses historical fund returns. Sharpe (1988), Sharpe (1992)
regresses historical fund returns on benchmark indexes and uses the regression coeffi-
cients to generate fund benchmarks. Brown and Goetzmann (1997) use past returns
to form clusters of funds, picking clusters such that they have low within-variation
in historical returns. A second approach, which we develop, uses fund holdings to
characterize style (Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Daniel et al. (1997), Chan et al.
(2002), Chan et al. (2009), Brown et al. (2009)). The holdings based approach is
extensively used in practice. The widely followed Lipper and Morningstar classifica-
tions use holdings data to construct peers. Our techniques contribute to this strand
of the literature.
We propose a transparent and easily extendable method for identifying a fund’s
peers based on fund holdings data. We let both the number of a fund’s peers and
the composition of its peer group vary from fund to fund in fairly general ways. A
distinguishing feature of our approach is that peers are fund-specific. If B is a peer
of A and C is a peer of B, we do not require that C is a peer of A. A second feature
is that our peer group size and composition are not static. They can vary from
quarter to quarter to let the peer group adapt quickly to track the evolution in fund
style shifts. We show that the peers we identify explain a significant component
of fund performance out of sample. We use our customized peers to characterize
performance, persistence and competition in the fund industry.
Briefly, our approach is as follows. We classify stocks according to k pre-
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specified dimensions of style. We represent a fund as a point in the resulting k-
dimensional space based on its portfolio’s value-weighted style characteristics. We
compute a normed distance between a fund i and all other funds j. We classify a
fund j as a peer of fund i if the normed distance di,j ≤ d∗. An interesting question
is what distance d∗ one ought to choose in determining a fund’s peer set. A tighter
spatial radius generates more close fits but fewer funds as peers while wider bands
may introduce excessive numbers of peers. We choose a granularity to match the
widely used Lipper stock classification schemes. We do not impose any constraints
on the number of peers of a fund. Some funds may have over 50 peers within spatial
radius of d∗, while other funds may have less than 10 peers within the same radius.
A second question is what style dimensions should define the space in which
funds are located. One extreme is to treat each stock as an independent dimension.
However, this approach weights distances between all pairs of stocks symmetrically.
For instance, the difference between two tech stocks would equal the difference
between a young tech stock and an old tobacco firm. It seems more sensible to specify
the spatial structure based on a smaller number of dimensions that capture likely
drivers of stock co-movement. This is our approach. Here, it is worth emphasizing
that expanding the spatial dimensions of style does not automatically improve fit.
Irrelevant dimensions result in unrelated peers, noisy benchmarks, and worse fit.
Our peer selection process is flexible enough to accommodate variations in spa-
tial dimensions and the distance function. For instance, the Morningstar or Lipper
classifications use lexicographic orderings that preference size and then sequentially
match on growth dimensions such as M/B, yield or earnings. We can accommodate
such preferences. Our baseline spatial specifications are the drivers of co-movement
studied in prior work, primarily size and B/M used by Morningstar and Lipper.
However, we also consider momentum and find a surprisingly significant gain in
power from doing so. Among other variables, dividend yield is somewhat beneficial
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but industry and several growth proxies such as P/E and sales growth show very
little incremental value in our study. We do not experiment with other dimensions
without a clear risk interpretation. However, our approach also accommodates other
fund attributes such as fund size or expenses (Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison
(1999b), Kim et al. (2000)).
We summarize the main results. Our sample comprises between open-ended
mutual funds investing in U.S. equity that report quarterly holdings data. Following
DGTW (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997), the baseline results locate
peers in a three dimensional space with size, growth, and momentum as the three
axes. We find that there is considerable cross-sectional and temporal variation in
the number and identity of peers of funds. For instance, about a sixth of funds have
less than 25 peers, while about a quarter have more than 200 peers within the same
maximal distance. A majority of funds exhibit churn in peer groups. For instance,
almost a quarter of a fund’s peer group consists of funds not in the peer group the
previous quarter.
The customized peers intersect but do not entirely overlap with Lipper style
peers. This is not surprising: the customized peers are updated every quarter so
style drifts in funds or their peers result in quick reassignments. For example, funds
switching to conservative styles to lock in early-year gains as in Brown et al. (1996b),
will find themselves clustered along a new set of customized peers whose investing
styles are closer to theirs. The new set of peers will likely still include many earlier-
quarter peers absent complete churn in portfolio to a new style category. However,
many new funds may now be better matches. Our approach permits this possibility
with greater granularity than existing style buckets.
We next examine if the peers explain fund returns out of sample. For holdings
announced in month T , we compute the equal weighted returns of a fund’s spatially
proximate peers for months [T + 1, T + 3]. In each month, we regress the cross-
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section of fund returns on the peer returns. In the baseline DGTW style space, our
customized peers explain an average of 42% of fund returns compared to 32% for
the 14-category Lipper style peers used widely in the fund industry. The R2 is 42%
when we include both the customized and Lipper peers. Funds also exhibit lower
tracking error using our peers compared to Lipper peers.
We next examine whether performance relative to customized peers produces
different rankings relative to conventional performance measures. If funds broadly
follow consistent styles reflected in traditional risk factors, we should find both the
customized peers and the traditional measures produces similar rankings of funds.
On the other hand, if funds drift, the two rankings can be very different. Two-
way sorts based on customized peer alphas and the DGTW characteristic selectivity
(CS), Carhart, and Lipper style alphas reveal a large number of off-diagonal funds.
Fund rankings using customized peers are imperfectly correlated with rankings using
the other methods. The results suggest that funds exhibit significant style drift.
We consider out of sample prediction of fund alphas. Such predictability is not
implausible. Our alpha rankings do not fully overlap with the CS and Carhart (1997)
alphas. Moreover, funds must meet a relatively high bar to outperform relative to
our customized peers, which are recalibrated every quarter. We conduct the alpha
predictability tests by tracking future fund alphas as a function of alphas relative to
customized peers. We find that outperformance relative to customized peers helps
predict future risk-adjusted returns. For instance, for one quarter ahead, decile 10
minus decile 1 spreads are an annualized 317 basis points. Skill persists but declines
with time, as the one year ahead alpha is about 206 basis points per year, about a
third lower than the one-quarter ahead alpha spread.
We analyze competition in the mutual funds market. The number of fund-
specific peers reflects the extent of competition faced by funds. Funds in less com-
petitive markets earn higher alphas because they have unique or differentiated ideas
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coupled with skills that are hard to replicate. Alternatively, they may identify niche
investment areas that investors desire, in which case such funds can charge higher
fees. However, these managers may or may not earn higher alphas on average de-
pending on whether all managers in the niche are skilled or not.
A second question is about persistence of alpha. Here, the tests focus not
on average managerial ability but on the subset of managers with skill. We ask
whether conditional on having skill, what types of markets display skill persistence.
If our measure of customized peers reflects competition, we should find that skilled
managers in a well populated area with many peers will likely not have persistent
alphas. Even if such a manager earns alphas in a period, it is easier for competitors
to enter and arbitrage away ideas. The same phenomenon can happen in a more
concentrated market, but this can take longer as there are not enough peers to
quickly move in the location of the successful manager. Thus, persistence of alpha
should be higher in concentrated markets. We test these predictions.
We find evidence that customized peers proxy for competition in economically
sensible ways. When funds have few customized peers, they appear to be specialized
and differentiated. These funds are younger, have lower assets under management
and higher expense ratio and management fees. Thus, our peer identification process
sorts the style space by competition between funds. While the variation in alpha
by concentration is low, there is economically significant alpha persistence in spatial
locations with concentrated funds and few peers. The results suggest that not all
managers have alphas, but those that do can sustain it in more concentrated markets
with few customized peers. Further characterization of competition represents an
avenue for further research, our view is that our peer identification methods can
help this line of research by providing clean, dynamic, and ex-ante measures of the
competitiveness of different market segments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some institu-
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tional background and reviews the current approaches towards peer identification.
Section 3 describes our methodology in detail. Section 4 describes the data and
Section 5 provides results. Section V6concludes.
3.2 Background and Related Literature
Current approaches for specifying fund style benchmarks are based on fund prospec-
tuses, past fund returns, or fund holdings. We briefly review the methods and the
related literature. We refer readers to Wermers (2011) for a detailed survey.
3.2.1 Prospectus-Based Peers
Fund prospectuses are potentially useful in understanding style because prospectuses
have legal force. Prospectuses provide short descriptions of style that are extracted
and categorized by fund databases such as Lipper. In practice, these descriptions are
usually too unspecific to provide precise quantitative guidance on fund strategies.
Moreover, the prospectuses explicitly permit managers to deviate from their stated
strategies. For instance, the prospectus of T. Rowe Price Growth Funds says
... The fund seeks to provide long-term capital growth and ... dividend income
through investments in the common stocks of well-established growth companies....
and ... the fund has the discretion to deviate from its normal investment criteria
The description leaves managers enormous latitude in their baseline investment
choices. Moreover, it explicitly permits managers to deviate from these choices. This
is typical, even when funds are specific about their investing philosophies.1
SEC rules require mutual funds to report a benchmark peer index, which can
1See, e.g., T. Rowe Price’s diversified madcap growth fund states ... The fund seeks to provide
long-term capital growth by investing primarily in the common stocks of mid-cap growth companies.
The fund defines mid-cap companies as those whose market capitalization falls within the range
of either the S&P MidCap 400 Index or the Russell Midcap Growth Index. The fund has the
flexibility to purchase some larger and smaller companies ... [and] some securities that do not
meet its normal investment criteria.
100
serve as a peer benchmark. However, the regulations offer little guidance about
which index a fund should pick and why. the flexibility opens up the room for
benchmark gaming, as pointed out by Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Huang
et al. (2011b). Sensoy (2009) finds that the benchmark in a large number of cases
does not match with the actual fund style. Thus, the prospectus disclosed bench-
marks are also unlikely to be reliable.
3.2.2 Returns Based Peers
A second approach towards constructing peers employs past fund returns. Sharpe
(1988, 1992) is an early example of the returns-based approach. Sharpe suggests
regressing fund returns on benchmark indexes with the restriction that the coeffi-
cients are positive and sum to unity. The coefficients can be interpreted as portfolio
weights that are used to establish fund benchmarks. An alternative approach is
to regress mutual fund returns on factors suggested in the asset pricing literature
(Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997)). Chan, Dimmock, and
Lakonishok (2009) find that the procedure does not perform well in their sample
of 199 managed equity portfolios. A third approach that employs historical fund
returns is is suggested by Brown and Goetzmann (1997). They represent the fund
benchmarking problem as a k-means return clustering problem. They identify 8
clusters of funds and find that the cluster returns explain fund returns better than
regression based approaches.
3.2.3 Holdings Based Peers
A third approach generates peer benchmarks based on fund holdings. Under this
approach each stock is classified into style dimensions. A fund’s style characteristic
on any dimension is the value weighted characteristic of the fund’s stock holdings
on that dimensions. The style dimensions usually employed in the literature include
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size, book-to-market (B/M), and past returns. Academic studies underline the
value of holdings-based benchmarking, e.g., Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) for
Morningstar funds from 1979 to 1997 and Chan, Dimmock, and Lakonishok (2009)
for 199 actively managed equity portfolios.
Holdings are also widely employed by the fund industry. Here, the goal is
to use holdings to generate fund peers. A fund is benchmarked by its performance
relative to same-class peers. Here, the construction of peers is of particular economic
interest because the excess returns above peer benchmarks are widely used to market
funds to investors. While the exact process for generating peer classes has varied
over time, one constant has been the use of two dimensions to classify funds: market
capitalization and the growth/value orientation of a fund’s stock portfolio. Both the
Lipper and Morningstar classifications use this approaches to form fund peer groups.
To illustrate, consider the Lipper process used to classify funds.2 Lipper defines
a stock as large, medium, or small cap based on its capitalization relative to the
70th, 70th-85th, and above 85th percentiles of market capitalization going from
large to small stocks. The growth/value orientation comes from a Z-score based on
B/M, P/E, price-to-sales, dividend yield, return on equity, and 3-year sales growth.3
Absolute Z-scores of 0.20 and above define growth/value orientation; “core” stocks
are neither value nor growth. The growth and capitalization orientation of a fund
is derived by aggregating fund holdings. For instance, Lipper characterizes funds
as large, medium, or small cap based on whether 75% of its holdings fall into the
relevant category of stocks, otherwise the fund is a multi-cap fund. Once funds are
classed into groups, the peers and fund performance measures are well defined.
We develop and evaluate new methods to construct a fund’s peer group from
holdings data. Our approach addresses a number of open questions on the economics
2See, e.g., the Holdings-Based Fund Classification Methodology published by Lipper in June
2010. Morningstar employs a similar style classification process.
3The Z-score is a fund’s characteristic minus the weighted average for its size bucket. The score
used for ranking is a weighted average of Z’s for current and prior quarter holdings.
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of the peer peer identification process. One question concerns the specification of the
style space. Neither Lipper nor Morningstar use momentum as a style dimension, nor
do Chan, Dimmock, and Lakonishok (2009). However, the academic literature since
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) considers momentum an important style attribute.
Likewise, does B/M suffice to capture a fund’s growth/value orientation? Or is
there value to supplementing B/M with attributes such as sales growth or dividend
yield. If so, how do we incorporate them into the style space? Likewise, Kacperczyk
et al. (2005) suggest that industry is a style dimension. Is it useful to incorporate
industry as a style dimension? Our framework addresses such issues.
We also address a less familiar issue of transitivity in peer group formation.
Current approaches, e.g., the Lipper 13-style classifications, construct transitive
peers. The benchmarks for a fund comprise all other funds belonging to its class.
Thus, if A is a peer of B and B is a peer of C, then C is also a peer of A. We show
that the transitivity restriction is not necessary and is in fact costly, as it results in
less precise benchmark peers.
Using intransitive peers can also address the economic issue of fund style drift
(Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Wermers, 2009).
The literature points out that managers shift holdings relative to static benchmark
classes, which can lead to incorrect performance attribution. In our approach, drifts
in stock picking style are met with corresponding changes in peer groups. We can
adjust peer groups without all-or-nothing reassignment of funds to new groups or
redefining entire fund categories, which would be necessary with transitive groups.
Because peer group changes match style changes, we can also identify the extent
to which selectivity is an individual manager attribute or an attribute of groups of
managers. Finally, intransitivity simplifies computation and permits flexible and
easily scalable methods for peer identification.
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3.3 Data
We obtain data on actively managed, open-ended U.S. equity mutual funds from
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund database. Our sample starts from Jan-
uary 1980. We focus on diversified equity funds. To identify such funds, we follow
a sequential algorithm. We first select funds whose Lipper Classification Code is
one of the following: EIEI, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE,
MLGE, MLVE, SCCE, SCGE, SCVE. If the classification code is missing, we select
funds whose “Strategic Insights” objective code is AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING,
or SCG. Where both codes are missing, we pick funds with Wiesenberger objective
codes equal to G, G-I, GCI, LTG, MCG, or SCG or “Policy” code is CS. For the
remaining funds, we require that the lifetime average invested in equity is at least
80%. We eliminate index funds by using CRSP defined index fund flags and by
screening the names of funds for words such as “Index” or “S&P.”
Our dependent variable in most specifications is the monthly fund return. The
after-expense monthly return comes from CRSP. To obtain returns before expenses,
we add back one-twelfth of the previous fiscal year end fund expense to the after-
expense monthly return. To avoid multiple counting of funds, we value-weight fund
class returns using prior month total net assets to obtain fund level before and
after expense returns. Similarly, we also value-weight expense and turnover ratios.
Fund size is the sum of total net assets of all fund classes. Fund age is in years,
computed as of the month end relative to the fund’s earliest first offer date. We
exclude fund-months in which age is negative to eliminate young funds with limited
histories.
We obtain snapshots of the quarterly holdings of funds from the Thomson
Reuters mutual fund holdings database. We exclude all funds whose objective code
is one of the following: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond & Preferred, Balanced,
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and Metals. For funds that do not report quarterly, which is less common towards
the later years of our sample, we extrapolate the previous quarter holdings to the
current quarter. This is done for at most one quarter to avoid excessively stale data.
Holdings disclosures before a quarter end are carried forward to the quarter end.
From the fund-quarter portfolios identified through the holdings data, we re-
move all funds whose total net assets (TNA) are less than $5 million. We do not
necessarily eliminate fund-quarters with missing TNA because these observations
are sometimes for funds have large previously disclosed TNA. We eliminate sur-
vivorship bias due of newly incubated funds by excluding the first appearance of a
fund-quarter in the Thomson Reuters dataset. These funds may appear in the funds
only if their prior performance has been satisfactory. Evans (2009) points out that
this bias is not eliminated by simply screening on size.
Because our focus is on diversified funds, we eliminate funds with less than
10 stocks in their portfolio. These funds are unlikely to be diversified. We then
combine the CRSP sample with the Thomson Reuters holdings sample using the
MFLINKS dataset developed by Wermers (2000). After matching the datasets, we
further remove fund-quarters that do not have a valid Lipper class in CRSP. We
implement this screen only for fund-quarters after December 1999 because Lipper
classifications are unavailable before that date. Our final sample consists of 3081
unique funds for which we have at least one disclosed portfolio from quarter 2 of
1980 to quarter 2 of 2010.
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Specification of Characteristics Space
As discussed in Section 3.1, we place stocks into a k-dimensional characteristics
space and value weight stocks held by a fund to locate funds in the characteristics
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space. We calculate the characteristic vector of each fund at the end of each quarter
based on reported holdings. Following DGTW or Carhart (1997), our baseline
characteristics axes are size, book-to-market (B/M) ratio and momentum.
Stock size is based on the the quarter-ending market capitalization of the
firm in dollar millions from CRSP. B/M is calculated in June of year t using the
book equity for the last fiscal year end in year t-1 and market equity at the end of
December in year t-1. The B/M ratio thus obtained is applied from July of year
t to June of year t+1. We calculate book equity as defined in Daniel and Titman
(2006). Momentum is the cumulative return of past 11 months [t− 2, t− 12]. Thus,
we exclude the return for quarter-ending month when the portfolio is disclosed.
We also require a minimum of 10 months of non-missing return data to calculate
momentum.
Each stock is assigned a 3-dimensional vector with each dimension representing
a percentile value in the interval [0,1], based on the characteristic percentiles of
stocks listed on the NYSE. For instance, to obtain size percentile, we first form
size percentile breakpoints to one decimal point based on the firms listed on the
NYSE with share codes of 10 or 11. We compare a stock’s size with the NYSE
size percentile breakpoints. For instance, if the firm size falls between the firm sizes
corresponding to the percentiles 74.5 and 74.6, the size percentile for the stock is
0.745. We similarly assign the B/M and momentum percentiles. We then rescale
stock weights in each fund’s portfolio using stocks with non-missing size, B/M ratio
and momentum percentiles. A fund’s characteristic vector is the dollar-weighted
average of its stock holdings vector.
3.4.2 Non-transitive Fund Peers
We compute fund pairwise similarity scores based on fund style to construct a fund-
style-similarity network from which a customized set of peers can be identified for
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each fund. These similarity scores are constructed from each fund’s 3 dimensional
characteristic vector as described above. The methodology we employ uses a tech-
nique related to the cosine similarity method used in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) –
HP – to construct industry classifications. However, there is one important differ-
ence. In HP, characteristic vectors are rescaled to have unit length before similarity
is computed, as their objective is to score firms in a relative fashion based on the
degree of relative vocabulary overlap. In the current application, we do not normal-
ize our percentile vectors prior to computing similarity. This choice recognizes the
fact that funds having low percentiles for all three characteristics are not peers for
firms having proportional but uniformly high percentiles of all three characteristics.
For fund i in quarter t, we denote its N -element characteristic vector of per-
centiles as Vi. In our main specification, N is equal to three as we consider three
characteristics. However, we express the methodology with greater generality as
similarity can be based on a larger vector of characteristics, for which the com-
putation is not unduly difficult. Each element of Vi lies in the interval [0, 1] and
denotes the fund’s percentile ranking (expressed as a fraction). A fund j should be
considered a peer of fund i if the elements of Vj are all very close to Vi in nominal
magnitude. Denote the distance as d and similarity as 1 − d, so high similarity
denotes closeness in spatial distance. If Vi[n] is the nth element of the vector Vi, the
pairwise similarity of funds i and j, Sij :





Similarity Sij is confined to the range [0, 1]. Scores closer to one indicate more
similarity and scores closer to zero indicating less similarity. Also, because Sij is
known for every pair of funds, this calculation implies a fund “style network” in
which the network is fully described by a pairwise similarity matrix.
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To complete the process of using this network to construct a peer classification
system, we need to identify a target level of granularity such that peers are funds
within a cutoff distance d̄ or a similarity exceeding S̄. The choice of the cutoff is an
empirical issue. We specify the target granularity based on the observed granularity
of the Lipper classification. In particular, under the Lipper classification, 8.761% of
randomly drawn fund pairs are in the same Lipper class. Because a goal of our study
is to assess how the performance of our classifications to the Lipper classification,
we will also require that our classification is equally granular such that 8.761% of
randomly drawn funds will be members of one another’s customized peer groups.
Analogous to the computational approach outlined in HP, the target granu-
larity of 8.761% is achieved by identifying a “minimum required similarity” S̄ such
that i and j are deemed to be peers if Sij ≥ S̄. This is equivalent to specifying
S̄ as the largest number such that 8.761% of randomly drawn Sij’s are larger than
S̄. As a minor refinement, we further require that any particular fund have at least
five peers. This refinement does not materially affect our results, but has the added
benefit of ensuring that any given fund can be compared to a material set of coun-
terfactual funds. Because the target granularity of 8.761% is relatively coarse, most
funds have 100 or more peers and hence the minimum of five is binding only for a
very small number of “unique” funds. Therefore, for any given fund i, its customized
peers are defined as all other funds j such that Sij > S̄.
We note that the peers we identify are not transitive. Intuitively, peer funds
can be visualized as funds within a sphere of a fixed radius. If two funds A and B lie
within a sphere surrounding fund C, it is not necessary that B lies within a sphere
of similar radius surrounding A. We also note that our specification of intransitive
peers is parsimonious. We can easily expand the dimensions of the characteristic
space – although more dimensions do not necessarily improve fit – or accommodate
different loss functions such as ordered sorts with B/M and momentum following
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size.
We also do not further utilize information regarding the degree of similarity
of each peer j relative to focal fund i. For example, some peers are more similar to
i than others, and the degree of similarity can be used to generate a further-refined
benchmark using weighted averages. We do not extensively pursue these refinements
in this version to keep the focus on the value added by intransitive customized peers.
It is useful to compare our method for generating peers with other approaches
used in the literature. Relative to the return based style analyses of Sharpe (1992)
and Brown and Goetzmann (1997), there are important differences. We use current
holdings rather than historical return patterns. Additionally, clustering identifies
transitive peers while we focus on intransitive peers. Intransitivity is also a key
difference between our methods and others such as Lipper or Morningstar classifi-
cations used in the industry.
Our analysis is also distinct from the DGTW approach of grouping the uni-
verse of all stocks by value, growth, and momentum and using these to generate
benchmarks. The benefits of this technique in classifying funds are analyzed very
carefully by Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) and more recently by Chan, Dim-
mock, and Lakonishok (2009). Our study can be viewed as complementing this line
of work in two ways. One, we examine the performance of funds relative to other
funds rather than passive benchmarks. In other words, we too use the classification
of stocks by styles but marry it with data on actual fund holdings. Second, we relax
the assumption of transitivity in fund peers by allowing each fund to have its own
set of peers.
3.4.3 Transitive Fund Peers
Although the focus of our paper is on intransitive customized peers, we also construct
a classification that imposes the transitivity restriction. A peer classification is said
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to satisfy the transitivity property if, for any funds i and j that are peers under
the given classification, then a fund k that is among fund i’s peers must also be
among fund j’s peers. As Hoberg and Phillips (2010) point out when constructing
industry classifications, the transitivity property should be viewed as a constraint,
as fund k might be quite dissimilar to fund j in the above example even if fund k
is a strong peer for fund i. We consider transitive fund peers to assess the value
added by relaxing the transitivity requirement, to better disentangle the source of
the additional explanatory power from using our customized peers.
In order to compute transitive fund peers, we start with the same similarity
matrix based on Sij used constructing intransitive peers for each pair of funds i and
j. Our objective is to now form 13 clusters of funds, matching the granularity of
the Lipper classification to maximize the within-cluster similarity of fund holdings.
Because the distribution of pairwise similarities for a small number of particularly
unique funds can be quite low, we choose a clustering method that has the objective
of maximizing the expected signal from peer effects under the assumption that
signal strength is proportional to fund pairwise similarity scores Sij. This algorithm
recognizes that fund pairs with higher similarity scores should be deemed pairs.
However, it also recognizes that more balance in the number of peers per group is
also beneficial because for any fund, a more refined signal can be extracted if there
are more peers.
The clustering algorithm follows the computational approach suggested by
Hoberg and Phillips (2010). We start by initially pairing each fund with another fund
that is highly similar to itself. For example, we first deem the two most similar funds
(based on Sij) to be a pair. Then, among remaining funds, the two most similar are
deemed a pair. This process is continued until all funds are paired. We next combine
these pair-clusters into larger clusters until only thirteen clusters remain (as Lipper
has 13 groups). In any particular iteration, we choose which clusters to combine
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based on which combination will generate the maximum expected improvement in
the signal strength, a process that requires considerable experimentation. This is
especially true when are close to the target when a unitary move of a fund can
impact the overall signal to noise ratio within a peer group. The details and an
implementable computational algorithm are available from the authors upon request.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for our dataset. Panel A shows that are 3,076
unique actively managed equity funds in our sample. The number of funds vary over
time with 498 funds towards the start to around 2,000 towards the end of the sample
period, reflecting the growth in the funds industry. The decline in the number of
funds in 2010 represents exits in the industry due to the 2008 financial crisis. The
total assets under management per fund expands over the period from an average of
$210 million in 1985 to $1,328 million towards the end of the period. The weighted
returns for our sample are comparable to those in prior studies such as Chan, Chen,
and Lakonishok (2002), although the samples are not identical. For instance, Chan
et al. use fund data from Morningstar and examine the time period between 1979
and 1997, while our study incorporates later time periods through 2010.
In Panel B, we report descriptive statistics classified by the 13 Lipper classes.
The largest number of funds are in the “Large Cap Growth” and “Large Cap Core”
style categories. The large cap floor is between the 316th and 317th stock in the S&P
composite index. The multi-cap core category, with 210 funds, is the third largest
category of funds, with the label “multi-cap” denoting the fact that less than 75%
of fund assets are invested in specific category cutoffs defined by Lipper. Relatively
few funds are in the “income” or “value” categories in terms of the number of funds,
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although the average assets under management are the highest for large cap value
funds, which also have the lowest total expense ratios.
3.5.2 Do We Identify Different Peers?
Table 3.2 examines the differences in peer classifications between our methods and
the Lipper classification methods. We ask whether the two methods generate similar
peers, given our requirement that our classification methods should result in similar
granularity as the Lipper methods.
The table reports three panels. Panels A and B report what is effectively a
Venn diagram between the customized peer (CP) and the Lipper peer (LP) classifi-
cations. In Panel A, in each quarter q for year t, for each fund jqt, we divide peers
into three categories customized peers that are not Lipper peers jqt(CP ̸∈ LP ),
common peers jqt(CP ∩ LP ) , and Lipper peers that are not customized peers
jqt(LP ̸∈ CP ). We add these numbers across all funds j and divide by the sum
to normalize them into percentages. We then average these percentages for all four
quarters q = 1, 2, 3, 4 for year t and report the average for each year. Panel B
reports similar statistics, but here, we compute the percentage of each category of
peers (e.g., jqt(CP ̸∈LP )
jqt(CP ̸∈LP )+jqt(LP∩CP )+jqt(LP ̸∈CP )), average them for each quarter q in year
t and then average the quarterly averages by year t. In either case, we find that
there is significant non-overlap between the different types of peers. In fact, only
about a fifth of the peers are common.
Panel C of Table 3.2 examines the dynamic variation in peer group compo-
sition. Here, we examine all pairs of funds in two successive quarters within the
same year and report averages within a year. Our procedure does not imply com-
plete instability in peer composition: about one half of peers in one quarter are
likely to remain peers in the next quarter (the column labeled “Common” in Panel
C). However, quite remarkably, few funds have exactly the same set of peers even
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between two successive quarters. The maximum number of funds that retain the
same set of peers in any one quarter is under 0.2%, equivalently, more than 99.8%
of funds churn peers from one quarter to another. Thus, the transitivity restriction
has considerable bite. We then consider the extent to which old peers drop out. A
fund peer has between a quarter and a third chance of dropping out in the successive
quarter and about a third of a fund’s peers are newly added that quarter.
3.5.3 Do Customized Peers Explain Returns?
The previous section suggests that that the fund-specific customized peers vary
significantly from Lipper peers. Whether these peers explain future returns better
is an interesting empirical question, to which we turn next. Tables 3.3 and 3.4
present the results.
Table 3.3 reports the results of a cross-sectional regression. For each fund j in
month t, we compute the average return of the fund’s customized (non-transitive)
peer group, identified in the most recent previous quarter. We denote the peer group
returns as rNTCP,jt and rLC,jt for Lipper class peers. We regress the fund’s return rj,t
on rNTCP,jt and rLC,jt individually and together to assess their explanatory power.
We note that the peers are formed based on previous quarter disclosed holdings,
so there is no look-ahead bias. We find that the non-transitive peers dominate.
The average regression R2 is close to 43% for the customized peers against 32% for
Lipper peer groups. When both are included together, the R2 budges very little
from that for the non-transitive groups alone.
Our results have two explanations. One, Lipper classification schemes rely
predominantly on size and B/M alone and sequentially sort B/M after adjusting for
size. On the other hand, we use size, B/M, and prior 12 month returns to classify
peers. A second difference is that we use intransitive peer groups, while Lipper
classifications require transitivity. In unreported results, we explore the source of
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these differences in detail. When we impose transitivity, we get results similar to
those achieved by Lipper. Thus, the additional power in our results comes from
relaxing transitivity.
Panels B and C in Table 3.3 show additional regressions in which we include
returns of funds classified by stated objectives in their prospectuses. Given the
discussion in Section 2 on the latitude for fund managers to deviate from their
stated investment strategies, it is not surprising that these returns add little to our
baseline results. In unreported results, we also considered customized peers in which
industry classifications of stocks are used as style dimensions. These peers produce
about half the explanatory power of Lipper peers and add little to the explanatory
power from our peer groups.
Following Chan, Dimmock, and Lakonishok (2009), Table 3.4 presents a dif-
ferent metric for explanatory power. We estimate the tracking error of fund returns
relative to benchmarks. For each fund, we compute the difference between the
fund’s return and its benchmark derived in the nearest prior quarter. The standard
deviation of the difference is the fund’s tracking error volatility. We require that
funds have at least twelve excess returns to compute the tracking error volatility. In
Table 3.4, we present the mean tracking error classified by Lipper class. In all Lip-
per classes, the tracking error is lower when using customized peers. The standard
deviation of tracking error volatility is also lower, indicating that our results are not
driven by small outliers in the data. Figure 1 presents visual evidence consistent
with this view. The tracking error distribution for customized peers (in the lower
panel) is flatter than that for the Lipper peers with more mass towards zero (both
figures are similarly scaled).
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3.5.4 Predicting Alphas
3.5.4.1 Do Alphas Agree?
We consider whether alphas relative to customized peers agree with alphas rela-
tive to other methods. Alphas from Lipper peers impose transitivity and are less
dynamic, unless funds have full transitions between classes. In contrast, our peer
groups are intransitive and capture less extreme drifts. Other alphas are relative
to traditional benchmarks, e.g., from Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997). As
Chan, Dimmock, and Lakonishok (2009) emphasize, different methods of analyzing
fund performance can produce very different results. We examine if this is the case
with the customized peer alphas.4
Table 3.5 divides funds into quartiles based on customized peer alphas (CPA)
and Lipper peer alphas through independent sorts. We find that the (j, j) diagonal
elements in the matrix account for between a quarter and a third of the observations
in each quartile. The off-diagonal elements are significant. Table 3.6 presents a cross-
tabulation between quartiles of alphas based on CS, Carhart, and customized peers.
There is greater agreement between our alphas and the others but less agreement
between CS and Carhart alphas. The CPA, CS, and Carhart classifications agree
on about 60% of the observations in the two tails. show that these alphas tend to
disagree more with the Lipper alphas. The diagonal elements represent only about
a quarter to a third of the observations. The Pearson and Spearman correlations
in Table 3.7 paint a similar picture. The CS alpha has lower correlation with the
Carhart alpha. However, it is more correlated with our measure, which in turn is
more correlated with the Carhart measure.
4We analyze but do not report results for the Fama-French regression alphas. The results are
similar to the Carhart alpha results.
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3.5.4.2 Predicting Alphas: Univariate Evidence
We next consider whether customized peer alphas (CPA) help predict future CS or
Carhart alphas. If the latter represent risk-adjusted returns of funds, our analysis
tests whether current customized peer alphas predict future risk adjusted returns.
We sort funds in quarter t into quintiles based on their current-quarter returns over
their customized peers. Using the time t characteristics, we compute the next-
quarter alphas for each quintile of customized peer alpha portfolios. While the fund
literature does not agree on whether momentum is a relevant attribute for assessing
fund style (e.g., Chan, Dimmock, and Lakonishok, 2009), we follow the DGTW CS
approach as our main specification.
Table 3.8 presents the results of a basic sort in which we predict the future
CS alphas based on the deciles of their current CS and customized peer alphas. We
predict the future CS alpha as it has the interpretation of a risk-adjusted return.
We test whether performance relative to our customized peers predicts future risk-
adjusted returns. We report results based on sorting according to past CS alphas
to control for inherent persistency in alphas.
We find that performance persists. For instance, the 10-1 decile spread based
on current quarter CS alpha is an annualized 263 basis points while the spread based
on customized peer alphas is 317 basis points. The spread declines to 251 and 311
basis points at a six-month horizon and 118 and 206 basis points at a one year
horizon. The results suggest that money manager skill is less persistent at longer
horizons. At a shorter horizon, the alpha spread pattern is more monotonic when
using our customized peer alphas compared to sorting based on CS alphas. At a one
year horizon, the 10-1 spread based on ex-ante CS alphas is no longer significant,
but the 10-1 spread based on customized peers persists.
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3.5.4.3 Predicting Alphas: Multivariate Evidence
Given the evidence that both CS and Table 3.9 turns to bivariate sorts in which
we first sort by both the current CS alphas and customized peer alphas. Panels
A and B report two different sorts. In Panel A, we sort by CS alphas first and
then by customized peers. In Panel B, we sort first by customized peers and then
by CS alphas. In Panel A, we find that in all quintiles of past CS alphas, past
customized peer alphas predict variation in alphas with a spread of between 107
and 209 basis points per year. The spread is especially pronounced in the high and
low performing quintiles, a pattern that persists even out to 12 months and remains
significant. In Panel B, we find the same pattern: spreads by our customized peers
remain economically and statistically significant especially in the top and bottom
quintiles of performers out to 12 months. The spreads within customized peer alpha
quintiles are less monotonic and have insignificant p-values throughout the table.
As the evidence in Table 3.9 is based on bivariate sorts, we supplement the
analysis with regression results to accommodate additional predictors of future per-
formance. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present the regression results for CS alphas and
Carhart alphas, respectively, at different horizons. The regression predicts future
alphas at three, six and twelve month horizons based on past-year customized peer
and CS alphas. The additional controls are expense ratios, fund turnover ratios,
fund assets under management, and fund age. We also include past flows to accom-
modate the possibility that flows predict future alphas and past standard deviations
to control for fund return volatility. Finally, we include the size of the mutual fund
family that a fund belongs to in order to control for cross-flows and benefits from
other fund family firms. All regressions include year fixed effects.
The results show that our customized peer alphas predict future performance
at all intervals. The coefficient for CPAt−11,t is significant at all three horizons.
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The past CS-alphas are significant in univariate regressions but essentially drop in
economic magnitude and significance when we control for customized peer alphas.
Among the additional controls in the regressions, the funds with high expense ratio,
oder funds, and funds with more volatile past returns have lower alphas. However,
these have no effect on the significance and limited effects on the magnitudes of the
coefficients for CPAt−11,t. In Table 3.11, we repeat the regressions for the Carhart
alphas and find essentially the same patterns.
3.5.5 Competition
The fund industry is now economically large. An important question concerns the
nature of competition between funds. We consider whether competition predicts
alphas and whether it predicts alpha persistence. We briefly motivate the tests
before turning to the results.
Given the accumulating evidence that mutual funds underperform on average,
the fund industry has seen a proliferation in both the size and assets under manage-
ment of passive investing products such as index funds and exchange-traded funds.
It is relatively straightforward to examine the nature of competition between index
fund products. To a first degree, these funds have well-defined indexes that they
must track so competition is likely to take the form of fees, especially when funds
track well known indexes. For instance, funds tracking the S&P 500 index are likely
to witness greater expense competition (Hortascu and Syverson, 2004).
In the active fund management industry, measurement of competition and its
effects is more delicate. Managers have relatively flexible investment mandates and
can pursue divergent styles, making performance measurement difficult relative to
(say) an industrial corporation. Of course, the ability of investors to pull out funds
serves as a disciplining channel, but evidence such as Sensoy (2009) suggests that
this may be less than effective because investors (85% of whom are households) use
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inappropriate benchmarks to judge fund performance. Whether there is competition
in the active fund management industry based on style and how this competition
manifests itself are thus interesting questions.
Our customized peer approach suggests one way of examining competition in
the fund industry. We characterize peers as all funds in a style space that lie within
a given spatial radius. A greater number of peers indicates more competition in a
given dimension of the style space. Thus, under the joint hypothesis that (a) funds
compete on investing style; and (b) competition in the style space is captured by
our peer measures, we can test hypotheses concerning competition in the actively
managed fund industry.
We basically conduct two sets of tests. One is about the level of alphas and fees
in the industry. Funds in less competitive markets earn higher alphas because they
have unique or differentiated ideas coupled with skills that are hard to replicate.
Alternatively, they may identify niche investment areas that investors desire, in
which case such funds can charge higher fees but managers may or may not earn
higher alphas on average depending on whether all managers in the niche are skilled
or not.
The static tests can also be viewed as being akin to a negative relation between
profitability and competition proxied by the number of firms within an industry.
However, when products are not easily characterized (e.g., by simple 2-digit SICs),
granular descriptions of products as in Hoberg and Phillips (2012) aid in identifying
the number and nature of competitors and can help analyze its effects. In essence,
this is our approach. Table 3.12 presents the results. We sort funds into buckets
based on the number of customized peers: less than 25, 25-50, 50-100, 100-200, and
more than 200 peers.
We find evidence consistent with competitive effects based on spatial loca-
tion. Assets under management increase as the number of peers increases. One
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interpretation of this result is that greater investor demand for a particular style
elicits a response from the supply side, with more funds willing to locate in that
part of the style space. Older funds with established track records and styles attract
greater competition with a greater number of peers. More specialized funds that
have fewer peers are not only smaller and younger, but also have greater 12b-1 fees
and expenses and charge greater management fees. There is rather minor spread
in CS alphas, suggesting that while niche areas attract funds and give them ability
to charge fees, these areas do not especially generate positive risk-adjusted returns.
Thus, it is not the case that all managers in niche areas are specially skilled.
We also present evidence on a second question, the persistence of alpha. We
ask whether skill is less persistent in a more populated area of the style space. The
essential idea is that managers in all parts of the fund industry can have special
ideas. However, managers in a well populated area with many peers will likely not
be able to hold on to the performance persistently. Even if such a manager earns
positive alpha in any one period, it is easier for competitors to enter and arbitrage
away ideas when the portion of the style space is well populated. This is harder – or
slower to accomplish – in concentrated markets with fewer funds. Thus, persistence
of alpha should be higher in concentrated markets.
Tables 3.13-3.15 report evidence on these issues. In each Table, we regress
future alphas on past alphas. Table 3.13 provides portfolio predictive evidence on
future alphas of portfolios sorted by current period alpha decile and competition.
We sort funds into portfolios based on their current period customized peer alpha.
Within each decile of current period alpha, we sort funds by the amount of competi-
tion based on the terciles of the number of peers in the quarter in which we compute
alphas. We then predict future CS alphas, which are the funds’ risk-adjusted re-
turns, over horizons ranging from one quarter to one year.
At each horizon, we find significant degradation in performance persistence
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based on levels of competition. For instance, in the one quarter results in Table
3.13, we find that the 10-1 spread is close to an annualized 499 basis points in
low competition terciles but this drops to 99 basis points in the high competition
tercile. The corresponding spread at a 12-month horizon is 331 and 96 basis points,
respectively.
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 present these results in a regression format. Here, we
regress future CS (Table 3.14) and Carhart (Table 3.15) alphas based on past cus-
tomized peer alpha deciles and a host of controls and report separate regressions
for low, medium, and high competition deciles. This is, in effect, similar to the
portfolio results of Table 3.13 except that it incorporates additional fund controls
such as fund size, expenses, age, or family characteristics.
In interpreting the regressions in Tables 3.14-3.15, we note that the regression
coefficients are basis points per month. In Table 3.14, for instance, the 1-quarter
ahead 10-1 spread in future alpha is 28.3 basis points per month, or about 340 ba-
sis points per year for the low competition tercile in univariate regressions, which
becomes about 16.4 basis points per month or 197 basis points per year in multi-
variate regressions. This practically vanishes in the high competition tercile, where
the spreads shrink by about 80% to 3.5 basis points per month, or 42 basis points
per year. The patterns persist over a one year horizon, though the spread is atten-
uated suggesting that competitive effects kick in over a one-year horizon. In short,
we find that the number of a fund’s peers captures competitive effects in fees, less
significantly in fund alphas but competition has a significant effect in the ability of
fund managers to sustain current period alphas.
3.6 Conclusion
A key issue in the fund management industry is the benchmarking of fund man-
agers by performance relative to peer funds. In this paper, we propose new tech-
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niques for identifying benchmark peers for mutual funds. We identify the location
of funds in the space of stock style characteristics. All funds within a pre-specified
normed distance are a fund’s peers and peers are customized to each fund. While
we develop implementation for the techniques we propose, they are easily scaled by
incorporating multiple new dimensions or alternative specifications of loss functions
to accommodate varying preferences for granularity.
We show that fund-specific customized peers differ significantly from peers
identified under current industry practice. These differences are both in the cross-
section and over time. In other words, at any point of time, our peers only partially
overlap with peers used by the industry. Over time, a fund’s best peers change,
dynamics that are not captured in static fund classifications. The underlying drifts
in fund style driving peer churn support the view that static classifications may be
subject to gaming by funds. More dynamic classifications that accommodate drifts
in fund styles are necessary for proper benchmarking. Our study is one step in this
direction.
We affirm the value of style dimensions stressed in academic research such as
Fama and French (1993) and Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). We
find that additional industry and additional growth proxies such as P/E and sales
growth that are sometimes used in practice add little explanatory power. However,
(perhaps surprisingly) momentum, a trait not favored by industry, helps significantly
in improving style classifications. However, we emphasize that the biggest boost
in performance comes from considering intransitive peers, or fund-specific peers
customized to each fund that do not require the property of transitivity.
We show that our fund-specific customized peers have out of sample predic-
tive value. The produce close to 25% improvements in out of sample performance
regressions and lower tracking error. Performance relative to customized peers also
has predictive value for fund alphas. Our peer-excess alphas predict future risk-
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adjusted alphas of funds in univariate sorts, in bivariate sorts that control for past
performance and in regressions that also control for other attributes.
We also use the customized peers to assess the nature and persistence of com-
petition in the actively managed fund industry. Under the joint hypothesis that
funds compete on investing style and competition in the style space is captured by
our peer measures, we test hypotheses concerning competition, performance, and
performance persistence. We find that when funds have fewer fund-specific peers,
funds are smaller, younger, have greater 12b-1 fees, expenses, and greater manage-
ment fees. The source of these rents is likely the ability of funds to identify niche
investing areas rather than their ability to generate alphas, as the average manager
in the niche low population areas is not especially skilled. However, the managers
with skill in niche areas are able to sustain them more than managers in more
well populated areas in the style space. While our characterization of competition
employs a simple count of the number of peers, further characterization of competi-
tion with other industry concentration measures merged with our customized peers
represents an interesting avenue for further research.
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Figure 3.1: Tracking Error Volatility Distribution
This figure shows distribution of tracking error volatilities estimated from monthly Lipper class adjusted return
and customized peer adjusted return in sub-figure (a) and (b), respectively. Tracking error volatility of a fund is
defined as the standard deviation of fund return minus its benchmark return. For each fund, its monthly Lipper
class benchmark return is obtained by averaging monthly return of its peers (excluding own fund return). Similarly,
customized peer benchmark return is obtained by averaging monthly return of its peers (excluding own fund return).
Then, for each fund, its Lipper class adjusted and customized peer adjusted return is obtained. Finally, standard
deviation of adjusted returns yields tracking error volatilities. We calculate tracking error volatilities of a fund
using all months during which it belongs to a particular Lipper class, and require at least 12 observations monthly
observations. If a fund changes its Lipper class and has more than one Lipper classification over its lifetime, then
we calculate multiple tracking error volatilities for the same fund over different periods during which it belongs to
different Lipper classifications. The sample duration used is 2000:01 to 2010:09. The figure also shows an overlaid
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports mean statistics by year in Panel A and by Lipper Classification in Panel B. To
obtain observations in Panel A, first, from the full sample of fund-month observations from July
1980 to September 2010, observations at the fund-year level are obtained by averaging monthly
total net assets (TNA), expense ratio, and net and gross raw return for each fund and for each year.
Then for each year average is taken over the funds in the sample in that year. Finally, average
is taken over all years. Nfunds in Panel A represents average number of funds in the sample per
year. Total funds represents total unique funds in the sample. For Panel B, first, observations at
the Lipper Class-year level are obtained by averaging monthly TNA, expense ratio, and net and
gross raw return raw return for each Lipper Class and for each year. Then average is taken over
each Lipper Class. Nfunds in Panel B represents average number of funds in the sample for each
Lipper Class per year.
Panel A: Mean Statistics By Year
Year Nfunds TNA Expense Ratio Raw Ret (Gross) Raw Ret (Net)
($M) (%) (%) (%)
1985 498 210 0.905 2.364 2.330
1990 841 265 1.148 -0.412 -0.433
1995 1465 559 1.303 2.344 2.265
2000 2222 1179 1.382 0.112 0.076
2005 2287 1190 1.379 0.742 0.620
2010 1783 1328 1.281 0.890 0.790
1980-2010 1392 667 1.200 1.139 1.038
Total funds 3076
Panel B: Mean Statistics By Lipper Classification
Lipper Class Nfunds TNA Exp Ratio Raw Ret (Gross) Raw Ret (Net)
($M) (%) (%) (%)
Small-Cap Growth 175 421 1.514 1.963 1.854
Small-Cap Core 183 545 1.359 1.553 1.458
Small-Cap Value 110 517 1.376 1.327 1.200
Mid-Cap Growth 163 777 1.399 1.856 1.718
Mid-Cap Core 106 822 1.321 1.788 1.677
Mid-Cap Value 86 1010 1.363 1.274 1.160
Large-Cap Growth 226 1651 1.246 0.968 0.854
Large-Cap Core 273 1664 1.182 0.650 0.547
Large-Cap Value 139 2821 1.128 0.506 0.414
Multi-Cap Growth 170 2170 1.419 1.553 1.436
Multi-Cap Core 210 1220 1.353 0.964 0.887
Multi-Cap Value 181 1169 1.239 0.680 0.578
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Comparison of Fund Classifications
The table reports R-squared and adjusted R-squared from cross-sectional monthly regressions of a
fund’s monthly return on its monthly benchmark return. Monthly benchmark return is the average
return of a fund’s peers (excluding own fund return) in case of Lipper Class Peers (LC), Lipper
Objective Peers (LObj) and Non-Transitive Customized Peers (NTCP). Lipper Classification for
each month into 13 peer categories (see Table 3.1) is obtained from CRSP. Funds in 13 Lipper Clas-
sifications have 7 Lipper defined fund objectives: Capital Appreciation, Equity Income, Growth,
Growth and Income, Mid-Cap, Micro-Cap, and Samll-Cap funds. The classifications, fund objec-
tives and all peer groups are obtained at the start of each quarter and carried over the next three
months. For any of these three months, only the surviving funds are considered to be peers. For
instance, if a fund has 100 peers based on its disclosed portfolio on March 2004 and if 2 funds do
not have data for April 2004, then this fund has 98 peers in April 2004. The table also reports
average number of monthly observations (NObs/Mon) used in cross-sectional regressions. The
monthly period used in regressions is from 2000:01 to 2010:09.
Panel A: Ret on Ret Regression, NTC Peers Vs Lipper Class Peers
Ind Vars NObs/Mon AvgR2/Mon AvgAdjR2/Mon
NTCP 1517 42.75% 42.71%
LC 1517 32.14% 32.09%
NTCP, LC 1517 43.96% 43.89%
Panel B: Ret on Ret Regression, NTC Peers Vs Lipper Objective Peers
NTCP 1512 42.71% 42.68%
LObj 1512 18.01% 17.95%
NTCP, LObj 1512 43.07% 42.99%
Panel C: Ret on Ret Regression, NTC Peers Vs Lipper Peers
NTCP, LC, Lobj 1512 44.05% 43.94%
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Table 3.4: Tracking Error Volatility: Lipper Classifications Vs Customized
Peers
This table reports mean and standard deviations of tracking error volatilities of funds. The statis-
tics are reported by Lipper Classification and for the full sample (in the last row). Tracking error
volatility of a fund is defined as the standard deviation of fund return minus its benchmark return.
For each fund, its monthly Lipper class benchmark return is obtained by averaging monthly return
of its Lipper Peers (excluding own fund return). Similarly, customized peer benchmark return is
obtained by averaging monthly return of its Customized Peers (excluding own fund return). Then,
for each fund, its Lipper class adjusted (Lipper) and customized peer adjusted (CPA) return is
obtained by subtracting the benchmark return from the fund’s return. Finally, standard deviation
of adjusted returns yields tracking error volatilities. We calculate tracking error volatilities of a
fund using all months during which it belongs to a particular Lipper class, and require at least 12
monthly observations. If a fund changes its Lipper class and has more than one Lipper classifica-
tion over its lifetime, then we calculate multiple tracking error volatilities for the same fund over
different periods during which it belongs to different Lipper classifications. The sample duration
used is 2000:01 to 2010:09.
Mean Std Dev
Lipper Class CPA Lipper CPA Lipper
Small-Cap Growth 0.0209 0.0229 0.0115 0.0116
Small-Cap Core 0.0180 0.0198 0.0124 0.0137
Small-Cap Value 0.0197 0.0213 0.0089 0.0099
Mid-Cap Growth 0.0203 0.0231 0.0123 0.0160
Mid-Cap Core 0.0182 0.0212 0.0102 0.0134
Mid-Cap Value 0.0214 0.0244 0.0127 0.0142
Large-Cap Growth 0.0152 0.0171 0.0090 0.0119
Large-Cap Core 0.0115 0.0131 0.0064 0.0087
Large-Cap Value 0.0127 0.0138 0.0063 0.0072
Multi-Cap Growth 0.0220 0.0276 0.0135 0.0189
Multi-Cap Core 0.0156 0.0184 0.0099 0.0127
Multi-Cap Value 0.0163 0.0191 0.0081 0.0118
Equity Income 0.0148 0.0151 0.0057 0.0080
Full Sample 0.0170 0.0194 0.0105 0.0133
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Table 3.5: Performance Ranking Comparison: Customized Peer Adjusted
Vs Lipper Adjusted
This table reports percentage of funds that are ranked similarly (differently) in the diagonal (off-
diagonal) cells according to the Customized Peer-Adjusted (CPA) and Lipper Peer-adjusted per-
formance. At the end of each year, from 2000 to 2009, for each fund, average monthly Customized
Peer-Adjusted and Lipper Peer-adjusted returns are obtained. To obtain these returns, first, for
each fund its monthly Lipper class benchmark return is obtained by averaging monthly return of
Lipper Peers (excluding own fund return). Similarly, customized peer benchmark return is ob-
tained by averaging monthly return of Customized Peers (excluding own fund return). Then, for
each fund, its monthly Lipper Peer-adjusted and Customized Peer-Adjusted return is obtained by
subtracting the benchmark return from the fund’s return. Finally, at the end of the year, average
abnormal performance is calculated over 12 months. Funds are then ranked independently into
quartiles according to the performance measures for each year. We then find out the proportion
of funds that are ranked by Lipper Peer-adjusted return within each CPA ranked quartile. This
results in a row with four column entries, containing proportion of funds that are ranked by Lipper
Peer-adjusted return. For instance, if there are 300 funds in the first quartile according to the
CPA measure, and within these 300 funds if there are 100 funds which are in the second quartile
according to the Lipper Peer-adjusted, then the cell entry (1,2) is 33.33%. Thus, for each year and
each Rank CPA, the sum of column entries is 100. Finally, we take average across years for each
Rank CPA. A diagonal cell in the table below represents the average percentage of funds that are
ranked similarly by two methods.
Rank Lipper
Rank CPA 1 2 3 4
1 31.25 23.64 23.84 21.27
2 27.88 27.23 22.48 22.40
3 22.06 27.25 25.76 24.93
4 18.70 21.95 28.00 31.35
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Table 3.6: Performance Ranking Comparison: Customized Peer Adjusted,
Lipper Adjusted Vs Other Measures
This table reports percentage of funds that are ranked similarly (differently) in the diagonal (off-diagonal) cells
according to the customized peer adjusted (CPA) and other performance measures in Panel A, and also according
to the Lipper peer adjusted and other performance measures in Panel B. At the end of each year, from 2000 to
2009, for each fund, average monthly customized peer adjusted performance and Lipper peer adjusted returns is
obtained. To obtain these returns, first, for each fund its monthly customized (Lipper) peer benchmark return is
obtained by averaging monthly return of customized (Lipper) peers, excluding own fund return. Then, for each
fund, its customized (Lipper) peer adjusted return is obtained by subtracting the benchmark return from the fund’s
return. Next, monthly Characteristic-Selectivity performance (CS) is obtained as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1997). Risk-adjusted monthly 3-factor (FF) and 4-factor (Carhart) alpha are obtained by subtracting
the estimated fund return from the fund’s return. The estimated return is obtained by multiplying estimated factor
loadings (obtained from past 36 month regression, with a minimum of 30 observations) with factor returns. Finally,
at the end of the year, average abnormal performance is calculated over 12 months according to all performance
measures. Funds are then ranked independently into quartiles according to the performance measures. The quartile
rankings are then arranged as in Table 3.5. A diagonal cell in the table below represents the average percentage of
funds that are ranked similarly by two methods.
Panel A: CPA Vs other perf measures Panel B: Lipper-adj perf Vs other perf measures
Rank CS Rank CS
Rank CPA 1 2 3 4 Rank Lipper 1 2 3 4
1 60.44 23.79 10.20 5.57 1 37.00 29.51 20.28 13.21
2 25.72 39.14 26.29 8.85 2 25.84 27.97 25.60 20.59
3 9.42 27.21 38.02 25.36 3 19.36 23.76 27.39 29.49
4 4.36 9.91 25.55 60.18 4 17.69 18.84 26.81 36.66
Rank Carhart Rank Carhart
Rank CPA 1 2 3 4 Rank Lipper 1 2 3 4
1 58.72 25.27 10.77 5.25 1 31.87 28.11 22.22 17.80
2 24.55 38.53 24.92 12.00 2 22.80 26.51 28.23 22.45
3 10.49 25.12 39.69 24.69 3 24.66 24.03 25.45 25.86
4 5.99 10.94 24.72 58.35 4 20.67 21.40 24.17 33.76
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Table 3.7: Correlation Among Performance Measures
This table reports Pearson and Spearman Rank correlations among various performance mea-
sures in Panels A and B, respectively. First, performance measures are obtained at the fund
level. Characteristic-Selectivity (CS) is obtained as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Werm-
ers (1997). It is dollar-weighted characteristic-adjusted (or DGTW-adjusted) return of a fund’s
holdings. Customized Peer-Adjusted return, CPA, is obtained by subtracting average return of
Customized Peers, RPeer, (excluding own fund return) from a fund’s return, RFund. Then average
monthly CS and CPA are obtained over a fund’s lifetime. 4-factor alpha (Carhart) is obtained
by regressing a fund’s excess return on 4 factors over its lifetime (Carhart (1997)). A fund must
have at least 30 observations for its Carhart performance to be calculated. While CS is gross of
expenses and transactions costs, CPA and Carhart measures are both net and gross of expenses.
For instance, CPA (Net) = RFund (Net) - RPeer (Net), and CPA (Gross) = RFund (Gross) -
RPeer (Gross). All correlations are statistically significant at 1% level.
Panel A: Pearson Correlation
Gross Net
Perf Measure CS Carhart CPA CS Carhart CPA
CS 1.00 1.00
Carhart 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00
CPA 0.51 0.60 1.00 0.52 0.61 1.00
Panel B: Spearman Rank Correlation
Gross Net
Perf Measure CS Carhart CPA CS Carhart CPA
CS 1.00 1.00
Carhart 0.45 1.00 0.45 1.00
CPA 0.51 0.62 1.00 0.53 0.62 1.00
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Table 3.8: Future Performance Prediction from Past Characteristic-
Selectivity and Customized Peer-Adjusted Performance
This table reports results on future Characteristic-Selectivity prediction from past Characteristic-
Selectivity (CS) and past Customized Peer-Adjusted (CPA) performance. At the start of each
calendar quarter, we sort funds into decile portfolios based on the past 12 months average CS and
CPA performance. Next, we calculate equal-weighted CS performance over the next three months
after portfolio formation, and then re-balance the portfolios. Finally, we obtain average monthly
CS post-ranking portfolio performance by taking average over the entire time-series. Similarly, we
form portfolios at the start of each half-year (year) and then re-balance portfolios after six (twelve)
months and obtain future CS performance. 10-1 represents zero-investment long-short portfolio
that is long on decile ten and short on decile one. Returns are percentage annual (monthly return
multiplied by 12). P -values are reported in parentheses.
3 Month 6 Month 12 Month
Decile CS CPA CS CPA CS CPA
1 -0.693 -1.013 -0.538 -0.784 0.037 -0.204
(0.383) (0.177) (0.453) (0.253) (0.961) (0.759)
2 -0.075 0.052 -0.021 -0.130 0.503 0.016
(0.884) (0.907) (0.966) (0.761) (0.298) (0.970)
3 0.417 -0.056 0.501 0.227 0.595 0.172
(0.309) (0.883) (0.213) (0.553) (0.141) (0.651)
4 0.059 0.316 0.181 0.390 0.457 0.458
(0.861) (0.379) (0.589) (0.251) (0.174) (0.188)
5 0.328 0.315 0.405 0.200 0.372 0.481
(0.323) (0.339) (0.266) (0.560) (0.261) (0.149)
6 0.623 0.413 0.495 0.202 0.301 0.301
(0.042) (0.202) (0.102) (0.538) (0.327) (0.364)
7 0.502 0.709 0.513 0.799 0.607 0.456
(0.146) (0.027) (0.151) (0.013) (0.074) (0.185)
8 0.713 0.909 0.703 0.935 0.409 0.903
(0.058) (0.013) (0.063) (0.011) (0.293) (0.016)
9 1.228 1.244 1.025 1.097 0.740 0.802
(0.010) (0.004) (0.022) (0.011) (0.094) (0.054)
10 1.939 2.157 1.977 2.331 1.217 1.856
(0.015) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.109) (0.006)
10-1 2.632 3.170 2.515 3.115 1.180 2.060
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